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Abstract
Background: The researcher's interest in the emerging areas of clinical governance and
risk management within the National Health Service (NHS) was the genesis of this study.
A growing concern about the apparent exponential rise in the number of untoward
clinical incidents, the lack of studies of such incidents involving nurses and the
developing interest in the apportionment of blame, were the basis of this research study
examining the management of untoward clinical incidents involving qualified nurses.
Method: This qualitative study combined a number of different techniques to generate
the data. An analysis of local and national policy documents with regard to the
management of clinical incidents was undertaken. This was used to understand the
framework within which the subject organisation was expected to manage such incidents.
Fifty reported untoward clinical incidents were examined in detail using the available
documentation. The qualified nurses involved were then approached to take part in
individual semi-structured interviews, to elicit their views on the structure, process and
outcome of the management of the incidents. In order to establish how Fatal Accident
Inquiries (FAIs) contributed to the overall understanding of incidents resulting in death,
forty-one inquiries from around Scotland were reviewed.
Conclusions: A number of conclusions were drawn from the data using these principle
sources. Throughout the study the policy framework changed, reflecting the dynamic
nature of this matter within the NHS.
> There was a perception among qualified nurses that senior nurses involved in the
investigation of an incident sought to blame and punish a nurse for their role within
an incident as opposed to reviewing systems and processes potentially contributing
to an error. Nurses reported inconsistencies between different managers involved in
the management of incidents. Nurses also drew comparisons between different
approaches adopted for doctors, especially where both were involved in the same
incident.
> Nurses attributed different approaches to different 'types' of nurse managers. It was
evident that such punitive approaches prevented nurses from reporting incidents for
fear of the reprisals. Some nurses attempted to deflect blame away from themselves
and to attribute it to organisational issues whilst others accepted blame as a result of
their involvement in an incident
r A consistent finding was nurses reported a blame-free culture was neither realistic
nor desirable but described a 'just and fair" culture as being more appropriate. Such a
culture recognising that errors are part of everyday life and should be seen within
this context whilst ensuring that patients remain protected by calling nurses to
account for any actions which may be regarded as negligent.
r- It was regularly reported that the lessons learned from such incidents were not
disseminated either within the managerial units or across the organisation as a whole.
Maintaining confidentiality in relation to the nurses involved was cited as the main
reason for this lack of sharing.
> There is little evidence that the wider literature available in respect of error
management has been incorporated into policy development. The pre-determined
standards in relation to this area of corporate governance, although at an embryonic
stage have attracted significant criticism.
> The determinations produced from Fatal Accident Inquiries (FAIs) highlight
shortcomings and within systems and processes likely to have contributed to a death.
Sheriffs' have used the determination to redress the balance of some of the very
negative and unjustified reports in the media. There is little evidence that these
determinations are used as learning opportunities.
The research presents a new model for the management of clinical incidents involving
qualified nurses. This model is presented drawing on the findings of this research study
as well as the outcome of other relevant sources. The RADAR model comprises of 5
stages: Recording, Analysis. Defining, Attribution: Reaction.
Table of Contents
Part 1 - Clinical Incidents in Context
Page
Chapter I Setting the Scene 1
The Perception 1
Perception Vs Reality 2
The Research 4
Nursing and Clinical Incidents 5
Foundations ofNursing 5
Gender and Nursing 6
Social Class and Nursing 7
Nursing and Management 7
Risk 8
Risk in Nursing and Other Sectors 9
Who's to Blame? 10
Chapter II A Review of the Literature 12
1. Professional Nursing Issues 12
a. The Nature ofNursing 12
b. Nursing Misconduct 16
c. Nursing Leadership 18
d. Summary 20
2. Interface with Medical Professions 21
a. The Different Approaches ofNurses and Doctors 21
b. Incidents Involving Doctors 24
c. The Extent of Medical Errors 25
d. Professional Regulation 26
e. Role and Function of Regulatory Body 27
f. Summary 28
3. The Theory of Error 29
a. Definitions 29
b. Nature of Errors 33
c. Medication Errors 38
d. Incidence 38
e. Causes and Impact 39
f. Nurses' Perceptions of Medication Errors 40
g. Potential Solutions for Medical Errors 41
h. Barriers to Reporting 43
i. Recognising and Reporting Errors 45
j. Organisational Culture in Reporting errors 46
k. Reporting Systems 48
1. Approaches to Managing Errors 49
m. Who Makes Errors? 50
4. Organisational Issues From Other Industries 52
i
a. Clinical Governance 55
b. Risk Management 58
c. Summary 58
5. Concepts of Blame 59
a. Nature of Blame 59
b. Apportioning Blame 61
c. Blame and the Patients' Perception 66
d. Summary 68
6. Legal Context 70
a. Nursing and The Law 70
b. Fatal Accident Inquiries 72
c. Summary 75
Part 2 - The Study
Chapter III Methodological Issues 76




Retrospective Documentation Review 81
Interviews with Investigator and Investigated 81
Review of Fatal Accident Inquiries 82
Data Analysis 83
Validity and Reliability 84




Problems with Access 89
End Note 91
Chapter IV Policy 94
Changes in Policy Context 94
Political Context 94





The Subject Organisation's Policy Documentation 104
Summary 106
Chapter V Documentation Relating to Incidents 108
Background 108
Factors Influencing the Change in Policy 109
ii
Documentation Used Within the Study 110
Information Requested 112
Completion of Pro forma 113
Other Documentation 114
Documentation relating to Investigation Process 115
Collation of Information 115
Summary 116
Chapter VI Clinical Incidents 119



































Perceptions of Policy and Procedure 172
iii
Summary of Perceptions of Policy and Procedure 175
Perceptions of Culture 177
Organisational Culture and Blame 177
Summary of Perceptions of Organisational Culture and 180
Blame
Issues ofNursing and Blame 180
Summary ofNursing and Blame 183
Blame Free Culture 185
Is a Blame Free Culture Desirable? 187
Process ofManaging an Incident 188
The Formal Recording of Incidents 188
The Process of Investigation 190
Outcomes 194




Chapter VIII Fatal Accident Inquiries 202
Background 202
Source Nature and Format of Data 203
Gordon Scott Niven 204
Group of IV Drug Users 206
Maureen Smyth 207
Hamish Adamson 208
William Sneddon, Lemond Mulroy, David Brodie 210





Part 3 - The Findings and Concluding Discussions
Chapter IX Findings 224
1. How are Clinical Incidents Involving Nurses Managed 224
Local Policy 227
Managerial Approach 228
Nurses' View ofApproach 229
Working in Partnership 231
Documentary Evidence Available 231
2. Are Clinical Incidents Managed Consistently? 232
How is the outcome of such investigations used to inform 234
clinical nursing practice?
What role does blame play in the process? 235
How can Fatal Accident Inquiries assist in the process? 237
iv
Chapter X Concluding Discussion and Proposed Model 240
Proposed Model 240
Nursing Approach to Managing Incidents 248




List of Legal Cases 283
Fatal Accident Inquiry Determinations 284
List of Tables 285
Appendices
Number
1 Subject Letter and Information Brochure









The popular press would have one believe that the number of untoward incidents within
the NHS has risen exponentially over the past decade and is likely to continue to rise in
the next. The nature of some incidents has certainly resulted in dramatic headlines. Such
headlines have done nothing to reassure a worried public that the words of Florence
Nightingale, when she declared that hospitals should do the patient no harm, ring true in
the 21st century. A president of the Royal College of Physicians commenting on the
press' handling ofmedical errors noted;
'There is rarely an informed comment on likelihood or cause, rather a tacit
assumption that they should never happen - and an implicit conclusion
that they are getting more common.' (Alberti 2001)
In the recent past, the perceived rise in the number of significant clinical incidents has
resulted in what one author describes as: -
'The resurgence of a reactionary blame culture that many more idealistic
souls had hoped was on the wane.' (Merrett 2001).
The data from NHS information systems are incomplete and obtaining accurate
information with regard to the number of clinical incidents is problematic. It is therefore
difficult to assess the degree to which this perception matches reality. What is clear is that
there are some serious 'failures' within health care systems. This is aptly illustrated in the
Department of Health for England, Wales and Northern Ireland document 'Organisation
With A Memory' which notes that every year
• 400 people die or are seriously injured in adverse events involving medical
devices.
• Nearly 10,000 people are reported to have experienced serious adverse reactions
to drugs.
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• Around 1,150 people who have been in recent contact with mental health services
commit suicide.
• Nearly 28,000 written complaints are made about aspects of clinical treatment in
hospitals
• The NHS pays out around £400 million a year in settlement of clinical negligence
claims, and has a potential liability of around £2.4 billion for existing and
expected claims.
• Hospital acquired infections - around 15% of which may be avoidable - are
estimated to cost the NHS nearly £1 billion.
(Department ofHealth 2000)
Perception VsReality
Within the context of the Scottish Health Service, the number of medical negligence
claims lodged with the Central Legal Office (CLO), which handles all claims for the
NHS in Scotland, has not seen a dramatic change in the 3 years 1997-2000.
Table 1: Number of Claims in NHS Scotland 1997-2000
Year Number of Claims
1997 - 98 520
1998 -99 524
1999-2000 482
The value of the claims over the same period demonstrates a significant rise.
Table 2: Value of Claims in NHS Scotland 1997-2000
Year Value of Claims (£M)
1997 - 98 45.7
1998 -99 61.4
1999 - 2000 84.1
However, these figures must be interpreted with some caution. The actual amount of
money paid out to claimants over the same period shows a reduction.
Table 3: Total Cost of Claims Paid in NHS Scotland 1997-2000
Year Cost of Claims paid (£M)
1997 - 98 4.1
1998 -99 4.4
1999 - 2000 3.5
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Medical negligence claims as defined by the CLO include claims against all clinical staff
and are not restricted to doctors. These data are a poor proxy for untoward clinical
incidents but they are the only centrally available data in relation to clinical incidents in
Scotland.
In its first national overview of generic clinical governance standards, NHS Quality
Improvement Scotland (NHS QIS) draw a number of conclusions, indicating that NHS
organisations in Scotland and their staff have not made risk management a top priority.
The report notes
• NHSScotland organisations are still reactive rather than proactive, responding to
problems rather than anticipating and potentially avoiding them.
• Even where organisation-wide policies have been developed, they are not always
visible at the locations where care is actually provided and are not always known
and understood by staff and patients. Too often, there are still different policies on
the same issue in place within one organisation.
• Learning and best practice are not easily shared between and across organisations.
• Communications, nationally and locally, are not always effective.
• Many NHSScotland organisations still do not manage potential risks to patients
effectively.
• NHS staff are apprehensive about reporting concerns and risks.
• Staff shortages continue to raise patient care risks.
In summary
'...very few parts of the service could demonstrate that they have
implemented a common approach across the organisation and as expected,
top ratings are an aspiration that has yet to be achieved.'
(NHS Quality Improvement Scotland 2003)
Patient care is a risky business. The complexities of the human interaction between
healthcare professionals and their patients and the interfaces between different clinical
professionals only add to the risk. Nurses who are the only the members of the multi-
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disciplinary team to provide 24 hours bedside care are particularly affected by this
phenomenon.
The Research
The provision of healthcare, the nature of nursing as a profession and the general
'fascination' with blame generated the interest in the development of the hypothesis that
incidents involving qualified nurses are likely to result in the apportionment of blame to
an individual nurse. The aim of this research study is to investigate the processes through
which Trust managers handle incidents involving qualified nurses, and how the outcome
of these processes is used to inform risk management procedures within organisations.
The key objectives of the study are:
• To describe the current processes employed within an organisation to record, report
and investigate untoward clinical incidents.
• To examine the consistency in the application of these processes within an
organisation and to identify the reasons for any inconsistent approaches by managers.
• To examine any differences in processes between two separate organisations within
the National Health Service in Scotland in order to identify any fundamental
difference between these organisations. (NB this particular objective is discussed in
much greater detail in Chapter HI).
• To describe the outcomes of investigations in relation to how the individuals) under
investigation are dealt with and how the results are used to inform changes in practice
and risk management processes.
• To determine whether blame or fault is apportioned to an individual(s) and the
relationship between the apportionment of blame and the eventual sanction against
the individual(s).
• To examine the criteria used for referral to an external agency (e.g. further legal
action) and explore what criteria are used to determine whether a Fatal Accident
Inquiry is merited.
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The aims and objectives of the study were developed from an initial exploration of
several issues including the role played by nurses in clinical incidents, the application of
the theory of risk management and the apportionment ofblame.
Nursing andClinical Incidents
Historically, there is a perception that the nursing profession has sought to punish the
perpetrator of an error. The militaristic, hierarchical structures, which have been a feature
of nursing management until the relatively recent past, may have resulted in nurses being
punished for incidents that may have been outwith their control. Bassett (1998) presents
the potential tensions between the needs of general management, the quality of patient
care and the nursing profession, the implication of these comments is that the culture in
the NHS (and more particularly within nursing) is so closely linked to tradition, hierarchy
and bureaucracy that the introduction of a more business focussed culture has 'created a
confusing and demanding dimension.'
'The conflicting elements within the nurse manager's roles have much to
do with the origins of nursing, gender, social class and protective
professional strategies deployed by nursing and medicine.' (Basset 1998)
Foundations ofNursing
"Nursing has its roots in the traditions of the Church and to a lesser extent
the army; both traditions were strongly authoritarian and hierarchical and
continued to influence nursing after it became a secular occupation." (Baly
1980)
The act of caring is as old as humanity itself. To whichever ideology of the origins and
nature of human beings and their interactions is subscribed, there is a basic understanding
that one human should care for another at times of vulnerability. Nursing as a profession
has clear origins in military and religious settings. Able-Smith (1979) suggests that
through such institutions, nursing has developed its language, rituals, uniform and body
of traditions. The influence of religion on nurses and nursing is clearly evident in the
history of its development. This can be demonstrated by the composition of the various
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groups of nurses who joined Florence Nightingale in the Crimea. The first cohorts of
women were drawn from Anglican orders, St John's House, Catholic convents, working
women experienced in caring for the sick and Irish nuns. Indeed Florence Nightingale
herself makes several references in her own diaries and other writings to undertaking
God's work and records that God has spoken to her through 'voices'. (Baly 1991)
Gender and Nursing
The effect of the gender of nursing has been the subject of much debate amongst authors.
Lumby (1991) identifies that the very name of nurse has its derivations in Greek - to
nurture or nourish. This she argues is essentially a female activity. Lumby goes on to
suggest that the increasing numbers of men entering nursing has contributed to 'its
belated professionalisation.' Dingwall et al (1988) identify four different categories of
what they describe as 'nurses before modern nursing'. These include: -
> Members of the sick person's household.
> Handywomen
> Private nurse
> Medical attendants (apothecaries, dressers, residents and clinical clerks.)
Typically the first three groups were women and the fourth was men.
Ford and Walsh (1994) argue that nurses lost their control of nursing following the
introduction of general management. This new management model was perceived to have
resulted in the further control of nurses (females) by accountants and business managers
(male).
"Nurses have traditionally, been oppressed by virtue of being
predominantly women in a patriarchal society and also by virtue of being
seen as handmaidens to the powerful medical profession." (Ford and
Walsh 1994)
Ask any child to describe a nurse and they will inevitably tell you that she is a woman in
a white dress with a hat. Many female doctors will describe that they have been mistaken
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for a nurse at least once during their career. The requirements of a nurse were described
in 1946 as
'No woman should take up the profession of nursing unless she is
prepared for hard work, constant subordination of her will and for
continued self-denial... She must be trustworthy, conscientious and
faithful in the smallest detail of duty. She must be observant and possess a
real power of noting all details about her patient. She must be promptly
obedient, and respect hospital etiquette.... A nurse's manner to her patient
should be dignified, friendly and gentle, but no terms of endearment
should be used. She should surround herself with mystery for her patient
and never discuss her own private affairs.' (Probationer's notes; St
George's Hospital 1946: in From Cradle to Grave)
Social Class and Nursing
Pre Florence Nightingale, most 'nurses' were from the lower social classes. One of her
main influences was to introduce middle class ladies into the profession in an attempt to
improve the standards. Dingwall et al (1988) reiterate a view presented almost three
decades earlier that working class women carrying out nursing care has been 'largely
ignored by historians of the occupation.' As a result the popular image has been
developed through fictional works, for example, Dickens', Mrs Gamp in Martin
Chuzzlewit. Whilst it is acknowledged that such accounts are produced to achieve a
particular view required by the author for his / her own ends these descriptions have some
grounding in a grim reality, which often the author is trying to correct by illustrating the
issue within their work. The social class of early nurses demonstrates the subordinate role
played within a social structure.
'At the beginning of the nineteenth century hospital nursing was done by
mature women of the domestic servant class. Hardened by their
experience of life, and often reinforced with gin, they were able to face the
confusion and stench of the hospital wards.' (Able Smith 1979)
Social class no longer dictates access to modern nursing, nor is it dependent on military
or religious bodies for its recruits. The move from a vocational, apprenticeship style
training to tertiary education has broadened the recruitment base. Those who were
previously excluded from direct access are now exploring alternative routes.
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Nursing and Management
Basset (1998) describes the conflicting elements of the various approaches adopted by
different groups of managers. These are characterised by the scientific approach (the one
traditionally adopted by the NHS) and the behavioural approach, summarised in table 4
below.




• Staff need to be coerced, controlled
and directed
• Staff are committed, seek
responsibility and care about their
work
• The needs of the individual are not
important
• The needs of the individual are
important
• The stick is better than the carrot • The carrot is better than the stick
• A command and control approach is
effective
• A facilitative, participatory
democratic and people centred
approach is effective
• The focus should be on individual
fault and blame
• The focus should be on system
failure and not blaming the
individual.
The social background, origins and gender aspects of nurses and nursing forms a picture
of a female-dominated occupation, struggling to have itself recognised as a profession,
dominated by, and seen to be subservient to, the medical profession, based on religious
and militaristic regimes of obedience with its practice firmly rooted in rituals and
routines. These are important aspects in the development of nurses and nursing practice
and are vital in our understanding of how modern practice and management have
developed. They are of particular relevance in understanding nursing's attitude towards
the management of errors.
Risk
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The identification and management of risk has been a key feature of industries for many
years. More recently it has been a feature of both clinical and non-clinical aspects of
management within the NHS. As the NHS developed during the 1980s and 1990s
adopting more business-like approaches, the concept of risk became more prominent in
the management of healthcare. For clinicians, balancing risks of different treatments or
indeed whether to treat or not to treat has been an integral part of patient management,
without necessarily having the label of clinical risk management.
As the concept of clinical governance developed from the 1997 White Paper, Designed to
Care, the process of risk management was developed into a framework, designed to
improve the entire patient process. In developing criteria for success the Scottish
Executive Health Department included: -
'Techniques such as risk management will be utilised to anticipate and
minimise potential problems.' (NHS in Scotland 1998)
The Clinical Negligence and Other Risk Indemnity Scheme (CNORIS) has been
developed in the NHS across the UK in different forms to assist NHS organisations to
develop risk management strategies to deal with both clinical and non-clinical risks. This
combined with the standards developed by NHS Quality Improvement Scotland sets out a
framework for quality improvement. These organisations argue for the need for a
structure that assesses, manages and learns from clinical incidents.
Risk in Nursing and Other Sectors.
The approach to managing errors adopted by nurses traditionally has led to a number of
unwelcome side effects including individuals becoming reluctant to admit when errors
have been made. The reporting of errors and staff's reluctance to come forward with
information about incidents and near misses has resulted in the information relating to
untoward incidents being incomplete and patchy. A number of comparisons have been
drawn between the health service and other industries, the most common comparison has
been the airline industry where voluntary, anonymous reporting of errors and near misses
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has resulted in a more open approach to the management of incidents, where lessons are
learned and a culture of continuous improvement is fostered. Professor Liam Donaldson,
comments that
'The aviation and other industries have systematic approaches to analysing
mistakes and failures and learning the lessons. The NHS needs to apply
what is known from those sectors to its efforts to assure quality of services
to patients.'
As clinical practitioners, nurses have used risk management techniques in delivering
nursing care without necessarily recognising them as such. Therefore, risk management,
as a concept is not new to nursing practice it is simply a new term for what has been an
integral part of the assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation of nursing care.
More recently these have been used extensively in very specific areas of care for example
the risk associated with the moving and handling of a patient, infection control and levels
of observation.
The most common errors involving qualified nurses are medication errors and these are
explored in some detail within Chapter in. The causes of medication errors demonstrate
the interactions between nurses and patients as well as the interdependency between
doctors and nurses in ensuring that the correct patient receives the correct drug, at the
correct time via the correct route. They also illustrate the range of skills and knowledge
required to make certain that all of these elements come together to make sure that
patients receive their prescribed therapies and to ensure that patients are not put at risk by
either not receiving their treatment or receiving the wrong treatments.
Who's to Blame?
It appears that the first reaction in some quarters when an incident occurs is to find out
who is to blame. This is not just the reaction from the affected patient and their family but
it is also whipped up by the sensationalised headlines in the media and more worryingly
within the professions and management. It would appear that as the BMJ put it that
'blaming individuals is more emotionally satisfying than targeting institutions.' Goodman
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(2002) echoes this view in his review of a new textbook dealing with blame in medicine
declares
'I do know some people who should be forced to read Errors, Medicine
and the Law: the ones who on learning of a self reported drug error
suspend the doctor with the explanation that he wasn't paid his salary not
to read labels.'
The concept of blame is one that has exercised the minds of society in general and the
media in particular and has been the subject of some comment.
'Blame must surely rank among one of the most unpalatable and peculiar
human devices, not least because it's generally the weak and culpable who
most often employ it.' (Muriel Gray, Sunday Herald, 20th July 2003 pi 1).
'The official inquiry into the sinking of the Marchioness riverboat has
blamed the captains and owners of both vessels for the disaster (BBC
News 23rd March 2001)
'Rumsfelt escapes blame in 'whitewash' Abu Graib report' (Telegraph
Headline 15/08/04)
'A babysitter accused of causing life threatening burns to a baby by
holding her under the hot water tap took the blame for the child's mother'
(BBC News 13/02/02).
'Where to Place the Blame? Some blame violence in the media and even
sue over it.' (Tustin Amole 1999 - Rocky Mountain news 20/04/1999)
'Peter Mandelson, Gerald Corbett, Bob Ayling - all have been labelled
scapegoats. It seems the urge to shift blame is innate, but now there's call
for us [to] restrain this impulse.' (BBC News Online 16/02/2001)
'And our own society seems so hooked on blame and recrimination, which
we sometimes dignify by the name of accountability. Accountability is
important, but it can tip easily into a witch-hunt.' (Alexander McCall
Smith, The Herald Magazine, 16th August 2003 plO).
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Chapter II
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE
In undertaking this literature review, a number of sources have been utilised. These
include the electronic nursing, medical and law journal databases, university and NHS
libraries, the researcher's personal library, media and personal communications. The
review explores a number of different issues and is presented across six broad themes.
1. Professional nursing issues
2. The interface with the medical professions
3. The theory of errors
4. Organisational issues and lessons from other industries
5. The concept ofblame
6. The legal context.
1. Professional Nursing Issues
[a] The Nature of Nursing
In order to understand the issues relating to current nursing practice there is a need to
review the history of the nursing profession and how it has developed not only as a
distinct profession but also as part of the multi-disciplinary team in which it functions.
Inextricably linked with this exploration of nursing is a review ofwomen in society and
the patriarchal role-played by the medical profession in relation to nurses and nursing.
Whilst there is a temptation to look at nursing solely in relation to women's issues,
Mackintosh (1997) reminds us that for as long as records have been available, men have
played a role in nursing. Therefore, whilst the changes within nursing are a reflection of
the social change experienced by women, they are by no means either synonymous with,
or exclusive to, women.
There is danger in undertaking an examination of the nursing profession in isolation. The
interfaces with medicine and other healthcare professions are clear and examined later in
more detail. The issues that have faced the nursing profession throughout its history are
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not peculiar to the occupation. Abel-Smith (1979) draws a parallel with other professions
that have undergone similar transformations; for example the relationships between
certified and uncertified teachers and between qualified and unqualified social workers.
Within the health services there are other tensions between different professions for
example between ophthalmologists and opticians and dental surgeons and dentists. Abel-
Smith goes on however to argue that the exceptional feature of nursing is the work. The
close working with pain, suffering, death and dying cannot but fail to have an impact on
those individuals who are exposed to this routinely as part of their normal working
pattern.
'The setting in which nurses work may well account for some of the
features of the profession - the tendency to withdraw to the protective
solidarity of a uniformed group, the search for perfectionism and the
attempt to achieve it by discipline, and last but not least, the widespread
public admiration for those who take on nursing work.' (Able- Smith
1979)
In particular the search for perfection through discipline is a feature of the nursing
profession that is important in the examination of the management of clinical incidents. It
could be argued that it is this striving to achieve perfection that has resulted in a culture
whereby nurses not only punish themselves but also each other (in particular
subordinates) when something does not meet some amorphous notion of perfection.
Similarly this may account for why medical staff who have perhaps been more realistic
about its limitations, accept that medicine and healthcare are not exact sciences and
therefore things will go wrong. This was well illustrated by a neurosurgeon who
subsequently became the Minister for Health for Scotland who commented to the Chief
Nurse for Scotland that only a nurse would expect another nurse to know everything at
the point of qualification. (Personal Communication)
Maggs (1996) argues that in research terms
'The history of nursing largely concentrates itself with organizational
issues- battles for registration, movement towards professional status - or
with the nurses themselves - education and training for example.'
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This needs to be expanded slightly for the purposes of this research in order to review the
social and philosophical issues that have resulted in nursing as a profession evolving to
the stage at which it currently finds itself. Abel Smith (1979) and Baly (1980) both
presented their histories of nursing within the social context. Abel Smith identifies how
the development of nursing reflects the position held by women in society. The fight for
registration, recognition as a profession and as a result the right to self- regulation was a
long fought battle. The issues relating to professional self-regulation will be examined
further later in the review. Following the registration in 1919 he observes
'The fact that most of the duties performed by the nurses looked to the
casual observer so close to those performed by the housewife in her daily
round may have led to an exaggerated attempt to differentiate the work
and expand the duration and content of the training syllabus.'
Marshall & Wall (1999) illustrate that whilst the role of women in the 19th century was
portrayed as a subservient role to men and restricted to domesticity ...
'... in the pluralistic West a variety of organised religious women built and
administered hospitals, initiated professional nursing and provided
effective health care services.'
The origin of nursing has shaped the practice and management of nurses and nursing.
Abel-Smith (1960) notes;
'The profession developed its language, its ritual and its uniform - its own
body of traditions which were drawn from the army, from religious orders
and possibly the new girls' public schools.'
This observation is reiterated by Bassett (1998) who, in describing differing management
approaches within the NHS, illustrates that the punitive approach adopted by some
managers is one..
'... rooted in the religious, military and bureaucratic origins of nursing and
the health service.'
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The hierarchical nature of the nursing professions has been widely recognised and
discussed and there is a perception that this has had a diminishing role over recent years.
However, Begley (2002) argues that within midwifery, hierarchy is still very much alive
and noted that this was less evident in other healthcare professions. This study also
reported that students perceived a lack of caring from their more senior colleagues.
Within the study Begley cites a number of other authors who outline similar conclusions
(Melia 1981, Treacy 1987 and Hanson 1996). Whilst this study did not deal specifically
with the management of errors it illustrates that the organisational culture remains
hierarchical and this in turn leads to some of the difficulties around adopting a more open
organisational culture.
In the early 1990s there was considerable debate within the nursing professions around
role extension and the development of skills previously the exclusive domain of medical
staff. The then governing body for nurses midwives and health visitors produced the
Scope ofProfessional Practice (UKCC 1992), detailing the framework within which such
roles could be undertaken safely. One of the major areas of practice this related to was
intravenous therapy. Scales (1996) outlines the roles and responsibilities with regard to
intravenous therapies although the issues of accountability and responsibility apply
equally to all areas of nursing practice.
In modern day clinical practice Gough (2000) argues that the power base within the NHS
is beginning to shift in favour of nursing. She points to the development ofNHS Direct
(NHS 24 is the equivalent organisation within Scotland) as nurses not merely becoming
the gatekeepers of healthcare but pioneering a new model of healthcare delivery. It is fair
to say that some of the analyses (usually anecdotal and usually from doctors) would not
necessarily agree with this appraisal ofNHS Direct. Similarly some organisations would
argue that this development has achieved little other than attracting the most experienced
staff out of acute areas at a time of national shortage. Gough points to other
developments, which she argues have resulted in new opportunities for the development
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of nursing as a profession. These include, the development of nurse consultant roles, the
creation of modern matrons and the development of nurse led intermediate care.
In a later paper Gough (2001) develops the theme of the opportunities open to nursing
and argues that one of the main barriers to the profession grasping the opportunities is the
apparent need to maintain the rigid notions of a profession. She quotes Professor Davies
as identifying the characteristic of an 'old' profession as elitism, paternalism,
authoritarianism, having mastery of knowledge (highly gate-kept and accessible to no-
one else), control, aloofness, detachment and distance. She then goes on to argue
'Best nursing practice is characterised not by paternalism but by
partnership; not by authoritarianism, but by collegiateness and
collaboration; not by a mastery ofknowledge but by shared and borrowed
knowledge and by reflective practice and life-long learning; not by
aloofness and detachment but by engagement and the therapeutic use of
self, not by control but by empowerment of self and others.'
It is clear that many of these issues are pertinent to the management of clinical incidents
and how the management under old professional styles can be improved through those
characteristics of the new professional approaches described by Gough. This is not to
conclude that hierarchies are in themselves wrong. It is however clear that the abuse of
power bases, which hierarchy can be guilty of encouraging, has led to the inappropriate
and arguably unfair, management of clinical incidents.
[b] Nursing Misconduct
A potential proxy measure of nurses' involvement in clinical incidents is the level of
misconduct hearings undertaken by the statutory body. Allegations of misconduct are
reported to the nurses' governing body. The name of the governing body has changed
from the General Nursing Council to the United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing
Midwifery and Health Visiting and most recently to the Nursing and Midwifery Council
from June 2002. The sources of complaints of misconduct come from three main areas;
employers, the public, and police who are obliged to report to the statutory body any
criminal offence committed by a nurse midwife or health visitor. There has been a
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progressive rise in the number of complaints made. The number and source of complaints
are outlined in tables 5 and 6 (UKCC 2001).
Table 5: The number ofComplaints made to Nurses' Governing Body 1996 - 2001
1996-97 1997-98 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001
893 1032 1077 1142 1240
Table 6: The source of complaints made to the Nurses' Governing Body, 1996 - 2001
1999-2000 2000-2001
Source No % No %
Employers 539 47.2 592 47.7
Public 249 21.8 276 22.3
Police 250 21.9 230 18.5
Miscellaneous 104 9.1 142 11.5
Total 1142 100 1240 100
The number of allegations between the two time periods has changed but the proportion
by source is similar. The categories of misconduct have not changed significantly across
time. The largest category in 2000/2001 was physical or verbal abuse of patients, which
accounted for 28.5% of cases with 30% and 31% respectively for the two previous years.
In 2000/2001, failing to keep accurate records or failure to report incidents was the next
largest category at 8.7%, which was slightly higher than the 6% the previous year. Whilst
the governing body acknowledges there does not exist a list of offences that will lead to
automatic removal from the register, it advises managers that the types of misconduct
potentially leading to removal include, physical or verbally abusing patients, stealing
from patients, failing to care for patients properly, failing to keep proper records and
committing criminal offences.
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A study undertaken in the United States of America (Croke 2003) examined in excess of
250 cases of negligence, lawsuits against nurses as well as complaints where the
significant issue raised was the quality of nursing care. The findings were categorised
into six major areas.
1. Failure to follow standards
2. Failure to use equipment in a responsible manner
3. Failure to communicate
4. Failure to document
5. Failure to assess and monitor
6. Failure to act as a patient advocate
The litigious nature of the culture within North America makes direct comparisons
between there and the UK difficult. However the failings listed within Croke's study are
similar to those complaints against nurses experienced within the United Kingdom. There
are no data relating to the level of litigation against nurses specifically and therefore it is
difficult to make reasonable comparisons between the two systems. There have been a
number of high profile cases relating to criminal activities involving nurses. These in the
main have related to nurses murdering or attempting to murder patients in their care.
[c] Nursing Leadership
The nature of nursing leadership has changed dramatically over the past years and it is a
valid area of enquiry to establish whether these changes in nursing leadership have had
any influence over the management oferrors. Nursing has a pivotal role in delivering safe
healthcare as well as ensuring that the environment in which healthcare is provided is
also safe. Mitchell (2002) argues that nurses are considered to be at the sharp end of
delivering care where errors occur as well as where they can be prevented and mitigated.
Nurses are also at the 'blunt end' of designing, managing and analysing systems. The
conclusion drawn by Mitchell is that nurses are in a key position to improve the delivery
of safe patient care but tend not to be included in designing the systems in which they
function. She illustrates this further by quoting Lewis Thomas, a physician-scientist who
noted
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'the institution is held together, glued together, enabled to function as an
organism, by the nurses and no-one else.'
Some two years earlier Henry (2000) outlined the same issues around nurses' influence
on the quality of healthcare delivery and identifies a number of reasons for this;
> Nurse comprise the largest component of the healthcare workforce
> Nurses are heavily involved in the delivery of healthcare
> Nurses are heavily involved with the professional management
> Nurses are accountable for much of the care provided in many
countries and for the design of health systems, through which care is
delivered, quality is assured and errors are avoided.
Henry also argues that nurse leaders have effectively ignored the evidence available in
relation to the management of errors. The commentary from Henry points to the work
undertaken by Leape suggesting that systems rather than individuals should be the focus
for any investigation.
'Expert evidence and the efforts of thoughtful researchers show us that
instead of blaming nurses and doctors, instead of pointing the finger and
alleging misconduct, we must understand to a much greater degree than
we do presently, the basics of health systems so that we can more easily
identify then eliminate problems with organization design and
maintenance...Nurse managers must be trained in the basics of system
functioning and maintenance.' (Henry 2000)
In an examination of leadership within the NHS Alimo-Metcalfe & Alban-Metcalfe
(2000) describe the leadership qualities required within the organisation if the
modernisation of the NHS so desired by politicians is to be achieved, and argue:
'This is a key consideration for the NHS centre, since the government's
modernisation agenda will not be achieved unless the NHS recognises that
cultures of blame, authoritarianism, narrow-mindedness and reckless
disregard for staff are not to be tolerated.'
Whilst these observations were not made specifically in relation to nursing they are very
appropriate and applicable to leadership styles within the profession.
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[d] Summary
From the literature reviewed it is clear that the origins and evolution of nursing as a
profession are key factors in understanding the approach it has taken to managing
untoward clinical incidents. This part of the review has demonstrated the ways in which
the origins and evolution of nursing have influenced modern nursing practice.
Throughout the research the impact of some of these issues will be demonstrated through
the observations made both by the researcher and by the participants during the
interviews. Whilst the researcher accepts that the hierarchical structures within nursing
have flattened, the effect of taller hierarchical structures remains. This is not to suggest
that this is 'wrong' or that such structures do not have tangible benefits. However, where
such structures are used to impose an unquestioning approach to management, the
outcome can be a very negative one for individuals who have to function within such an
environment.
Webster and Anderson (2002) assert: "...in nursing, blame remains the predominant
approach for dealing with error." The literature relating to untoward clinical incidents
involving nurses in the main deals with medication errors and this area is explored later.
In drawing these two areas together, Osborne et al 1999 observe
"Nurses involved in committing a medication error may be reluctant to
report it unless there is obvious harm to the patient. The reluctance comes
from fear of punishment..."
It is also important to explore the inter-relationship between nursing and medicine, to
understand further the complexities of why these two professions who work so closely
together in the same environment have such different approaches to the issues of incident
management.
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2. The Interfacewith theMedical Professions
Ootim (2002) discusses the issues of errors in relation to effective leadership within the
NHS and identifies that as part of literature review undertaken it was clear that the
volume of literature in relation to errors in medicine was significantly greater than that
available in relation to nursing. The wider literature relating to errors within medicine is
outwith the scope of this review however a truncated exploration of common issues and
areas within medicine that are pertinent to nursing has been undertaken and presented.
[a] The Different Approach of Nurses and Doctors
It is well recognised - although there is little in the way of objective evidence to
substantiate any claim - that whilst doctors 'get away with' errors as the old boy network
tends to defend its own, nurses on the other hand are only too happy to see their
colleagues dragged through a humiliating process of investigation, disciplining and even
dismissal. Kellet (1996) illustrates this through a case where a consultant and a nurse
were involved in the same incident. He identifies how at the end of the process the nurse
was disciplined to a level only just short of dismissal and the consultant was able to
practice as normal. To the objective outsider this seems iniquitous - but this would be a
very simplistic conclusion and not one that acknowledges a number of different factors.
These include the different roles and responsibilities of two different disciplines working
within the same multi-disciplinary team, the different codes of conduct relating to each
profession and the different historical evolutions of the individual professions. One
question it does raise, however, is whether 'natural justice' has been done and been seen
to be done.
Harding - Price (1999) attempts to illustrate the differences between the way doctors and
nurses are treated by their regulatory bodies through the case of a doctor who 'ordered'
nurses to withhold food supplements from an 85-year old lady in their care. He goes on to
condemn the General Medical Council for not removing the doctor's right to practice but
chooses instead to suspend him for 6-months. He then goes on to argue
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'If nurses are struck off for misconduct then the same rules must be
applied to doctors and other healthcare professionals.'
There is no indication in this manuscript to suggest that the nurses involved were struck
off as a result of the same incident and therefore it is perhaps difficult to draw meaningful
comparisons between how two different groups of staff are dealt with as a result of this
particular incident. Given that different healthcare staff groups have different codes of
conduct it could also be argued that what constitutes 'gross misconduct' may also be
different. Whilst that may be the case, codes of conduct tend to be based on similar
ethical and moral principles and therefore one would expect (and perhaps especially the
general public expects) that what constitutes gross professional misconduct within
different professional groups, is a breach of such similar principles.
Wu (2000) acknowledges that patients are of course the 'first and obvious' victims of any
untoward clinical incident, but then goes on to argue that doctors are deeply affected by
the same errors and that they could reasonably be regarded as the second victim.
However, he later goes on to identify that other healthcare professionals are also affected
and recognises that the different management systems within NHS organisations result in
differences in how they are treated and how they react.
'Nurses, pharmacists, and other members of the healthcare team are also
susceptible to error and vulnerable to its fallout. Given the hospital
hierarchy, they have less latitude to deal with their mistakes; they often
bear silent witness to mistakes and agonise over conflicting loyalties to
patients, institutions and team. They too are victims.'
Di Bisclegie (2002) makes a number of observations in relation to doctors and errors. He
suggests that all doctors make errors, they are generally minor and that they become less
frequent as the doctor's experience becomes more extensive. The author then outlines
three options open to any doctor when an error occurs. The three options are described as
'Firstly, mistakes may be dismissed or blamed on others. This is clearly
the path to more mistakes. Next mistakes may be dwelled upon and over
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analysed so as to result in paralysis of the doctor. Most of us choose the
third option, which is to analyse the mistake, learn from it and move on.'
This author presents what at first sight may be regarded as a very simplistic view of
errors. It certainly demonstrates that the organisation in which this doctor functions may
be completely unaware of errors committed by this individual doctor and therefore not
only has an inaccurate view of the level of untoward clinical incidents but arguably has a
'dangerous' doctor functioning in the organisation. Whilst Di Bisclegie argues that
doctors learn and move on, the wider organisation does not have the opportunity to learn
from the errors. The author acknowledges that errors can be rationalised but they are
nonetheless still mistakes. It could be argued that a doctor's ability to rationalise an error
(the article would suggest that such rationalisation is by the individual doctor rather than
to a colleague or management of the organisation) does not offer any level of assurance
that the individual has learned from the error before moving on - potentially to make the
same mistake on a different patient. Hettiaratchy (2001) takes quite a different approach
and acknowledges that having made a mistake themselves they are less likely to be
critical of others who have also made mistakes. This author also illustrates through the
description of the error they were involved in that there are not always extenuating
circumstances or they were part of a 'chain of error', but that sometimes people do get
things wrong and goes on to argue:
'Perhaps if we were all slower to blame and quicker to understand, it
might be possible to learn from our collective errors rather than
consigning them to the bin marked "only happens to others'".
The adage of prevention is better than cure arguably applies to errors as much as any
other aspect of life. Lester and Tritter (2001) argue that one way of potentially reducing
medical errors is to alter the way doctors think about errors through medical education
and 'professional socialisation'. They identify a number of additions to the curriculum to
assist in achieving what they acknowledge would be a 'longitudinal' approach and
includes, team working, communication skills, evidence based practice and strategies for
managing uncertainty. Such issues would also apply to nurses although these are areas
are already included within the current nurse education programme. The one method that
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could improve this for both professional groups would be to undertake such
undergraduate training together. The issue of collaborative education between the
professions has been debated for some time. This has been in the main around the need to
develop a multi-disciplinary approach from an early stage. Such joint education would
have a number of other added benefits for professional practice including incident
management.
[b] Incidents Involving Doctors
The number and nature ofmedical incidents is a constant source of material for the media
and in particular it has provided the basis for some very lurid headlines for the tabloid
press. Alberti (2002) commented on the lack of the discussion around the causes and
likelihood of something going wrong and the apparent assumption that not only should
errors never happen within healthcare settings but that the number is rising. He goes on to
conclude that there are two important issues around the actual position, on the one hand
errors have always happened and on the other we have no idea how common they are
within the United Kingdom.
In 1996 one surgeon who was dubbed 'Dr Dolittle' by a tabloid newspaper following the
tragic death of a patient, took matters further and successfully sued the newspaper for
libel and was awarded £625,000. During the trial it was recognised that the doctors
involved in the case were not at fault and that the newspaper was therefore libellous.
However, subsequent cases have not deterred editors from such headlines. (Seldon 1996)
The intrathecal injection of the cytotoxic chemotherapy agent Vincristine was one such
case. Dyer (2001) reports the same mistake occurred on thirteen different occasions in the
UK in the previous sixteen years. Ten of these have resulted in death and the remaining
three resulted in paralysis. Dyer goes on to describe one of the cases; that of a 12 year old
boy who died as a result of an incorrect intrathecal injection, where the Crown
Prosecution service dropped the charges against the two doctors involved, concluding
that the child's death was a result of
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'chance events and failings at the hospital rather than gross negligence by the
doctors.'
The prevention of cytotoxic disasters is proposed through some very simple strategies by
a number of authors. For example, Crotty (2000), Fernandez (2000) suggest a number of
solutions to deal with this problem
[c] The Extent ofMedical Errors
There have been a variety of attempts to quantify the extent of medical errors and their
impact. The most comprehensive review within the United States of America was
undertaken in the late 1980s by Brennan et al (1991). This study is now regarded as the
benchmark for estimating medical errors within a hospital. Using the methodology set out
in the study from Harvard, Wilson et al (1995) was able to estimate the level of error
within Australian healthcare system. Within the United Kingdom there have been few
attempts to replicate the study to identify the incidence of errors within United Kingdom
hospitals.
The National Patient Safety Agency (2002) undertook an exercise to quantify the level of
errors in English hospitals through a system of anonymous reporting of errors by a small
number of Trusts. The results caused a storm in the British press as the conclusions, if
extrapolated across the NHS in England, would suggest approximately 850,000 incidents
each year (BBC 2002). However, the study was recognised as being so flawed that the
results should be reviewed with a great deal of caution. It prompted the Chief Medical
Officer to host a press conference when it was thought there was a move to suppress the
results. The entire system appeared to be flawed and therefore questions were raised
about the validity of the exercise. The methodology was unclear, there were
inconsistencies with definitions leading to under and over reporting in different hospitals,
incomplete coding, and problems with the computer interfaces. Of the 27,000 incidents
reported over a six month period 56% were unspecified and 59% were un-coded, large
numbers of fields were missing, large amounts of data were unusable and only 1 in 20
Trusts were involved in the pilot.
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One of the major issues surrounding the analysis (in particular the measurement) of
untoward clinical incidents is obtaining a consensus opinion on the definition.
In various studies there have been attempts to quantify the problem,
Table 7: A Comparison of incidents in Different Countries.
Country Number and Outcome
USA 44-98,000 deaths




New Zealand 10% ofadmissions
UK 850,000 adverse events / deaths / permanent disability
(NPSA 2002)
Vincent et al (2001) reported that the 'epidemiology of adverse events has not been
studied in Britain.' Through a retrospective review of case notes Professor Vincent and
his team attempted to quantify adverse incidents in two London hospitals, and concluded
that the findings strongly supported the notion that adverse events in British hospitals
were as serious a problem as in the USA and Australia.
[d] Professional Regulation
One of the defining criteria of a profession is self-regulation. Such self-regulation if not
seen to deal with its professionals in an 'acceptable' way may result in pressure being
placed upon government to replace the system with a different method, which takes away
the profession's ability to regulate itself. This applies equally to nursing as it does to
medicine.
'Historically, in the United Kingdom self-governance of the nursing
profession has been accepted as a right. Yet it is important to remember
that the prime reason for the existence of self-governing bodies is to
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protect the public from disreputable professional practitioners and not to
provide a 'cosy' system for regulation of practitioners by practitioners.'
(Watkins 1999)
The aftermath of the Kennedy Report into the paediatric surgery issues in Bristol raised a
number of questions with regard to the self-regulation of the medical profession and a
growing dissatisfaction among the general public at what was seen as closing of ranks
within a profession to protect a non-performing member. Gough (2001) argues
'there is now a growing loss of trust and confidence by the public in health
professions to provide safe and effective care.'
[e] The Role and Function of the Regulatory Bodies.
Medicine's regulatory body, the General Medical Council, has acknowledged the
apparent lack of trust in the medical profession and, in an attempt to regain some of the
lost trust initiated a public campaign. (The Herald 6th April 2004). The head of GMC
Scotland said; -
'We all recognise that there is enormous public confidence in individual
doctors. This has been shown again and again, but it has equally been
shown that there is some lack of public confidence in some areas. The
road shows will look at increasing understanding of how medical
education fits through to how doctors work in their professional life, and
what happens if that goes wrong. For all of us when we understand how
something works, it gives us greater confidence in it'.
The effectiveness of such a campaign remains to be proven. It is interesting to note that in
the same report it was recognised that Scottish patients lodge proportionately fewer
complaints with the GMC than patients in the rest of the United Kingdom. There does not
appear to be a similar lack of confidence in the governing body for nurses and there is no
similar public awareness campaign for the Nursing and Midwifery Council. It is
suggested that there are two principal reasons for this.
> Firstly, there are within the medical profession a number of very high profile
cases regarded as having been poorly handled by the GMC, the most notable of
which was the case of Dr Harold Shipman, a General Practitioner who was
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convicted of a number of murders and was thought to be responsible for the
deaths of in excess of a further 200 patients within his care. It is reported that the
Council disciplined him after he was convicted of drug and forgery offences in
1976 thought to be two years after his first killing. There have been a number of
instances where cases were perceived to have bee dealt with poorly by the UKCC
(predecessor to the NMC) but they were neither as severe nor as high profile as
the Shipman murders.
> Secondly, it is clear that the nursing regulatory body has been more willing to be
seen to deal with cases ofmisconduct brought before its disciplinary committees.
It could be argued that this is either a reflection of, or is reflected in, local systems
of dealing with nursing misconduct where nursing is viewed as being very harsh
against its own profession.
[f] Summary
Nurses and doctors interact as part of a multidisciplinary team on a daily basis. The
totality of the care they deliver to patients is the result of a complex interaction based on
mutual understanding and respect for their respective roles. They function within the
same risk-laden environment, which, coupled with the intricate personal interactions
evident in the therapeutic relationships with patients, results in the inevitability of an
error occurring. All of this happens within a complex organisation, yet the literature
available suggests that the approaches to dealing with untoward clinical incidents - even
when both are involved in the same incident - appears to be very different between the
two professions. It is evident the way in which the two professions deal with clinical
incidents and their consequences are different. It is also clear that the two professions
have different histories and socialisation processes. A corollary of such differences is
separate ethical frameworks for each profession, which make it unsurprising that they
have different approaches to managing similar situations. There are significant
opportunities for these two professional groups to collaborate more effectively at
undergraduate, post-graduate and everyday clinical practice levels to improve collective
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understanding of the processes around error management and to reduce the likelihood of
recurrence.
3. The Theory ofErrors
There are a number of authors who have written extensively on errors perhaps the most
prolific and prestigious of this group of authors is James Reason. He has produced two
seminal texts, Human Error and Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents, which
are widely quoted by other writers on, and researchers into, the subject of error
management. These two particular texts provide a definitive view of the theory relating to
errors and have been built upon by other authors in advancing a clearer understanding of
antecedents to errors and the ways errors can be managed within a system that has mutual
benefits for individuals affected by errors, and organisations in which they occur.
[a] Definitions
It is important to define exactly what is meant by error. A number of terms are used
throughout the literature, within the media and as part ofpolicy documentation, without a
clear understanding of what is actually meant. Some of the terms are indeed used
synonymously, which in strict terms is incorrect. As a result, estimates of the number of
clinical incidents vary widely. This lack of clarity in defining an untoward clinical
incident was one of the major criticisms levelled at a report produced by the National
Patient Safety Agency. The lack of a definition that is interpreted consistently between
the organisations involved meant that some reported all incidents; others only reported
those causing harm or death to a patient. This resulted in a reporting system not being
able to establish a clear understanding of the quality and type of incident.
The terms untoward incident, adverse event, accident, error and mistake all tend to be
used synonymously. In a review of the literature Walshe (2000) identifies a number of
different definitions used:
> 'Any response to medical care in the hospital that is unintended,
undesirable and harmful to the patients. (McLamb & Huntly 1967)
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> A potential compensable event is a disability caused by healthcare
management. (Mills 1978)
> Adverse patient occurrences (APOs)... refer to untoward patient
events, which under optimal conditions are not a natural occurrence of
the patient's disease or treatment. The common thread of all APOs is
that they are events which health professionals agree are not desirable
outcomes ofmedical management. (Craddick & Bader 1983)
> An unintended injury caused by medical management rather than by
the disease process. The injury is sufficiently serious to lead to
prolongation of hospitalisation or temporary or permanent impairment
or disability in the patient. (Harvard Medical Practice Study 1990)
> An unintended injury or complication, which results in disability,
death or prolonged hospital stay and is caused by healthcare
management. (Wilson et al 1995)
> An untoward or undesirable occurrence in the healthcare process,
which has or potentially has some negative impact on a patient or
patients and results or may result from some part of the healthcare
process. (Walshe 1998)'
The terminology used within the management of untoward incidents itself colours the
perception of the severity of the problem. Lorimer (1996) argues
' The word accident often obstructs the study of injury prevention. The
word suggests an event that takes place without foresight or expectations,
yet such events as a group are not random and do not occur by chance;
they can be expected to happen, even if the time, place and precise
circumstances cannot be foreseen."
Miller (2001) develops this theme further by illustrating that the sinking of RMS Titanic
was a result of a number of different factors, which were only relevant when the ship
eventually struck an iceberg in the mid-Atlantic. The eventual sinking of the 'unsinkable
ship' was caused not merely by the collision with an iceberg but a multitude of factors
which as single entities may not have been important however when they came together
at the time of the collision they all contributed to the eventual demise of the ship and the
majority of its passengers. Miller goes on to draw some interesting parallels between
these factors and those evident within the NHS. For example the appropriate skills and
training of staff, the need for clear systems ofworking, the need for clear instructions that
are accessible (both in terms of physical and language accessibility) and a sense of
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invincibility (Titanic was thought of as being unsinkable and many clinicians have a view
of'this could never happen to me')
The two terms that need to be clearly differentiated are error and violation. Reason offers
definitions for both of these terms, which Merry and McCall Smith develop a little
further in order to enhance the understanding of these terms and how they are used.
Error All those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical
activities fails to achieve its intentional outcome and when these failures
cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance agency. (Reason)
An error is an unintentional failure in the formulation of a plan by which it
is intended to achieve a goal or an unintentional departure of a sequence of
mental or physical activities from the sequence planned, except when such
a departure is due to a chance intervention. (Merry& McCall Smith)
Violations Deliberate - but not necessarily reprehensible - deviations from those
practices deemed necessary (by designers, managers and regulatory
agencies) to maintain the safe operation of a potentially hazardous system.
Deviations from safe operating procedures, standards or rules. (Reason)
A deliberate - but not necessarily reprehensible - deviation from those
practices appreciated by the individual as being required by regulation or
necessary or advisable to achieve the appropriate objective while
maintaining the safety of people and equipment and the ongoing operation
of a device or system.
To differentiate these two concepts simply Merry and McCall Smith suggest that errors
are involuntary and violations are voluntary. The important difference between these two
concepts in the management of untoward incidents will be examined in some detail later
in the review. In exploring the writing of these important authors it is possible to define
and adopt taxonomy of errors. Errors can be divided into three main areas, which can
then be further sub-divided. Merry and McCall Smith expand on Reason's earlier work
on errors, by introducing how the concept of blame can be viewed within the
management of errors as Reason's texts on errors did not deal with blame.
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Errors
Skill-Based Errors Rule-Based Errors Knowledge-Based Errors
Slip Lapse Technical Knowledge Errors of
Failures Judgement
Skill-based errors
Skill-based errors involve actions and are usually the result of distraction and can be sub¬
divided into: -
> Slips - something is done which was not intended as a result of a failure of
attention. An act of commission. For example a nurse gives a drug to the wrong
patient as a result ofbeing distracted during a medication round.
> Lapse - something is not done which was intended as a result of a failure of
attention. An act of omission. A nurse does not administer a dispensed medicine
to a patient having been called away to attend to another distressed patient.
> Technical - a skill-based error, which is distinct from a slip or a lapse. There are
two main factors, which relate technical skill-based errors in medicine (1) patient
variability (2) practitioner variability. Practitioner variability can relate to
difference between two different practitioners or related to one practitioner but in
different circumstances.
Rule-based errors
These are failures in either problem solving or planning.
> Rule-based errors: A failure in the process by which a set of circumstances is
recognised and an appropriate rule applied. Either due to pattern of events is
incorrectly recognised and matched to an inappropriate rule. Or due to the
application of a wrong or inadequate rule to correctly matched mental schema.
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Knowledge based errors or Deliberation Errors
These are deficiencies that lie in the knowledge stored in the memory or in the
knowledge available from the events and circumstances of the situation.
> Knowledge failures: Those situations where the fault lies with the information
recalled from the individual's internal store of knowledge. This may be due to
either a failure ofmemory or the individual did not have the knowledge.
> Errors of Judgement: The decision may have produced the desired goal but
didn't. The outcome is a poor guide of quality of decision. The decision should be
called an error only if unsound for example if there is a fault in logic or a
deficiency in the information.
Thompson and Dowding (2004) apply the theories proposed by Reason to nurses' clinical
decision-making skills and conclude
'...that when making decisions nurses, like all people, are subject to
uncertainty, error and heuristic short cuts. Unfortunately, it [the paper] has
shown that these heuristics are fallible and can introduce unhelpful bias
into decision-making. The need to prevent harm to patients demands that
professionals learn from mistakes and take corrective action.'
[b] The Nature ofErrors
The most common errors associated within qualified nurses are medication errors. In
1992 the UKCC identified that nurses who were involved in medication errors were often
dealt with through the disciplinary processes within organisations. This in turn was likely
to discourage the reporting of such incidents which, they comment, will be to the
potential detriment of patients and of standards.
The reporting of errors is an area of considerable debate. The main question is whether
any reporting scheme is either voluntary or mandatory. Cohen (2000) briefly outlines the
relative benefits of both methods before coming down in favour of voluntary, reflecting
the conclusion of the Institute for Safe Medication Practices.
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The report by the Department of Health 'An Organisation with a Memory' (2000)
presents some important figures of adverse events in the NHS.
• 400 people die or are seriously injured in adverse events involving medical
devices.
• Nearly 10,000 people are reported to have experienced serious adverse reactions
to drugs.
• Around 1,150 people who have been in recent contact with mental health services
commit suicide
• Nearly 28,000 written complaints are made about aspects of clinical treatment in
hospitals.
• The NHS pays out around £400 million a year settlement of clinical negligence
claims and has a potential liability of around £2.4 billion for existing and expected
claims.
• Hospital acquired infections - around 15% of which maybe avoidable are
estimated to cost the NHS nearly £1 billion.
As has been demonstrated by a number of different authors it is very difficult to
determine the true level of errors and as a result a number of different measures are used
as a proxy to understand the scope and nature of such incidents. One measure is the
number of claims made against the NHS. The situation in Scotland as outlined by the
Central Legal Office was described earlier and suggests that the number and magnitude
(in financial terms) are not rising as perceived. Fenn et al (2000) examined the cost of
medical negligence claims in England. The study identified that during the last decade of
the 20th Century the number of negligence claims (as measured by the rate of closed
claims) rose by approximately 7% per annum. The authors acknowledge that this is a
substantial rise but argue not the exponential rise often referred to in the wider popular
press.
Untoward clinical incidents within nursing are as significant an issue for professional
practice as for the medical profession. The majority of literature relating to clinical
incidents within nursing relates to medication errors. The management of untoward
clinical incidents is influenced by the managerial approach, which in turn is coloured by
history. The militaristic origins have resulted in a punitive approach to dealing with
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situations where something has gone wrong. Bassett identified this approach in her study
of the management of drug errors. Abel-Smith (1960) concluded that
'Faced with a crisis, the reaction of the nurse was to do and not to think. It
served also to protect her from self-criticism if her efforts did not produce
the required results. It was at least comforting to know that a recognized
procedure had been perfectly performed even though it had been ineptly
chosen.'
Weingart et al (2000) drew together a number of different studies to identify the
epidemiology ofmedical errors and conclude: -
> 'Although researchers regularly publish studies of medical error, adequate
epidemiological information is limited to a few institutions, procedures
and specialties. Because most studies were conducted in academic referral
centres the results may not be generalisable to community based hospital
and out patient care facilities.
> Comparing studies is difficult because research methods are not
standardised. The lack of agreement about methods and the variable rigour
of their application contribute to the variations found in error rates. There
is a serious need for researchers to use consistent definitions and methods
and for collaborative work on measuring error.
> Systems for monitoring and reporting error could provide the platform
from which more detailed studies of subpopulations could develop.
However, expecting that individuals will carry out health care flawlessly
creates an environment in which clinicians are reluctant to report their
errors. Universal underreporting, in turn, undermines the ability to
measure error accurately.
> For these reasons the precise prevalence and magnitude of medical error is
unknown but it is probably enormous. We are aware of no study showing
that medical care can be provided without error. In fact, the more closely
we examine patient care the more errors we find. No setting is free from
hazards and no specialty is immune, and patients are at risk no matter what
their age, sex, or health status.
> But the risk is not homogenous. Patients who are sicker, subjected to
multiple interventions and who remain in hospital longer are more likely
to suffer serious injury as a result of medical mistakes. Unless we make
substantial changes in the organisation and delivery of healthcare, all
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patients - particularly the most vulnerable - will continue to bear the
burden of medical error.'
Stanhope et al (1999) undertook a small study to examine the reliability of adverse
reporting systems. The research was undertaken within 2 maternity units and took the
form of a retrospective analysis of 250 cases notes from each hospital. Staff reported only
23% of the 196 adverse incidents identified from the 500 case records. The risk managers
identified a further 22% and the remaining 55% were only picked up following the case
record analysis. The study concluded that incident reporting systems seriously
underestimated the true level of reportable incidents.
As a follow up to this study Vincent et at (1999) attempted to identify why staff reported
less than half the reportable incidents. Most staff knew about the reporting system but
almost 30% did not know that a list of reportable incidents existed. Some interesting
trends on which staff groups would report incidents also emerged. For example midwives
were more likely to report incidents than doctors and junior staff were more likely to
report than senior staff. Some of the reasons offered for not reporting incidents were: -
• Fears of junior staff that they would be blamed
• High workload
• The belief that the incident did not warrant a report (despite the fact the incident
was designated 'reportable')
• Junior doctors felt less supported by their colleagues than senior doctors
The final point here is counter-intuitive to the finding that junior staffwere more likely to
report error than senior staff. It could have been expected that the lack of support made
junior less likely to report errors. Once again the conclusion was drawn that incident
reporting systems do not provide a reliable index of the rate of adverse incidents.
Meurier (2000) describes an approach using critical incident technique of clinical errors
to illustrate how valuable qualitative information can be obtained from accounts in order
to improve understanding of errors and their causes. In this study 20 registered nurses
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were invited to produce a report using a critical incident technique of an error which had
led to an adverse event, or potentially could have led to an adverse event, they had made
in their professional practice. A number of these were then followed up by short
interviews. In the paper published in 2000, one of the events is described in order to
illustrate how the process can be used to provide additional information. The situation is
analysed using Reason's Organisational Accident Model. However, the incident
described detailed how a patient who had been admitted to a medical ward following a
drug overdose eventually jumped from a window. Whilst the incident itself outlined a
number of issues that may have contributed to the patient being able to jump out of the
window, it could be argued that there is no error involved as such. Using the
Organisational Accident Model a number of latent failures were identified including
staffing of the ward, management support, communication, protocols and policies and
training and there is little doubt that from the description all of these things could have
been improved. However, it does not demonstrate that an error, per se, led to the patient
having the opportunity to jump out of the window. Meurier states within the paper that
the management blamed the 'F' Grade nurse involved and there is an implication that the
individual nurse was duly punished. It is not described in the text within the Critical
Incident Report and therefore it is difficult to draw these conclusions from the overall
manuscript. It is also clear that there are individuals who have a clear determination to
commit suicide; no matter what systems are in place however many staff are observing
them, they will find a way if their determination is so strong.
O'Leary (2000) identifies how the accreditation system used within the United States i.e.
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations (JCAHO) can be
used to reduce errors and adverse outcomes. The Joint Commission produces a number
of standards against which participating organisations are measured. O'Leary argues that
if organisations are doing "right things right" as presented in the standards then errors and
adverse outcomes are less likely to happen than if there were no such standards. O'Leary
goes on to argue
37
"It has become too easy to accept some undefined degree ofmedical errors
as the inevitable by-product of today's increasingly complex patient care
and simply to blame and punish individual caregivers when things go
seriously wrong."
Within Scotland a similar set of standards is being developed through NHSQIS. The
JCAHO has been in existence for a number of years and has been able to refine the
standards across this period. NHSQIS (and its predecessors) are a recent development
and will take some time to be able to have a similar impact on the NHS in Scotland.
[c] Medication Errors
Medication errors are the most common group of errors affecting qualified nurses. In a
study into the factors underlying the occurrence and reporting of drug errors Gladstone
(1995) identified a number or areas of concern. These included nurses' confusion
regarding the definition of a drug error, appropriate action to take when a drug error
occurred, nurses' fear of disciplinary action, nurses' fear of loss of clinical confidence,
variation in managerial response and the lack of nurses' mathematical skills. Nurses'
reluctance to report drug errors is in part due to fear of reprisal (Osborne 1999). The
United Kingdom Central Council identified and raised the same issue some time earlier
that when nurses make drug errors under pressure ofwork they often become the subject
of disciplinary action. Alderman (1997) identifies how organisational culture can be
changed and the information obtained from medication errors can be used to improve
nursing practice. The impact of a fatal medication error on those nurses involved in its
administration can be overwhelming. Golz and Fitchett (1999) describe how the result of
a drug error in which they were involved had a devastating effect on their personal and
professional lives.
[d] Incidence
The incidence of drug errors has been quantified on a number of occasions. Cooper
(1995) cites a number of studies in both the UK and the USA, with an error range from 2
to 18% (quoted by Raju et al (1989), lessee (1981)) . Osborne et al (1999) report from
several studies examining the number of reported errors, that recorded error rates range
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from 1.6 to 38% of all medication errors. The literature clearly shows that
inconsistencies of definition, data gathering, failure of recognition and lack of reporting
makes the true scale of errors impossible to identify.
[e] Causes and Impact
Fuqua and Stevens (1988) identified four contributing factors to medication errors.
1. Inadequate knowledge or medication administration skills
2. Failure to comply with hospital policies and procedures.
3. Failure in communication.
4. Disruptive personal experiences.
Wolfe (1989) reflects these contributory factors and identified a number of situations,
which preceded medication errors. These included errors in transcribing medication
orders, distractions in the institutional environment, failure to absorb or act on
information on drug packaging labels, confusion over similar packaging labels and
container sizes, use of defective equipment and selection of the wrong medication
container. Other factors included poor handwriting, selecting the medication from
memory without checking the medication administration record, recording medication as
given before it was administered, leaving medications at the bedside and scheduling
medications during a change-of-shift report.
It is also clear that a number ofmedication errors are due to poor mathematical ability of
nurses (Miller 1992). Often this leads to incorrect doses being administered by a factor
of ten. Bayne and Bindler (1988) identify that many nurses are aware of this deficiency
but are afraid to admit to it. A variety of strategies have been suggested to reduce the
likelihood of errors due to mathematical inability, for example, the use of calculators
(Shockley 1989) however in another studies (Eaton 1989) it has been noted that
individual nurses may not recognise glaring errors. Use of two nurses to check
medication doses is common practice particularly within paediatrics, however this could
again be providing a false sense of security as Bayne and Bindler (1988) suggest that
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nurses are unlikely to admit to their inadequacies with regard to mathematical ability. It
has been suggested (Pirie 1987) that a complexity of calculations required to be
undertaken by nursing staff are equivalent to those required in A level mathematics and
the author goes on to argue that it would be impractical to suggest that this be an entry
requirement to nursing programmes. However the current entry requirements for nursing
programmes are not consistent between educational institutions and few, if any, require
mathematical ability beyond basic secondary school qualification in arithmetic.
[f] Nurses' perceptions of medication errors
Osborne et al (1999) identified in their study nurses perceptions of medication errors. In
their ranking of perceptions of cause the respondents in the study viewed the major
causes ofmedication errors in rank order as;
1. Failure to check the name band of the patient with the medication administration
record.
2. Fatigue and exhaustion on the part of the nurse.
Osborne et al's study ranked distraction as the fourth major cause of medication error,
which was in contrast with the study undertaken by Gladstone where distraction was the
No. 1 cause for error within the unit.
A number of authors have identified the fact that nurses are reluctant to report medication
errors for fear of their potential repercussions (Gladstone 1995, Gibson 2001, Alderman
1997, Osborne et al 1999, Webster and Anderson 2002) Gladstone (1995) identified that
there was considerable variation in what managers did or did not take into account when
dealing with a drug error. These included the type of error, the type of drug, the actual or
potential effect on the patient as well as other factors such as pace of work on the ward,
staffing levels and the nurse's reaction to the error. Gladstone reports
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"there was wide variation in the criteria if any used by the managers when
deciding what action to take with regard to the nurse who had made an
error. These criteria included the part of the system that had failed, any
previous errors, the nurse's insight and attitude to the incident and the
possible extenuating circumstances."
In a study examining nurse's responses to errors Meurier (1998) reports three main
findings. The first was that nurses were more likely to make internal causal attributions as
a result of an error (i.e. they were more likely to blame themselves) no matter what the
outcome of the error. The second finding noted that nurses were likely to attribute a lower
importance to incidents with a less serious outcome. The third finding related to the
influence of the outcome on an evaluation of an error. A number of issues arise from the
findings within this study. By internalising the blame for an error a nurse may ignore
some of the other factors that may have contributed to the error resulting in a less than
full understanding of the antecedents to an untoward incident. All errors and near misses
should be recorded and reported irrespective of the outcome. Once again this facilitates a
fuller understanding of the types and causes of errors. Finally, the outcome should not be
viewed in isolation as a criterion in relation to professional practice. Meurier argues that
'If a nurse does something that is a violation of the expected actions or
omits to carry out an important observation or instruction, then this should
be taken as evidence of poor performance whether or not harm has been
done to the patient.'
[g] Potential solutions to medication errors
Webster and Anderson (2002) advocate the use of anonymous incident reporting to
reduce drug administration errors on hospital wards. In their paper they suggest the use
of the systems approach to managing such errors. They acknowledge that systems do
exist for reporting incidents within nursing however these typically are not anonymous
and tend to focus on individuals rather than hospital processes. They argue that
anonymity is an essential element of any reporting mechanism using the systems
approach to error management. In their paper they identify a number of very practical
ways in which medication errors could be reduced. For example in many drug trolleys
within wards the drugs are stored in alphabetical order and they point out that the
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alphabetical organisation is potentially dangerous as different agents are placed together
simply because their names start with the same letter. They go on to argue that this
problem is compounded by the fact that many drugs now are presented in non-descript
bottles or packets. A similar issue is also demonstrated in relation to drug cupboards.
The use of computers has allowed the reporting of medication errors to be used in a
positive way to identify common areas of error and ways of improvement. Sehati and
Inkster (1995) outline the use of a software package, used to improve management of
drug errors, in particular the use of reports resulted in the authors being able to identify;
1. The shift on which most errors are likely to occur.
2. The drugs most commonly given in error.
3. The healthcare professionals who are most susceptible to drug errors.
4. Drug error black spots.
5. The inconsistency of approach when dealing with drug errors.
The issue of medication doses within paediatrics is reported by a group of pharmacists in
Liverpool who suggest the following systems to reduce the risk of over dosage: (Caldwell
et al 2000)
1. Document dose calculation in the patient record.
2. Independent dose calculation checks by the pharmacist before the first dose is
administered.
3. The removal of dangerous drugs from floor stock.
4. Supply of ready-to-use syringes.
5. Labelling should be in the same units
The issue of medication errors is the subject of much debate within the literature and in
particular illustrates the direct and indirect costs of any error. Barber (2002) poses the
question whether we should consider non-compliance as a medical error and reports that
around one-third to one-half of patients does not take their medicines as directed. Having
reviewed much of the literature in relation to error management, Barber concludes you
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should not consider non-compliance as a medical error as the terminology is
inappropriate however non-compliance has a substantial amount to learn from medical
error theory and a merging of the approaches could benefit patients significantly.
O'Shea (1999) in undertaking a review of the literature dealing with the factors which
contribute to medication errors concluded that:
> Medication errors are a persistent problem associated with nursing practice.
> The mathematical ability of nurses is highlighted as a problem area.
> In-service education in relation to medication management is required.
> Nurse managers should consider assessment of workload, nursing care delivery
systems and staffing levels on different shifts.
> Medication errors are a multidisciplinary problem and require a multidisciplinary
approach to identify solutions. This may address problems relating to poor
adherence to policy and poorly written prescriptions.
> Interventions to reduce medication errors have been initiated, however as the
problem persists the interventions do not have a long lasting effect.
It is clear from the literature that medication errors are a widespread problem within
nursing practice and as therapies become more complex, the role of nurses in the
prescribing and administration ofmedication will do nothing to reduce the likelihood of
errors occurring. There are however a number of risk management strategies that can be
employed to reduce the incidence and impact.
[h] Barriers to Reporting Incidents
Throughout the literature relating to clinical incidents there is a recognition that barriers
to reporting incidents exist. As described earlier a number of authors identified this as a
major issue on the management ofmedication errors. Lawton and Parker (2002) report on
some research findings and conclude: -
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• Healthcare professionals, in particular doctors, are reluctant to report adverse
events to a superior.
• Healthcare professionals are more likely to report an incident to a colleague when
things go wrong
• Healthcare professionals are more likely to report incidents to a senior member of
staff, irrespective of outcome for the patient, when the incident involves a
violation of a protocol.
• Even though it is unlikely to be reported, it is most likely when the incident
represents the violation of a protocol with a bad outcome.
Dimond (2002) outlines some more fundamental reasons as to why healthcare
professionals do not report adverse incidents. These are
• Lack of awareness of the need to report what and why
• Lack ofunderstanding ofhow to report
• Staff feel that they are too busy to make a report
• Too much paperwork involved in reporting
• The patient recovers from the adverse event and the urgency goes out of the
situation.
• Fear of point scoring by colleagues, retribution by line management, disciplinary
action or litigation
• No evidence of timely feedback and / or corrective action being taken resulting
from making a report.
These findings broadly reflect those reported by an American Study by Elnitsky (1997)
whose study concluded that
'Examination of nurses' perceptions of supervisors' beliefs about and use
of incident reports revealed that 1) nearly 20% of nurses believed that
supervisors used incident reports against employees; 2) 17% of nurses
believed that their supervisors used incident reports against them in their
professional evaluations; and 3) 25% of the nurses reported they were
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afraid that supervisors would have a negative view of their skills when
they reported an incident.'
Ootim (2002) quotes Tariq Hussain, a former UKCC Director ofProfessional Conduct, in
exposing an attitude of "sack now - ask questions later" of some hospital managers being
a major reason for the non-reporting of errors. Ootim also suggests that in the United
States there tends to be "a knee-jerk reaction" by those in authority to blame the
individual for a nursing error. A review of further literature however suggests that this
has been the situation in the United Kingdom for some considerable time and Ootim's
suggestion that the situation in the UK is only now beginning to reflect the situation in
the USA, does not appear to be a reasonable one. There are many high-profile examples
of where this has occurred within medicine even where there is a perceived old boys
network, which is extensively used to protect perpetrators of errors. In nursing it is
suggested that the hierarchical and militaristic nature of nursing and the "hand-maiden"
role that nurses play to doctors have contributed to a tendency within nurse management
to apportion blame to an individual for an error.
[i] Recognising and Reporting Errors
One significant barrier to reporting an incident is recognising that an error has actually
been committed. This should also be examined alongside what Elnitsky et all (1997)
describe as nurses' incident-reporting behaviours. In a study, which recruited qualified
nurses from hospitals located in a southeastern coastal state of the United States, it was
revealed that 36% of the respondents 'believed that some incidents do not need to be
reported.' In drawing comparisons with other studies Elnitsky draws attention to the
study reported by Sutton et al (1994) from the UK and states;
'The validity and reliability of incident data, however are in question. The
number of documented incidents represents only a portion of all incidents
occurring in hospital included in this study and others. Nurses' incident
reporting behaviours revealed that some incidents are not reported. Thirty-
six percent of nurses surveyed believed that some incidents do not need to
be reported. This finding is consistent with that of Sutton et al who
reported that 35% of incidents were unreported.'
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However on closer examination this is an invalid comparison between two different
measures. Elnitsky's study examined the responses of nurses whereas Sutton's study
relied on patients indicating that nurses knowingly did not report accidents. Sutton (1994)
warns that
'The possibility of some patients exaggerating or overestimating the
occurrence of unreported incidents for their individual reasons should not
be dismissed.'
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that nurses under-report accidents and incidents. In
the main this relates to (i) the nurse does not recognise that an error has been made (ii)
the nurse does not regard the incident as requiring to be reported (iii) the nurse is fearful
of the potential consequences of reporting incidents.
There are some examples of local reporting systems, which have demonstrated that
changes can be made to prevent recurrence of certain types of errors. James (2003)
illustrates an incident reporting scheme within a hospital group functioning for eleven
years and reporting on one thousand incidents. James goes on to describe some of the
features believed to contribute to the success. These include a clear and shared
understanding of the definition of an incident; the assurance of anonymity (except in
those cases where harm has occurred), the voluntary nature of the reporting; maintaining
enthusiasm by presenting results every quarter and demonstrable changes to preventing
recurrence. As confidence in the system has developed, individuals have been willing to
provide their name voluntarily
[j] Organisational Culture in Reporting Errors
In an interview for the Harvard Risk Management Forum, Lucian Leape, points out that
there are two main ingredients needed to be present within an organisation to develop an
organisational culture which is safety conscious. These are effective leadership from the
Chief Executive and a non-punitive environment. He goes on to say that there has to be
an edict that says "we do not punish people for making or reporting errors. Period. We
only punish people for misconduct.'" When asked to elaborate on the difference between
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the two he argues that 'Very few errors are due to misconduct. Most errors are caused by
systems failure not people failure.'
Nolan (2000) argues that in order to improve patient safety by reducing the number of
errors, the strategies for the design of safe systems of care have to be adopted. He goes
on to suggest that designers of systems of care can make them safer by attending to three
tasks:
1. Designing the system to prevent errors
2. Designing procedures to make errors visible when they do occur so
that they may be intercepted
3. Designing procedures for mitigating the adverse effects of errors when
they are not detected or intercepted
Nolan illustrates this point by illustrating a common error when using Automated Teller
Machines (ATMs). It was noted that a large number of individuals left their bankcard in
the ATM once they had received their money. It was suggested that the reason this was
happening so frequently was the primary purpose ofgoing to an ATM is to obtain money.
Therefore, once you have received it the principal task is complete and removing the card
is forgotten. The original system dispensed the money before returning the card. In order
to prevent such errors the system was changed so that the card was returned before the
money was dispensed. Indeed this was enhanced even further in that cash would not be
dispensed until the card was physically removed from the ATM. Therefore the individual
must always take their card and, given the primary purpose was to obtain money, collect
the money dispensed. This illustrated how a system could be modified in order to reduce
/ eliminate the identified error.
This example illustrated by Nolan identifies how human factors in systems lead to errors.
Weinger et al (1998) argue that a significant way of reducing errors involving medical
devices is to incorporate human factors into the design of such devices at the outset.
They go on to suggest that the patient's safety will be enhanced if the medical community
demands better-designed medical devices through standards, regulations and market
forces.
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This apparent failure to incorporate human factors into design is not however restricted
simply to medical devices. A first alert from the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA)
identified that concentrated forms of Potassium had been prepared in similar vials to
water or normal saline resulting in Potassium being used to dilute venous drugs resulting,
in some cases, in death. Wilson (2001) illustrates a similar issue whereby a company
produced a bottle of stoma deodorant closely matching a bottle of eye drops,
demonstrating the potential for a stoma deodorant to be inserted into the eye. Wilson also
argues that there is an even greater likelihood of this happening given that the very reason
the patient requires eye drops may be due to poor eyesight.
Shaw (2001) identifies that changes within organisations are only effective when
behaviour changes accordingly.
'Institutional policies, standards and guidelines are only effective if people
whose actions they are intended to influence are aware of them,
understand them and are able to comply with them as written. The mere
existence of such policies, standards, guidelines and protocols does not
guarantee their compliance neither does the dissemination of such
information.'
[k] Reporting Systems.
Pinker (2002) reports that the organisational culture within the Quebec region of Canada
has changed dramatically whereby the Quebec College of Physicians and Surgeons has
moved to change its code of conduct to expect its members to reveal errors to patients as
quickly as possible or face disciplinary action. The Quebec government has then
followed suit and expects hospitals within the region to adopt the same approach.
In another part of Canada, Vancouver, staff are encouraged to discuss adverse events
openly and honestly. Kent (2002) reports that multi-disciplinary staff within one unit
discuss adverse events or near misses on a regular basis in what are described as 'safety
huddles'. In some instances the solutions to preventing a repeat of an adverse incident or
preventing a near miss becoming a full-blown incident are very simple. These two very
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different approaches have been adopted within Canada and as yet there are no available
studies to demonstrate which is the more effective.
[I] Approaches to Managing Errors
Reason (2000) identifies two approaches to managing human error, the person approach
and the systems approach. The two different systems are summarised as
> The person approach focuses on errors of individuals, blaming them for
forgetfulness, inattention, or moral weakness.
> The system approach concentrates on the conditions under which individuals
work and tries to build defences to avert errors or mitigate their effect
The person approach
This approach remains the dominant approach within healthcare as well as some other
industries and it has been argued that such an approach is counter-productive to the
development of a safety culture within organisations. By focussing on the acts of
individuals the organisation fails to recognise the context in which the error occurs and as
a result there is a failure to identify recurring errors and their causes. Reason argues
'The pursuit of greater safety is seriously impeded by an approach that
does not seek out and remove the error-provoking properties within the
system at large.'
The systems approach
The systems approach to managing errors is geared towards making changes to systems
in order to reduce or mitigate the effects of errors. Nolan (2000) in reviewing literature
surrounding improving systems identifies 5 categories of system changes, which will
reduce errors and adverse events.
1. Reduce complexity




5. Mitigate the unwanted side effects of change.
Hall (2002) however dismisses the notion that systems are at the root cause of mistakes
arguing that this is a flawed argument based on a philosophy of structuralism and should
be replaced by virtue ethics. Hall goes on to argue that systems do not make errors -
people do. She argues that: 'The new philosophy of deconstructivism also does not offer
any solution to the management of errors.' Hall points to virtue ethics as a way of
reducing errors and identifies how this may be viewed
'Virtue ethics means character counts, that being a virtuous person
matters. Translated into 21^-century patient care, it means that you see
people who care for patients as individuals, and you hold their caregivers
responsible for their actions. People are not mere cogs in systems. They
are human beings who can be held accountable for their acts, including
their mistakes.'
[m] Who makes errors?
Ootim (2002b) cites Bell et al (1997) who concluded that skilled performers of cognitive
tasks make fewer errors than novices. Reason (1990) however would argue that even the
most skilled performers could make errors, which have disastrous outcomes. Ootim goes
on to make the point that undetected errors are particularly problematic in that when an
error is detected appropriate corrective action can be taken either at the time or at a later
stage to minimise the impact of the error. No such corrective action can be undertaken
with undetected errors. Reason (2000) argues that it is often the best people who make
the worst mistakes. Error is not the monopoly of an unfortunate few. Henry (2000) in an
editorial covering quality of care, health system errors and nurses, identifies that despite
the growing body of evidence of systems failures, managers and other authorities
continue to blame, and seek to blame, the person who was involved in that error.
Donchin et al (1995) reported a study involving an examination of errors within an
intensive care unit. The two data sources were the incidents reported by nurses and
physicians immediately after they happened and observations undertaken on a sample of
patients by individuals' experiences in human engineering. The study reported that nurses
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committed a greater proportion of the errors than those committed by doctors. This
conclusion applies to both the reported errors (nurses 54%, doctors 46%) and observed
errors (nurses 60% and doctors 40%). However, the conclusions recognised that the
complex interactions between the two staff groups play a significant role.
'A significant number of dangerous errors occur in ICU. Many of these
errors could be attributed to problems of communication between the
physicians and nurses. Applying human engineering concepts to the study
of the weak points of a specific ICU may help to reduce the number of
errors. Errors should not be considered as an incurable disease but rather
as preventable phenomena.'
This study makes an attempt to quantify the rates of errors among and between doctors
and nurses within a specific setting and illustrates the inter-relationship between the two
different groups. Whilst it does not draw specific conclusions around blame it could be
suggested that the nature of these interactions makes it very difficult to pin-point the
exact cause of errors and as such makes it difficult to apportion blame to an individual.
This is a conclusion suggested by a number of different authors.
Summary
The available literature demonstrates the increasing interest in errors, their causes and
management. Inextricably linked with this is the issue of blame and how it is apportioned.
These issues generated the interest of the researcher and stimulated the development of
this area of study. There is a strongly held belief that nurses, in the pursuit of managing
nursing, sought to blame nurses for errors. The purpose of the research is to determine
whether this belief is matched by reality. If so, why is this the case? As outlined earlier,
within the literature there is a strong body of evidence from social scientists that this is, in
part, related to the origins of nursing and the way it has developed as a profession.
4. Organisational Issues and Lessons fromOther Industries
In any examination of error management within the health service it is important to
identify lessons from other industries. Different industries have identified processes for
managing errors and more importantly how these contribute to organisational
development. Helmreich (2000) draws comparison between how errors are managed
within the aviation industry and health services. He identifies three main sources of data
used to manage errors.
1. Confidential survey of pilots and other crewmembers.
2. Non-punitive incident reporting systems.
3. Observational methodology.
Through this data collection, errors are categorised which in turn is useful in identifying







Each error is categorised and a mitigation strategy adopted to prevent it recurring. For
example errors categorised as proficiency errors require technical training or retraining,
whereas communication and decision errors require team training. This model has been
adapted for use in health care settings and in particular within the operating theatre. There
is recognition that the operating theatre is a more complex environment than a cockpit
and the more obvious difference that 'Aircraft tend to be more predictable that patients.'
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However, there are a number of different behaviours, which may contribute to increase
the risk to patients within an operating theatre. These are;
• Communication
• Leadership
• Interpersonal relationships, conflict
• Preparation, planning, vigilance
One of the training strategies used within the aviation industry is the use of simulators.
Within healthcare, anaesthetics was one of the first disciplines to embrace the notion of
error management. This specialty is also one that lends itself to the use of simulators. A
centre for training has been established in which a mock theatre has been established
where a mannequin connected to a computer programme can simulate different problems
experienced during a general anaesthetic. This allows trainees to react to different
situations and manage problems without danger to patients. It also allows the
development ofpotentially high-risk techniques such as difficult intubations.
The use of simulators is now an integral part of education and training of medical and
nursing students as well as the skills development programmes for qualified staff. These
are outlined by a number of different authors: Anaesthetics (Merry et al 2002, Forrest et
al 2002, Devitt et al 2001, Byrne and Greaves 2001, Jacobsen et al 2001, Morgan and
Cleave-Hogg 2000), Surgery (Paisley et al 2001), Urology (Ballaro et al 1999),
Gynaecology (Hadzimahmtovic et al (1999).
Barach and Small (2000) identify methods of reporting incidents, errors and near misses
in aviation, petrochemical processing, steel production, nuclear power and the radio
pharmaceutical industries. In comparing the differing systems in other industries with
those within medicine a number of conclusions were identified.
• Research studies have validated an epidemic of grossly underreported,
preventable injuries due to medical management.
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• Recent policy documents have placed high priority on improving incident
reporting as the first step in addressing patient injuries, and have called for the
translation of lessons from other industries.
• Complex non-medical industries have evolved incident reporting systems that
focus on near misses, provide incentives for voluntary reporting, ensure
confidentiality whilst bolstering accountability, and emphasise perspectives of
systems in data collection analysis and improvement.
• Reporting of near misses offers numerous benefits over adverse events; greater
frequency allowing quantitative analysis; fewer barriers to data collection; limited
liability and recovery patterns that can be captured, studied, and used for
improvement.
• Education and engagement of all stakeholders of health care and negotiation of
their conflicting goals will be necessary to change the balance of barrier
incentives in favour of implementing reporting systems.
McCune (2000) argues that airlines now have rigorous psychological assessment for
pilots and concludes that
'psychological assessment of doctors or medical students, or both, along
with training in recognising personality types and error-prone situations
could be ofbenefit to both practitioners and patients.'
Sexton et al (2000) examine the methods adopted within medicine and aviation and
conclude that
> Medical staff are more likely than aviation staff to deny the effects of stress and
fatigue.
> Cockpit crews and intensive care staff advocate flat hierarchies but surgeons are
less likely to do so.
> Error is difficult to discuss in medicine and not all staff accept personal
susceptibility to error.
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Robinson (2002) demonstrates the similarities between the emergency services and
aviation. The main areas of similarity are ;-
• High stress environment
• Decisions with life or death consequences
• Rapid decision-making
• Many distracting factors
• Amenable to protocols
In drawing comparison between the approach taken in some industries and that taken by
the NHS, Ottewill (2003) concludes that;-
'.. the NHS has lagged behind other industries in recognizing the ubiquity
of human error and implementing cultural changes to minimize its effect.
The person approach to human error and the inherent blame culture has
been shown to have serious shortcomings. This situation is neither to the
benefit of professionals nor patients. Although it has a certain attraction
for managers, deflecting blame from organisational and leadership failings
does nothing to correct weaknesses in systems and so will not prevent
future error. In the long term therefore it is in no-one's interests at all.'
This conclusion however does not take account of personal failings and how these can be
dealt with within the approach suggested by Ottewill. It could be argued that there is little
to be gained by managers in seeking to deflect blame from the organisation to the
individual. Equally it could be argued that it is convenient for perpetrators of errors to
attribute the cause to perceived organisational failings in order to deflect focus away from
a personal weakness.
The comparisons with other industries are helpful in demonstrating how a systems
approach to incident management can reduce the risk of a recurrence and empower staff
to report incidents and near misses freely. However, the number of variables
characterised by the complexity of human interactions within healthcare are considerably
greater that those experienced, for example, in the airline industry. Therefore, a wholesale
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adoption of incident management methods from such industries into healthcare is
inappropriate.
[a] Clinical Governance
Clinical Governance as a concept was described in the Department of Health's 1997
white paper Designed to Care. One minister for health described this as 'corporate
accountability for clinical performance.' The intention was the political desire to move
away from the heavily finance biased agenda of the internal market towards a
concentration of the clinical quality of care. Sam Galbraith, the Minister for Health in
Scotland described the new term thus
'Clinical governance is the vital ingredient which will enable us to achieve
a Health Service in which the quality of health care is paramount. The best
definition that I have seen of clinical governance is simply that it means
"corporate accountability for clinical performance". Clinical governance
will not replace professional self-regulation and individual clinical
judgement, concepts that lie at the heart of health care in this country. But
it will add an extra dimension that will provide the public with guarantees
about standards of care.'
What is particularly important about this statement is that it relates to clinical care in its
widest sense; it is not restricted to doctors. Given the timing of its inclusion in the White
Papers covering Scotland and England so soon after the revelations from Bristol, it has
often been associated with these events, which were primarily medical issues. Lugon and
Seeker-Walker perhaps summarise these views in the introduction to their book
Advancing Clinical Governance, where they comment that
'Society's view of clinicians has recently undergone a sea change. This
has followed from a series of high-profile medical disasters, which have
received considerable media publicity. This has forced the present
government and the NHS to be seen to be putting their house in order.
Clinical governance became an integral part of the 1999 NHS Act.'
It is interesting how the use of the terms clinician and medical are used almost
synonymously. Whilst there can be little doubt that some high profile clinical 'disasters'
influenced the issues around clinical governance there is no evidence to conclude that
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these were the exclusive reasons for the inclusion of this new concept into the White
Papers. The primary reason relates more to the desire of the then new government
wishing to be seen to stamp its new authority on a health service run by its political
opponents for many years. It was an attempt to redress the perceived imbalance between
the comparatively heavy emphasis placed on financial management as opposed to quality
of care often perceived by clinicians as less important to managers and politicians.
Clinical Governance is perhaps the most significant policy development in recent years in
providing a framework within which clinical care could be improved. Managers and
clinicians could use clinical governance as a tool to improve both the delivery of care and
the environment in which care is delivered.
Wilson (2002) in Tingle and Cribb, illustrates that clinical governance incorporates a
number of different process including
> Clinical audit
> Evidence based practice in daily use supported within the infrastructure
> Clinical effectiveness
> Clinical risk management with adverse events being detected, openly investigated
and lessons learned.
> Lessons for improving practice are learned from complaints
> Outcome of care
> Good quality clinical data to monitor clinical care with problems of poor clinical
practice being recognised early and dealt with.
> Good practice systematically disseminated within and outside the organisation
and clinical risk reduction programmes of a high standard being in place.
One important area, which Wilson has omitted in the list identified above, is the
involvement of patients, carers and the wider public in clinical governance processes.
Kelson (2001) in Lugon & Seeker-Walker outlines that this is an area, which has been a
key feature in a number of policy frameworks (The White Paper The new NHS and A
First Class Service). Kelson goes on to suggest that patient involvement (for the purposes
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of the publication Kelson uses the term 'patient' to include patients, service users, carers,
members of the public and members of groups representing their interests) can be
achieved at two main levels:
> Individual involvement - For example the central role of patients in decisions
about their own health and care.
> Collective level - For example patient representatives' actively contributing to
NHS policy and planning.
[b] Risk Management
The management of risk within the clinical setting is in itself not a new concept. Clinical
staff have argued that almost all clinical interventions involved some form of risk
management that has become part of the caring process as they have become more
experienced. However, the concept has developed into a more structured framework
within which clinical care and the environment in which it is delivered can be
systematically evaluated in order to assess, identify, prioritise and effectively manage
risks. At an organisational level such risks apply to wider organisational issues such as
finance.
[c] Summary
Whilst authors have identified similarities between the NHS and other industries, and
identified the need to change an organisation's culture, few have acknowledged the
difficulty in changing cultures within long-standing professions developed over centuries.
The researcher argues that this is key to understanding why there are significant barriers
to simply lifting a system of regulation from one industry, superimposing it into
healthcare and expecting to achieve similar results. The challenge is undoubtedly the shift
of organisational culture within the NHS to one more akin to other high-risk industries.
This in itself is a difficult and challenging process. When the need to change the culture
within professions is added the magnitude of the challenge increases several-fold.
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5. TheConcept ofBlame
[a] The nature of blame
The concept of blame is central to the main aims of the research. In different settings
there are different interpretations of blame.
The Oxford dictionary defines blame as; assign fault or responsibility to, assign the
responsibility for (an error or wrong) to a person, responsibility for a bad result;
culpability, the act ofblaming or attributing responsibility.
The Oxford thesaurus identifies a number of synonyms
Find fault with, censure, criticise, fault, accuse, charge, indict, condemn, point to, point
(the finger) at, rebuke, reprimand, recriminate, reproach, scold, reprehend, reprove, hold
responsible, fix the responsibility upon, put or place or lay the blame, culpability,
responsibility, guilty.
Within the field of social psychology research, blame is investigated in how we either
accept blame or attempt to apportion blame to others. Tennen and Affleck (1990) review
a number of studies looking at blame attribution and find that there are two different
schools of thought with regard to blame - the psychoanalytical school views blame as a
developmental diathesis and the social psychology literature, which sees blame as
'learned helplessness' and 'excuse theory'.
Campbell-Tiech (2001) in discussing the European Convention on Human Rights
delivers a fairly scathing attack on society as a whole and argues that this is
'... symptomatic of what I perceive to be a deeper malaise; we are, as a
society, overly attached to the concept of blame. It is not sufficient that
you are right; someone else must also be shown to be wrong. In apparently
empowering the individual against the state we have moved further away
from the acceptance of risk, from the recognition of the fact of accident.
Negligence is nowadays such an all-embracing concept that there is little
if any room for the defence of accident. The results of this way of thinking
are slowly seeping into public consciousness. Teachers cancelling the field
trip, the rugby coach requiring insurance, the restraunteur seeking an
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indemnity in advice from his reputable supplier: all join the doctor
practicing defensive medicine and the lawyer whose advice is so
convoluted as to be worthless (but safe).'
LaDuca (2001) draws our attention to the issues of competence and blame. Whilst the
paper deals with the competence of doctors the issues relate equally to the competence of
nurses or indeed any other skilled individual. It is argued that;
'...attention is directed to mechanisms for assuming that the doctor has
maintained the competence we certified at some earlier time. Usually our
effort centres on the doctor, but it is essential to recognize that the process
of evaluating the doctor draws our attention inevitably to evaluating the
situation. We confront the need to distinguish the blameworthy error from
the blameless misfortune.'
Essentially LaDuca argues that there is a need to examine the entire context of the
situation rather than concentrating on the individual before we can decide whether blame
can be attributed.
Merry and McCall-Smith (2001) consider 5 different levels in the classification ofblame.
Level 1 : The first level is pure causal blame, where the agent is identified
as the physical cause of an event but has acted reasonably, has broken no
rules and has done nothing wrong in moral terms.
Level 2 : The second is blame attributed for an action, which
unintentionally deviates from or falls short of what can normatively be
expected of the actor (that is the way of doing things prescribed in the
textbook - the 'theoretical norm')., but no moral culpability exists. This
may be construed as negligence if conduct is measured against an absolute
standard and fails to take account either of the fact that the reasonable
person is a human being with all the limitations that status implies, or of
the state ofmind of the individual at the time.
Level 3 : The third level is blame attributed for an action, which deviates
from or falls short ofwhat can reasonably be expected of the actor (that is
the way things are done by people of reasonable competence in the field -
the 'empiric norm') and where moral culpability may exist even though
there is no intention to cause harm. .. People can only be morally
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accountable for those acts which they have chosen to perform; things
which they could not reasonably have avoided doing should not be laid to
their moral account.
Level 4 : The fourth level of blame is appropriate for situations where the
actor knows of the existence of risk and nevertheless proceeds with the
action. This is recklessness.
Level 5 : The fifth level entails an unambiguous intention to cause harm.
Alderman (1997) illustrates the need to move away from the system whereby nurses are
blamed for medication errors to one in which a culture of openness allows a nurse to
report such incidents and near misses in a punitive free environment.
In an extensive discussion around the ethical issues involved in adverse events Krizek
(2000) identifies five major hurdles to improving quality within surgical practice
1. Inadequate data about the incidence of adverse events
2. Inadequate practice guidelines or protocols and poor outcome analysis
3. A culture ofblame
4. A need to compensate 'injured patients'
5. Difficulty in truth telling.
All these hindrances are in someway related to the culture within an organisation,
[b] Apportioning blame
Whenever something goes wrong in a hospital there is usually frenzied activity within the
media, management and public. The Kennedy report following the affairs of paediatric
cardiac surgery cases in Bristol resulted in a breakdown of confidence in medical
professions. It is not clear if this influenced Baroness O'Neill of Bengrave's choice of
subject for the 2002 Reith Lectures, but the issue ofTrust was the main theme of the five
lectures delivered throughout the first part of 2002.
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In an emotional letter to the BMJ in 2000 an anonymous writer explained that as a result
of the trauma, which they experienced following an incident and the subsequent
retraining that they realised that 'blaming individuals is more emotionally satisfying that
targeting the institution.' The anonymous author draws comfort from the conclusion
reached by Reason in an earlier article in the BMJ that found that 'It is often the best
people who make the worst mistakes.'
Warden (1996) outlines the proposed new powers for the Health Service Ombudsman as
being a change which would do nothing to expel the impression of a blame culture within
the NHS. He quotes the paper describing the new powers of the Ombudsman being
"without seeking in any way to encourage or promote the blame culture it
is the Ombudsman's responsibility to criticise where, in his view, the
patient does not receive the service he is reasonably entitled to expect."
Grant (1999) provides yet a further example of how media can not only distort the facts
of the case but also prolong the agony of nurses involved in tragic error. Grant describes
how, at the time of an incident, the Massachusetts Department ofHealth did not refer the
nurses to the governing body, that an internal investigation and two further external
investigations undertaken by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organisations and the National Institutes
for Health found no fault with any individual nurse. Despite this, four years later, the
Massachusetts State Board of Registration and Nursing proposed sanctions against the
nurses involved without ever having conducted an appropriate investigation into the case.
This would tend to demonstrate in this particular case, which may be replicated in other
areas, nurses' and nursing's apparent predisposition towards attributing blame.
In reporting some of the proceedings of the Bristol enquiry which set out to investigate
the circumstances behind a number of paediatric deaths, Healy (2000) reports a number
of calls to remove the blame culture within the NHS in order to allow the service to learn
from its mistakes. Nigel Ofen, Head of Clinical Quality at the NHS Executive Eastern
Region is quote as saying "until we remove the blame culture, we cannot move forward."
62
We have to remember that a generation of doctors was brought up in a medical education
system that was about being put down if you got it wrong. In the same report, Karen
Parsley, Director of Nursing at Brighton Healthcare drew parallels with the aviation
industry that the lack ofblame culture allowed pilots to have regular feedback sessions as
a result of simulated exercises. Two other important differences were presented, i.e. the
NHS was more hierarchical in its organisation structure than the aviation industry, and
also junior pilots are encouraged to report concerns and they are listened to by their
senior colleagues, the implication being that the same could not be applied to medicine.
Deirdre Hind, the Chair of Commission for Health Improvement, backed the call for a no
blame culture and argued that it is essential that both the public and the media reduce the
humiliation, blame and pillorying ofpeople who admit their mistakes.
Recognising that a number of commentators have drawn parallels with the aviation
industry, Nottingham (2001) advances the analogy between medicine and aviation,
arguing that
"there are some branches of medicine in which not only is the doctor the
only pilot on the flight deck but he is flying in a converted second world
war bomber with questionable reliability. I would dearly love to fly in
such an aircraft but whether I would chose to fly in one to the United
States is another matter. The airlines (the NHS in this case) are unable to
afford to replace the aircraft regularly and who flies the plane when the
pilot is away being updated. The passengers (patients) do not like being
kept waiting and often there are no spare parts".
Nottingham presents one other major difference between the aviation and healthcare
system by recognising that there are considerable data collected on adverse incidents in
the aviation industry but asks the question "where is this information?" Which airlines
regularly fly with aircrafts that are mechanically dangerous? Which is the world's worst
airline or the most dangerous airport? Where does one find this information out? Is there
aviation or pilots league table similar to the hospital league tables that we hear so much
about? How much choice do I get over who flies me when I next board the plane?
Nottingham concludes that mistakes do however occur. When they do, consultants may
be suspended or lose their jobs and the media reaction is unforgiving and predictable.
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Disclosure of the mistake to the patient may cause legal proceedings to be started. This is
not much incentive to own up.
In an editorial in 2001, the Canadian Medical Association reported the case of a four-day-
old girl undergoing cardiac surgery, which tragically was not successful. This death was
the twelfth in 1994 and resulted in the closure of the cardiac surgery programme. It was
concluded that errors occurred at all levels of the cardiac surgery programme, in its hiring
procedures, lack of monitoring, lack of a complaints procedure and even in the
administrative decision to develop a paediatric cardiac surgery programme at a centre
with a caseload too low to sustain excellence. The Assistant Chief Judge undertook an
inquest into the deaths during the cardiac programme. He concluded that error is a human
reality and the Canadian Medical Association adds to this, claiming that blaming is also a
human reality. The editorial goes on to conclude
"everyone who has studied problems of error in medicine agrees that the
prevention of errors requires identification and frank non-punitive
investigation and discussion. As in other complex activities such as
aviation, the identification of errors should be active not passive, focusing
on not just catastrophic events but on near misses that could have been
catastrophic but were not. It is always easier to find a scapegoat than to
change the culture of a working environment but we must find the
resources and muster the personal resolve to look at what we do in a
systematic way, prospectively as well as retrospectively, expecting errors
and developing non-blame mechanisms for preventing them."
Sibbald (2001) again draws parallels between the reporting of errors between medical
spheres and aviation. It poses the rhetorical question why medicine does not follow
aviation's lead in reporting errors. One suggested reason is the potential for litigation.
"The Director of Research and Education at the Canadian Medical
Protective Association is saying that there is no privilege (exemption from
legal action) following disclosure. In other words, people reveal medical
errors at their legal peril. Sibbald also goes on to draw parallels between
the system in Canada and those in Australia and the United Kingdom and
interestingly describes the setting up of the database of errors by the
National Patient Safety Agency as a mandatory no name, no blame
national system for reporting failures, mistakes and near misses which is
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some way short of the reality. In Australia, the Australian Incident
Monitoring Study (AIMS) has allowed healthcare workers to voluntarily
and anonymously report incidents and accidents.
The pervasive nature of the blame culture within the NHS is not however restricted to
clinical errors. Bradshaw (2002) illustrates how the blame culture is perpetuated by
Government Departments, i.e. Department ofHealth on managers and the reforms are not
implemented quickly enough or indeed the suggested positive outcomes are not realised.
Bradshaw argues that
"the system of Health Service delivery creaks under the weight of
Government reform and when things go wrong there is one particular
target group to blame, that is NHS managers who are already reeling from
target fatigue, arising from the volume and pace of the current reforms.'
Bradshaw also shows that blame is a convenient escape route. He argues that it avoids
Government shouldering national accountability and is convenient because NHS
managers are not particularly well liked by the general public. Thus the Audit
Commission Report in 2001 on waiting times in Accident and Emergency, which
concluded that waiting times had worsened nationally and blame for this was promptly
placed on managerial shortcomings
"criticising managers is also far easier than doing something really radical
such as imposing a user charges for an A&E visit which is the most
effective way to reduce unnecessary attendance."
In reviewing a new text "The Trouble With Blame: Victims, Perpetrators and
Responsibility", Simon (1996), makes the point that;
'The trouble with blaming is doing too much or too little. Obviously there
is a place for blame, but it must not be used as a means of obscuring the
reasons for our actions, whatever they may be.
... Balance is the key.'
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Whilst the text under discussion related to perpetrators and victims of sexual and physical
abuse, the issue of apportioning blame applies equally to the management of clinical
incidents.
The issue of blame within healthcare is not peculiar to the British NHS. This is an issue
which has and is being tackled in most healthcare systems. Within Canada, the United
Kingdom was being identified as an exemplar in developing an open culture of reporting
errors via the National Patient Safety Agency. Sibbald (2001) argues one of the reasons
that there is lack of disclosure in Canada is that there is no privilege (exception from legal
action) following disclosure. Inaccurately she then goes on to suggest that this is the case
in the United Kingdom, by suggesting that
'In the UK a mandatory no name, no-blame national system for reporting
failure, mistakes and near misses should be implemented by the newly
formed National Patient Safety Agency by the end of 2002. It aims to
reduce the number of serious prescribing error by 40% by 2005.'
Anonymous reporting of incidents with the NHS is not as yet a reality. However, in his
consultation document entitled 'Making Amends', the Chief Medical Officer of the
Department ofHealth, makes a number of recommendations including
> Statutory provisions would be introduced to encourage openness in the
reporting of adverse events. This would encompass:
> A duty of candour requiring clinicians and health service managers to
inform patients about actions which have resulted in harm.
> Exemption from disciplinary action for those reporting adverse events
or medical errors (except where there is a criminal offence or where it
would not be safe for the professional to continue to treat patients)
> Legal privilege would be provided for reports and information
identifying adverse events except where the information is not
recorded in the medical record.
[c ] Blame and The Patient's Perspective
There are some important issues, which require to be explored around the patient's
perspective in relation to clinical incidents. The earlier discussion related to how the
public's perceptions may be influenced by how untoward incidents are reported in all
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areas of the media. It is understandable that the general public are concerned about
incidents and their concern is equally understandable when they are apparently told that
the culture within the NHS should not seek to apportion blame to whoever was
responsible for an untoward incident, particularly when such an incident has resulted in
the death of a patient. This was very clearly articulated by one patient representative who
comments on an incident where the wrong kidney was removed, that
'A perfectly fair consumer perspective is: If you cannot tell right from left
then are you fit to practice?'
Whilst the reality of the situation was somewhat more complicated than not knowing left
from right but a recording error that was made and not corrected and this subtlety was not
lost on this commentator and he goes on to acknowledge
'Although I understand all the valid reasons for avoiding a culture of
wholesale blame, patients are entitled to require the people whom they
trust with their lives to take responsibility and be held accountable for
their actions. If the medical profession cannot cope with this reasonable
demand, rebuilding public confidence in its trustworthiness will prove to
be more of an uphill struggle than it need be. It may be hard in so far as
scarcely any doctors deliberately damage their patients, but the public
expects privileged professionals to accept their obligations, including
penalties for inexcusable carelessness. Perhaps readers can explain why
professionals should not suffer the consequences of gross carelessness like
employees in every other trade and calling.' (Goss 2000)
This is possibly the biggest challenge to healthcare professionals i.e. finding a way in
which clinical incidents can be managed in as fair a way as possible to the individual
practitioner whilst at the same time ensuring that current and future patients maintain
their confidence in individuals, groups of staff and the institution as a whole.
The issue of disclosure of an incident to a patient has provoked much debate. The
arguments have been polarised. At one end the approach is the patient's right to be told
everything about their care and at the other the approach is if there is no harm there is no
point in worrying the patient. The Health Committee of the House of Commons in 1999
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published a report entitled "Procedures Relating to Adverse Clinical Incidents and
Outcomes in Medical Care". The Royal College of Physicians of London prepared a
statement to contribute to the report in which it is acknowledged that adverse outcomes
were concealed from patients.
'There is no doubt that in the past some incidents and adverse outcomes
were concealed from patients, their relatives and management. It must not
be assumed that the motivation for such concealment was necessarily a
guilty attempt to avoid blame. Many well-meaning professionals believed
that the complete disclosure might simply cause increased anxiety in the
patient and relatives, which could interfere with subsequent care. It was
always the case that steps were taken to minimise and alleviate the adverse
effects produced. (Royal College ofPhysicians 2000)'
There is no doubt that much of what is described here may well be the case but it is this
type ofpaternalism which so often angers patient groups.
The rise in consumerism principles within society as a whole has not only resulted in the
approaches being adopted by patients and their representatives as described above but the
courts have also had to change their approach. Edozien (2001) describes how accepted
medical practice may be negligent and outlines a number of rulings illustrating the courts
have changed and concludes that:
'The courts reserve the right to decide that even accepted medical practice
may be negligent. For policy reasons they have seldom used this right but
in line with consumerist pressure in society at large, this position is
shifting and the courts are now exercising the right more often. The
challenge is to find the appropriate balance, which upholds the rights of
the individual whilst protecting the overall interest of society.'
[d] Summary
How blame is apportioned has become an area of interest within the NHS in relation to
what has been described as a culture of blame. In an attempt to move away from this
there have been a number of calls for a blame free culture. At its most simple this would
suggest a culture in which there is no blame apportioned. Yet those who call for such an
outcome are unclear as to what this organisational culture might look or feel like. The
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researcher takes the view that this has become a victim of extreme 'political correctness'.
As a result, some would argue that blame should be avoided at all costs. There are
however some very clear situations where apportioning blame is entirely justified. The
use of a systems (rather than a person) approach to the management of an incident allows
a clearer understanding of the root causes. This in turn facilitates a more effective
resolution. It is the researcher's view that whilst a systems approach is being discussed
more widely within the nursing professions, it is the person approach that remains the
dominant method ofmanagement.
There has also been a wider interest in the concept of blame within society as a whole
and it is an issue being addressed by many different groups in different settings for
example teachers, social workers, police etc. Blame is also being used in the health
context in a different sense, in that patients are blamed for their state of health e.g.
blamed for developing cancer as a result of smoking or heart disease as a result of poor
diet etc. Blame within a legal context relates to an individual's moral culpability for acts
of omission or commission and provide us with yet a further set of circumstances in
which blame may be defined and attributed.
6. The Legal Context
[a] Nursing and the law
Nurses understanding of the law and how it affects their professional life has not played a
prominent role in basic preparation for registration. In the preface to his book Law For
Nurses and Nurse-Administrators in 1940, Speller points out that although some
knowledge of law is expected of candidates for certain higher nursing qualifications such
as the University of London Diploma, 'no book on law has yet been written for the
nurse'. This spurred him to write a book for nurses. Young (1995) argues that 'Their
knowledge still tends to be patchy but is now a topic that very much grabs their interest'.
An understanding of the law is now part of the pre-registration and undergraduate
programmes within the UK. Understanding duty of care is a fundamental part of an
understanding of a legal perspective of nursing practice.
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The differences between criminal and tort law are outlined by a number of authors in this
field (for example Montgomery 1995). Criminal deals with a wrongdoing committed
against society as a whole. Tort law deals with the relationships between individuals. To
this end any study of law in relation to professional nursing practice is concerned with
tort.
In order to determine whether an action has been deemed to be negligent, three basic
questions need to be answered in the affirmative.
1. Does a duty of care exist between the two parties involved ?
2. Has the duty of care been breached ?
3. Has the breach of duty resulted in an injury ?
The first of these questions are readily answered. It is relatively simple to establish
whether a duty of care exists. Within nursing any nurse who looks after a patient within
an institution or within the patient's home clearly has a duty of care to that patient. The
second question is more difficult to establish - i.e. did the professional fail in their duty
of care. This brings into question the standard of care provided. Within English case law,
the Bolam case in 1957 established the standard of care expected is that of any 'ordinary
skilled doctor acting in accordance with the practice accepted by a responsible body of
medical men skilled in that particular art'. (Bolam v Friern Barnet Management
committee). Thus the standard of care any patient can expect is a reasonable one and not
the 'gold standard'.
Within Scotland, the case considered as the leading authority is Hunter v Hanley 1955.
This case predates Bolam and the language adopted by Lord Clyde suggests that the test
relates to the course of action taken by any professional man of ordinary skill. McNair in
1957 however uses a different form of words and relates to the actions of a body of
medical men. Whilst this may appear to be a straightforward standard against which other
cases may be measured, Howie (1983) argues that standards adopted within England are
different from those in Scotland. It is important to review these two cases and explore
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Howie's conclusion that the two tests are different, indeed, to explore the view that the
test in Scots law is more stringent than in English Law.
In Hunter V Hanley, Lord Clyde directed that-
'To establish liability by a doctor where deviation from normal practice is
alleged, three factors require to be established. First of all it must be
proved that there is a usual and normal practice; secondly it must be
proved that the defender has not adopted that practice and thirdly (and this
is of crucial importance) it must be established that the course adopted is
one which no professional man of ordinary skill would have taken if he
had been acting with ordinary care.'
In Bolam v Friern HMC, McNair J directed that
'A doctor is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with a practice
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that
particular art ... merely because there is a body of such opinion that takes a
contrary view.'
In Hunter V Hanley the test is that a doctor can be found to be negligent if it can be
shown that the action taken is one in which no professional medical man of ordinary skill
would take. In Bolam V Friern however the test is that a doctor cannot be found to be
negligent if it can be shown that the action taken is one which a body of medical men
would take. Hence, Bowie's assertion that the test for negligence is more stringent in
Scotland than in England.
Other authors dispute this potential difference between the tests in England and Scotland.
For example Norrie argues that if a Scots court was unable to establish that a common
practice was negligent then it would be difficult to see that this would not be the case in
England. In supporting this view it is noted that Bolam adopts the test within Hunter and
two further cases cite two other cases which have adopted the same test i.e. Whitehouse
Vs Jordan and Maynard Vs West Midlands Health Authority.
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The third part of the test relates to the whether the injury was caused by the breach of
duty. This is perhaps more difficult to determine. For example it may be evident that the
patient has been harmed in some way but being able to form a causal relationship
between the alleged breach and the sustained injury may be more difficult. Edozien
(2001) comments that
'In medical negligence action, it is in most cases easy to establish the
existence of a duty of care. Where most cases fail is establishing a breach
of that duty or in establishing causation.'
[b] Fatal Accident Inquiries
A fatal accident inquiry (FAI) is the Scottish equivalent of a coroner's inquest. There are
some significant differences between the two systems. The most notable is that the
Coroner in England and Wales undertakes the investigation and acts as the judge whereas
in a FAI the Procurator Fiscal undertakes the investigation and presents this to the Sheriff
in whose Sheriffdom the death occurred. In drawing comparisons between the two
systems Donald (1998) comments that
'Like its English counterpart, the Fatal Accident Inquiry is a fact-finding
not a faultfinding exercise and the terms of a determination can neither be
founded upon, nor admitted in evidence, in a future action.'
As such it is unlikely that a FAI would be considered if there is any likelihood of any
criminal actions.
Fatal accident inquiries are set up under the provision of the Fatal Accident and Sudden
Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976. The act came into force in 1977 and at the same
time repealed the preceding Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1895 and the Fatal
Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1906. Under the provisions of the
Act an inquiry can be undertaken following an untoward clinical incident resulting in
death as it may be regarded as being expedient in the public interest. Such investigations
are set up as a fact-finding rather than a faultfinding exercise. Sheriff Reith in her
determination following the inquiry into the death of Sharman Weir comments
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'In my opinion a Fatal Accident Inquiry is very much an exercise in
applying the wisdom of hindsight.'
In recognising the issues in relation to fault finding and blame (which is of particular
relevance to this study) Sheriff Reith refers to Black V Scott Lithgow Ltd and the
comments made by Lord President Hope in relation to role of a fatal accident inquiry
'There is no power in this section [of the act] to make a finding as to fault
or to apportion blame between any persons who might have contributed to
the accident. This is in contrast to section 4(1) of the 1895 Act, which
gave power to the jury to set out in its verdict the person or persons, if any,
to whose fault or negligence the accident was attributable. It is plain that
the function of a Sheriff at a Fatal Accident Inquiry is different from that
which he is expected to perform at a proof in a civil action to recover
damages.' (Black V Scott Lithgow 1990 SLT 612)
In the course of the investigation the following sections are required to be outlined in the
final determination: -
Section 6(1)(a): where and when the death and any accident resulting in the death took
place.
Section 6(1) (b): the cause or causes of such death and any accident resulting in the death.
Section 6(1)(c): the reasonable precautions, if any, whereby the death and any accident
resulting in the death might have been avoided.
Section 6(1) (d): the defects, if any, in any systems of working, which contributed to the
death or any accident resulting in the death.
Section 6(l)(e): any other facts that are relevant to the circumstances of the death.
Whilst it is acknowledged that the process has been established in order to find the facts
and not the fault, the requirement to report under sections (c ) and (e) offers the Sheriff
considerable scope to comment on any issues which may have emerged in the course of
the evidence provided and that relate directly to the circumstances surrounding the death.
As such these comments can be very helpful to organisations in identifying weaknesses,
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which need to be addressed. However the negative side is that individuals may be singled
out for particular criticism.
Within the data for this research study the determinations of forty-one FAIs are explored
in some detail and therefore comments of their usefulness in relation to the management
of untoward clinical incidents are reserved for that section. Levy and McRae (2004)
however offer six main features of FAIs that make them an important part of the legal
process.
1. You have the opportunity to hear evidence on oath from relevant
witnesses. The notes of sworn testimony can be lodged in any
following civil case to determine any change in position.
2. You can challenge unfavourable evidence in cross-examination and
by adducing alternative sources of evidence.
3. You can recover important documentary evidence and have the
opportunity to examine physical evidence, which may include the use
of experts.
4. Issues of liability, fault and cause should in most cases become clear.
5. Any gaps or inadequacy in your civil should become clear or be
capable ofbeing dealt with.
6. Compared to any civil litigation the FAI is usually cheaper and more
productive in recovering information.
Some of these points, at first reading, would suggest that they are contrary to an
understanding of the function of an FAI. For example Issues of liability, fault or cause
should in most cases become clear appears to contradict the view that a FAI is a fact
finding rather than a fault finding exercise. However, essentially the point being made
relates to the fact that such issues may be clarified within an FAI as opposed to this being
the primary function of the inquiry.
[c] Summary
The precedents set in the courts provide the definitions and principles of clinical
negligence. These have in the main been established through cases involving doctors
although these principles would apply equally to nursing (and indeed other clinicians).
Within Scotland, fatal accident inquiries provide a legal setting within which clinical
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incidents that result in death can be examined in some detail in order to, as one sheriff
noted
'The purpose of any conclusions drawn is to assist those legitimately
interested in the circumstances of the death to look to the future. They,
armed with the benefit of hindsight, the evidence led at the Inquiry, the
Determination of the Inquiry, may be persuaded to take steps to prevent
any recurrence of such a death in the future.' (Sheriff F Reith - Inquiry
into the death of Sharman Weir 23rd January 2002)
The stated aim of any FAI is to establish facts and not fault. The systems approach to
incident management adopts a similar philosophy. The NHS has identified this approach
as the preferred way forward. It is therefore a legitimate form of enquiry to review the
processes employed within a FAI and to identify whether such processes can be adapted







This qualitative study explores qualified nurses' experiences and perceptions of the
management of untoward clinical incidents using a phenomenological approach.
Holloway (1997) describes such qualitative research as
'
a form of social enquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and
make sense of their experiences and the world in which they live. A
number of different approaches exist within the wider framework of this
type of research, but most have the same aim : to understand the social
reality of individuals, groups and cultures. Researchers use qualitative
approaches to explore the behaviour, perspectives and experiences of the
people they study. The basis of qualitative research lies in the
interpretative approach to social reality.'
Polit et al (2001) describe the phenomenological approach as having '... its disciplinary
roots in both philosophy and psychology (and) is concerned with the lived experience of
humans.' The authors go on to identify this approach as being closely related to the
research tradition of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics '... uses the lived experiences of people
as a tool for a better understanding of the social, cultural, political and historical context
in which those experiences occur.' (Polit et al 2001)
The data collection processes employed throughout this study involved the collation and
analysis of national and local policy documents relating to the management of untoward
incidents, an in-depth critical examination of the documentation relating to individual
incidents, interviews with managerial staff, and interviews with those nurses and
investigators involved in the individual incidents. The final area of investigation is an
examination of the determinations of fatal accident inquiries undertaken and reported
within the timeframe of the study.
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The research process was undertaken in a number of stages. The first stage was an
examination of policy documents and the documentation relating to past incidents. It
examined
1. Who was involved in the investigation process
2. The nature of the clinical incident
3. The record of the investigation
4. The outcome of the investigation
5. The level of action taken
The second stage was a detailed exploration of a number of the investigations examined
in the first stage. In particular the researcher investigated (1) the perceptions of the staff
involved in the incident and (2) the perceptions of the individual investigating the
incident
The research finally examined how the information gleaned and the lessons learned from
the incident and the subsequent investigations are then used to inform changes in clinical
practice, development of clinical risk strategies and the achievement of the principles of
clinical governance. The research also examined a number of cases, which were the
subject of a Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI). The researcher examined whether the process
provided a lead in the management of clinical incidents, which could then be employed at
an organisational level. By the nature of such incidents this was a retrospective review of
cases rather than a concurrent examination of the process. These determinations were
obtained from the public records available through the court system. As these were in the
public domain the issues of confidentiality were less restrictive. The FAIs were not
restricted to those generated from a hospital environment.
The techniques were in the main qualitative techniques in order to obtain as much
information as possible surrounding the incidents and how the key players felt the
process was handled. In particular the research examined the perception of the
apportionment of fault and whether the key players felt that the outcome was 'fair'.
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Sampling Procedures
Figure 1 Diagrammatic Representation of Process of Sampling
All Clinical Incidents
Incidents recognised Incidents not Incidents Incidents
but not reported recognised recognised, reported recognised, reported
and investigated through other
through clinical system
incident system
Unable to include Unable to include Included Unable to include
Staff involved contacted
Agreed to be interviewed Did not agree to be interviewed
r r
All interviewed Asked to provide reason
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Morse (1991) proposes that the method of sampling in qualitative research must be both
appropriate and adequate and goes on to define these as: -
Appropriateness: The degree to which the choice of informants and
method of selection fits the purpose of the study as determined by the
research question and the stage ofthe research.
Adequacy: The sufficiency and quality of data.
It is recognised that in order to meet the criteria for appropriateness and adequacy that the
researcher must have a high degree of control over the composition of the sample. The
figure outlined above demonstrates how the sampling was influenced and to a degree
determined by the design of this study. It also demonstrates the control exerted by the
researcher in determining the subjects in the final stage interviews. It is important to note
that the clinical incidents included within the sample were only those reported through
the organisation's clinical incident policy framework. At the beginning of the study this
was managed through the organisation's nurse management structures. At the outset of
the study it was recognised that the researcher may have had to select a cross section of
incidents if there was a significant number of similar types of incidents (for example the
study could have been dominated by incidents involving medication errors). This
however was not the case as the reported incidents provided a broad range of different
scenarios.
Having identified the incidents to be included within the study, the researcher was able to
identify the members of staff involved and the role they played. Each member of staff
was then contacted by letter with an information brochure and consent form, (Appendix 1
and 2) thus the willingness of subjects to become involved in the study determined the
number and range of subjects involved in the second stage. The researcher also felt that
the reasons why individuals did not wish to take part in the study could provide some
fruitful data. Therefore, each subject was asked that if they decided not to take part in the
study that they provide a brief explanation for this decision. It was also made clear to
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subjects that they were free to withdraw from the study at any time throughout the
process. This understanding of the reasons for declining and or withdrawing from the
study are described by Polit et al (2001) as an integral part of any critique of a sampling
plan for a qualitative study.
A number of incidents were excluded from the study. Current live investigations were
excluded to prevent the research study being seen to be 'interfering' with a difficult and
potentially stressful situation for those involved. Incidents that could have compromised
the anonymity of the subject organisations were excluded. Incidents which were part of a
formal legal process were also not included. These were excluded by the researcher in
drawing up the research protocol and were ultimately excluded by the sampling process
as such incidents were removed from this policy framework. These were managed under
a different policy framework, implemented and managed in conjunction with the Central
Legal Office (CLO). The CLO is the source of legal advice for all organisations within
NHS Scotland.
DataManagement
Mason (1996) describes that within qualitative research, data are generated rather than
collected. The generated data was managed according to the data source. Data from
documents were managed via a system of paper and computer programme and disc.
Semi-structured interviews were taped and then transcribed. All data were managed by
the researcher in order to assure participants of their anonymity
Policy Examination
The first stage of this was to review the policy documentation relating to the management
processes to deal with such incidents and investigations. The policy documents included
those developed at a national level to guide practice across NHS organisations as well as
those developed at a local level to guide practice within the subject organisation. As the
research was conducted across a significant timescale it was recognised that policy
development within this period was a dynamic process. This was particularly the case in
the management of quality, clinical governance and risk management. Accordingly, it
was important to acknowledge that different incidents may have been managed within
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different policy frameworks. As such it was essential to relate any reported differences in
the management of incidents directly to the policy framework within which it was
investigated.
Retrospective Documentation Review
The research involved a review of all documents used in the management of a clinical
incident. This included any formal recording documents (for example clinical incident
report pro forma, RIDDOR etc.) as well as any statements provided by the individual
involved in the incident and any witnesses. The package of documents also included the
final report produced by the investigator. As the data were being collected any references
which may identify individuals or situations were coded in order that anonymity may be
assured. The researcher employed a number of techniques in order to ensure that the
relevant data could be extracted from the documentation. The data required included
clinical areas involved, nature of incident, any injury sustained, involvement of patients,
process of investigation and the outcome of investigation.
Interviews with Investigator and the Investigated
The researcher interviewed, using a semi-structured interview technique, the key
individuals involved in the investigation. These only took place where an investigation
had been completed. The key individuals included the investigator, the individual under
investigation and any witnesses called to the formal investigation. None of the
investigations had led to an appeal against the decision made and therefore there was no
opportunity to review the appeal process. Kahn (1957) [cited by Sullivan 1998] described
an interview within a research context as 'a conversation with a purpose'. Sullivan
identifies the advantages and disadvantages of using the interview in qualitative research.
Advantages
• It takes into consideration individuals who are unable or unwilling to write out
long coherent answers.
• The most appropriate way to facilitate a participant within the project to express
their experiences freely.
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• Allows the researcher to assess 'latent content' of the interview such as facial
expressions, voice intonation and body language.
• To seek clarification were necessary.
Disadvantages
• Interruptions either by telephone or unexpected caller.
• Insufficient time allowed for the interview.
• 'Stage fright on the part of the participant.
• Failure to ask the questions in a logical manner.
• Interviewer resorting to teaching, preaching or counselling.
Other considerations to be taken into account by the researcher related to consent from
participants, confidentiality, the time, place and length of the interview, withdrawal from
the interview and the method of recording the interview. The researcher addressed these
as follows
Consent. Subjects were asked to return a completed consent form to the researcher
indicating their willingness to take part in the study or to provide a brief explanation for
their decision not to take part.
Confidentiality: This was assured as the organisation was not identified by name, the
individuals involved would not be identified and the researcher was the only individual
with access to the coded information.
Time place and length of interview: These were, in part, determined by each of the
research subjects. The researcher agreed to arrange the meetings at a time and place
convenient to each subject.
Withdrawal from Interview: It was reiterated to research subjects that they could
withdraw from the process at any time.
Method of recording: The research subjects were made aware that the interview would be
recorded (audio recording only) and that the researcher would transcribe the interview
ensuring anonymity.
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Review of Fatal Accident Inquiries
The researcher reviewed documentation involved in the process of a Fatal Accident
Inquiry. There were no fatal accident inquiries relating to the subject organisation within
the timescale of the study. The researcher therefore reviewed the determinations of FAIs
across Scotland between 1999 and 2004. An explanation of the role and function of an
FAI is provided as part of the literature review. The data were extracted from the Scottish
Court Opinions. In total 41 determinations were examined.
Data analysis
All data was analysed by the researcher as another measure to assure the participants of
their anonymity. A number of authors have identified different ways of undertaking an
analysis of qualitative data (Polit et al 2001, Holloway 1997, Morse 1991). The
researcher employed a process, which was in effect a hybrid of these different approaches
to qualitative data analysis. The nine-step process is: -
1. Ordering and organising the collected material from both the documentation review
and the semi-structured interviews.
2. Re-reading the data - the semi-structured interviews were taped and transcribed.
3. Breaking the material into manageable sections.
4. Identifying and highlighting meaningful phrases.
5. Building, comparing and contrasting categories in particular the comparison in the
process between different units within an organisation.
6 Looking for consistent patterns ofmeanings.
7. Searching for relationships and groupings categories together.
8. Recognising and describing patterns and themes and typologies.
9. Interpreting and searching for meaning.
Validity & Reliability
Younge & Stewin (1988) argue that within qualitative research validity and reliability are
'misnomers'. Maxwell (1996) however argues that the concepts are valid in qualitative
research but uses differing procedures in order to demonstrate that the study is both
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reliable and valid. Brink (1991) states that 'when a researcher uses a single data
collection instrument only once on single individuals questions are often raised about the
reliability and validity of the research'. By using several data collection methods the
researcher believes that the validity and reliability of the research can be assured.
Validity
Internal validity within the study is demonstrated by providing evidence (quotes from
interviews etc.) to support statements made within the research project. By achieving this,
the research is then open to public scrutiny. External validity is much more difficult to
establish as the research is specific to a very defined area of research and context. It is
important however to establish the research's trustworthiness through the reflection of the
ideas and perceptions of the participants. To achieve this degree of validity the transcripts
from the interviews were returned to the subject for any additions / omissions and
corrections they felt were necessary to ensure that their views were being fully reflected
in the data.
Reliability
The concept of reliability is difficult to apply in its strictest term to qualitative research.
Reliability in quantitative research is designed to ensure that the techniques used within a
study can be replicated in another project and produce similar findings. Holloway (1997)
argues that "this consistency is difficult to achieve in qualitative research because the
researcher is the main research instrument." Therefore as the relationship between
researchers and participants is unique qualitative research cannot be replicated in exactly
the same way as quantitative research studies. It is however important that an audit trail is
produced in order that the process is open to scrutiny. This has been achieved within this
study by clearly defining the process of gathering the data and having the data checked
by the subjects who were interviewed.
Limitations & Delimitations of Study
The limitations (shortcomings and restrictions) of the study are similar to those
attributable to all qualitative research. These relate to the generalisability of the findings.
The particular limitation of this study is that it concentrates on units within one
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organisation. The original research proposal attempted to address this by involving more
than one organisation. Unforeseen problems relating to access prevented the research
being undertaken in the additional organisation of choice. Delays in reaching a final
decision prevented an alternative organisation being identified and utilised within the
study.
The delimitations (boundaries) of the study is that it only included incidents involving
qualified nurses, only those involved within the organisations under investigation and
only reviewed the Fatal Accident Inquiries which have been completed within a five year
period leading up to the date of agreement received from the Chief Executives of the
respective organisations.
Access
The researcher is a senior manager within an NHS Trust. It was recognised that access to
current and historical data would require the permission of the Chief Executive at the
outset. There would appear to be no apparent reason why this would be refused. Similarly
the researcher would have easy access to staff involved in order that face-to-face
interviews could be conducted. In approaching organisations and individuals for access to
information assurances of complete anonymity would be guaranteed as only the
researcher had access to documentation supplied and the transcripts of any interviews.
Similarly through the researcher's networks within both the local and national health
service there were no perceived difficulties in obtaining access to other healthcare
providers in order to obtain comparative data should this be felt appropriate.
As the study progressed significant problems were encountered relating to access to one
of the organisations. These problems are explored further in this chapter and a more
detailed commentary on the wider issues are contained within Chapter X.
Ethical Concerns
In developing the proposals for the research, it was felt that as the study did not require
access to patients or their records nor did it require access to staffs personal information,
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there would be no requirement for ethical approval via the local ethics committee.
Following concerns raised by one of the study organisations this decision was reviewed
and an application was submitted. The view of the ethics committee was that the study
did not require ethical approval.
It was however recognised that there were a number of ethical issues, which need to be
borne in mind throughout the study. The main ethical concern surrounded the need to
assure anonymity of the organisations, incidents and the individuals participating in the
study. This was assured by the removal of any unique identifiers within texts and the
guarantee to interviewees that the interviews would be coded and only the researcher
would know and have access to the codes. Where required, further security measures
were taken to assure anonymity. These included
• The use of pseudonyms, which do not resemble the real names of those, involved
within the research.
• Ensuring participants are not identified by gender, age or professional staff group (i.e.
staffgrade or areas ofworking)
• Specific locations (including the organisations used within the study), which may be
identifiable, were excluded in any narrative.
Holloway (1997) identifies a variety of general ethical considerations, which must be
made in development of qualitative research. Those which are particularly pertinent to
this study include: -
• The researcher's 'sensitivity and diplomacy' whilst dealing with professional
colleagues.
• Considerations in obtaining informed consent at the outset of the study.
• Potential compromising of the participant anonymity due to the detailed nature of the
research.
• Potential conflict between the roles of investigator and professional within an
organisation.
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• Understanding by the participants of the role of the researcher as investigator or
professional.
• Potential for participants to become 'distressed' during interviews.
• Potential for 'empathy' to introduce assumptions and inaccuracies within the
research.
The researcher acknowledged the potential for the above situations to present ethical
dilemmas within the research and these were minimised by the design of the
methodology, data collection and data analysis methods.
As the researcher is a healthcare professional within the area of study, the issues of
'insider research' must also be included as part of the ethical considerations. Hewitt-
Hewitt-Taylor (2002) identified some of the advantages and disadvantages of insider
research but concludes that on the whole that insider research provides an added
dimension to the quality of the qualitative data that are collected. This view echoes the
experiences ofMcEvoy (2001) who concludes in a review of interviewing colleagues as
part of a research project:
'Shared experience may act as a catalyst that helps to generate new
avenues of experience by opening up and extending the depth of a
discussion.'
Whilst accepting that there are a number of common features of an interview between
colleagues and one between anonymous interviewers there are a number of issues which
need to be taken into account: -
• The nature of the insider's perspective.
• The dynamics of interviewing in the context of an ongoing relationship and
presentation of findings.
87
McEvoy also outlines the similarities in the ethical issues encountered through
interviewing a colleague and those encountered by ethnographic researchers conducting
fieldwork.
Sullivan (1998) identifies some of the issues to be considered when undertaking sensitive
interviews. The examples cited relate to research into bereavement in same-sex
relationships. The research undertaken within this study is also very sensitive in that we
are effectively asking nurses to 'relive' a traumatic experience, which may in some
instances have had a devastating effect on patients.
The researcher secured the assistance of a clinical psychologist external to the
organisation used within the study. This provision was made to ensure that should the
process of taking part in the study prove to be overwhelming for any individual subject,
they could have access to a professional who could assist them to work through any
particular unresolved issues. In discussion with the psychologist, it was agreed that any
request would be made directly to the psychologist and would not involve the researcher.
The psychologist involved proposed that such sessions would be approached using
techniques similar to those used within post-traumatic counselling.
TheOrganisations
The two organisations involved within the research are National Health Service Trusts
within Scotland. A very brief description is given to provide some understanding of the
size, nature and structure of the organisations. The lack of detailed information is
deliberate in order to maintain the anonymity of the two organisations. This was part of
the agreement with the chief executives in obtaining access to the data. During the
completion of the research, NHS Trusts within Scotland were dis-established and these
organisations no longer exist as legal entities. They became instead operational divisions
of a unified health board
88
Trust A: A large teaching Trust with several general hospitals and specialist hospitals all
of which had training status. The clinical care within the Trust is managed through a
number of directorates each ofwhich has a number of related clinical sub-specialties.
Trust B: A moderate size Trust, which also has a number of general hospital and
specialist units. The district general hospital is regarded as a teaching district general
hospital. Like Trust A this Trust is also managed through a number of clinical
directorates.
Problems Relating to Access
The researcher made the initial approaches for access to the data directly to the chief
executive of each of the two organisations. Not surprisingly these were then referred to
the directors of nursing. Trust A posed a number of questions with regard to the study
relating to some recent organisational changes that may have influenced the outcome of
the study. Following a meeting with the director of nursing, approval for access to the
requested data was granted. Trust B responded indicating that they were happy for the
study to proceed.
From a logistical standpoint it was felt that the initial stages of data collection should be
based within one organisation at a time, therefore, the data was initially collected from
Trust B. However during the data collection within Trust A, a number of concerns were
raised with regard to the methodology and a meeting was requested between the Trust's
senior nurse for research. Following extensive discussions it was agreed that ethical
approval should be sought for the study. The rationale being, that since the initial
approval a new research governance framework had been introduced which insisted that
all health related research should have ethical approval. An application was made to the
local ethics committee, which responded by indicating that in their view the study did not
require ethical approval and that if managerial access was agreed then the study could
proceed.
89
The committee reported its findings to the relevant executive directors in the two
organisations. Trust A expressed concern and surprise at this decision and were unsure
how to proceed. The researcher met with the senior nurse and the research manager to
discuss how to deal with their concerns. It was felt that an honorary contract would have
to be awarded to the researcher. This was not felt to be problematic. The organisation's
representatives had a number of concerns about the researcher's access to sensitive data
relating to employees. A number of potential means of obtaining the data were explored
however each was regarded as being flawed from the organisation's perspective.
Trust A, required that individuals within the organisation be contacted to agree to have
the data relating to an incident in which they were involved released to the researcher.
This presented a number ofproblems:-
• If an incident involved a number of individuals and all but one gave consent this
would not be provided to the researcher.
• The methodology suggested by the researcher offered the staff member an
opportunity not to take part in the study if that was their preference. This would
still allow the research to use the details of the incidents but not follow up issues
with an individual.
• The selection of the incidents for investigation would be affected by the
willingness of the individuals to take part rather than be a part of the management
information available within the organisation.
The researcher then suggested an alternative methodology. The information could be
provided in an anonymous format to the researcher who would then identify the
incidents, which he would like to discuss further with the staff involved. However, the
organisation's data systems could not provide information in this format. It was then
suggested that someone from the organisation could remove the names manually. This
was not accepted by the organisation, indicating that they would not be able to release
staff time to undertake this exercise.
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These difficulties were discussed with the project supervisors who agreed that the
suggested methodology by the organisation was likely to introduce a bias into the type of
incidents, which could be investigated. The original methodology allowed for individuals
who had been involved in an incident not to take part in the interviews. It still however
allowed the researcher to have details of the incident and how it was managed which was
an integral part of the study. The new methodology would not have allowed the
researcher access to the incident itself, despite previous access approval from more senior
and accountable individuals with executive roles within the organisation.
Given the likely introduction of a bias into the data collection it was greed that the
research should not include data from Trust A. The issues raised by Trust A were
discussed once again with Trust B who felt that the study had a robust methodology and
was assured that as individual members of staff had an opportunity to decline to take part
in the study, there were sufficient safeguards for the individuals whom they had a
responsibility to protect.
In both organisations it was once again reiterated that there was no requirement for the
researcher to access either a patient's medical records or a member of staffs personal
file. The researcher only required access to the management information retained relating
to individual incidents. This process took almost two years to work through and a
significant delay in the timescale for the completion of the study was inevitable.
Endnote
In concluding the chapter on methodological issues it is worth reflecting two main areas
of concern emerged during the study.
Firstly, as described above, the initial research proposal outlined the data collection to be
completed using two NHS organisations. The process was therefore based on this
premise and access to the organisations sought. Having obtained permission from the
chief executive's office from both organisations this proved to be more difficult in one of
the organisations. Following lengthy discussions with the relevant more junior staff it
91
was felt appropriate to withdraw from this area of the study and to concentrate the
research on the organisation that had agreed access and saw no reason to alter the original
decision. The process and eventual outcome of the debate was frustrating for the
researcher but on reflection there is little to suggest that it materially affected the data
generated. There would have been a greater pool of nurses and managers who would
have been approached to take part in the study but there is nothing to suggest that the
response rate to the request would have been any greater and that the responses from the
interviews would have been significantly different. However it is perhaps worthy of some
discussion as to the ethical questions that could be raised with the organisation in light of
their apparent unwillingness to allow access. Ashcroft [In Tingle](2002) presents the
ethical issues in relation to nursing research and argues that there is a strong ethical
element in nursing research as there is in nursing practice and declares that
'...attention to the core principles of good nursing - respect for dignity
and autonomy for patients, beneficence, non-maleficence, justice and
integrity - will remain essential. The best research and best practice in
research embodies and promotes these principles.'
As such he argues there is a duty to benefit others and taking part in 'socially useful'
research is one way of doing that. It could be argued that it is unethical to act as a barrier
to such socially useful research. The situation is made even more frustrating and in a
sense 'sad' by the fact that the main barrier to this nursing research was another nurse.
Secondly, the number of nurses who agreed to take part in the study was relatively small
and not as high as hoped. Although the study is qualitative in nature and therefore not
concerned with the statistical importance of the number involved, it is worth commenting
on the number of participants. Given the very sensitive nature of the study in that it aimed
to discuss a traumatic event within a nurse's professional career and the voluntary nature
of taking part then it could be suggested that it may not have been surprising if no one
agreed to take part. Fortunately that was not the case. There is also no evidence to suggest
that if the number had been greater that the issues raised as part of the interviews would
have been significantly different nor that the range of incidents would have been any
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greater. (Holloway 1997) recognises that the sample size in this type of qualitative study
tends to be small. Therefore, the research is presented with the view that there is nothing
to suggest that the group of nurses and managers involved in the study were not a
reasonable cross section of staff either from this organisation or any other NHS
establishment. It is perhaps worth noting that a number of subjects approached did not
take the time to respond despite a request from the researcher to provide a brief response
as to why they would prefer not to take part in the study. The point made by Ashcroft that
taking part in socially useful research where there is no cost to the individual applies




Changes in the PolicyContext
"Clinical risk and litigation management strategies have also been
developed nationally, along with a number of health quality initiatives,
which have introduced a whole new set of 'buzz phrases' such as clinical
governance, control assurance, clinical risk management, patient
empowerment, reflective practice, evidence based healthcare and life long
learning." (Tingle 2002)
During the period of the study, a number of different major policy developments were
introduced within the NHS impacting on the management of untoward clinical incidents.
As such it is important in analysing the data collected and generated during a period of
such significant change that these are acknowledged and understood. The period also saw
a number of initiatives on how nurses and nursing practice developed as part of the
multidisciplinary team as well as in a uni-professional sense. The expected outcome of
such policy developments, professional changes and political imperatives is a much more
effective approach to the management ofuntoward clinical incidents.
PoliticalContext
Scottish Parliament
The development of the Scottish Parliament and the devolvement of health to the Scottish
Executive has seen some noteworthy changes in the way in which the health services are
managed. There is a danger of assuming that initiatives within the Scottish NHS are
nothing more than 'tartanised' versions of the initiatives in England and Wales. Perhaps
the starkest contrast is in the debate around central control and local control. The
development of Foundation Hospitals within England and Wales is a demonstration of
the government's desire to see health services being managed locally and free from
influence of Department of Health 'interference'. In Scotland however, the abolition of
NHS Trusts and the formation of 15 Unified Health Boards and a suggestion that this
number is reduced, demonstrates a much more centralist approach to the management of
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health services. NHS Scotland also has a number of special health boards dealing with
very specific operational areas, for example the Scottish Ambulance Service and the State
Hospital. This difference in approach within the systems offers a unique opportunity to
assess the impact of the two different approaches to managing health services. Arguably
there are too many variables to make meaningful comparisons however there may not be
an opportunity in the future to undertake such a study.
Other areas of development are more closely related to the issue of incident management.
For example whilst there are no comparable organisations to NICE (National Institute of
Clinical Excellence) and CHI (Commission for Health Improvement) in Scotland, the
bringing together of several different organisations related to clinical quality and
effectiveness under one organisation NHS Quality Improvement Scotland (NHSQIS),
acknowledges the need for a national approach to setting and assessing clinical and non¬
clinical standards. NHS Quality Improvement Scotland was formed on 1st January 2003
as a result of the amalgamation of: -
> Clinical Standards Board for Scotland (CSBS)
> Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN)
> Nursing and Midwifery Practice Development Unit (NMPDU)
> Clinical Negligence and Other Risk Indemnity Scheme (CNORIS)
> Clinical Resource and Audit Group (CRAG)
> Scottish Health Technology Board for Scotland (SHTBS)
> Scottish Health Advisory Service (SHAS)
The organisation outlines its purpose as
". . .to improve the quality of healthcare in Scotland by setting standards
and monitoring performance, and by providing NHSScotland with advice,
guidance and support on effective clinical practice and service
improvements."
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The initial focus of this organisation related to clinical standards and in particular
standards required for cancer care. The Clinical Standards Board for Scotland developed
a set of generic clinical governance standards in January 2001. Around the same time the
company commissioned by the Scottish Executive Health Department to manage the
Clinical Negligence and Other Risk Indemnity Scheme (CNORIS), Willis Ltd, developed
risk management standards. The development ofNHS QIS saw these two elements being
brought together under HDL (2003) 29. The result was the development of a set of
healthcare governance standards which at the time of writing were in draft form and
available for comment.
One part of the standard relates to the management of adverse events. However, there
appears to be a very broad interpretation as to what constitutes an adverse event.
Consequently, criteria relating to the management of complaints and claims are identified
alongside actual clinical incidents. The definition of an adverse incident used within the
document is: -
'Any event or circumstance that could have or did lead to unintended or
unnecessary harm, loss or damage to patient, public, staff or organisation.'
(NHS QIS 2003)
It is clear that this definition is intended to cover many different incidents (actual or
avoided) and in doing so almost makes it unusable in relation to how organisations
manage any aspect. For the purposes of this research it does not help to define how
organisations should manage clinical incidents. This situation is further complicated by
the use of another term i.e. adverse event, which the document defines as: -
'Any occurrence which is not routine, and which causes physical or
psychological harm, loss or damage.' (NHS QIS 2003).
Again this is very broad and given the similarity to the definition of adverse incident then
it is not unreasonable to question the need for a separate definition. As organisations are
expected to meet the criteria set out in the document it is likely that they will look to
these standards in order to inform the development of a framework within which such
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policies and procedures should be implemented locally. However, the lack of specificity
in the terms used and the method in which organisation will be measured make it very
difficult for organisations to appreciate fully either what is expected of them or how they
will be assessed against the criteria. Whilst it is recognised that the standards are at this
stage draft and are being circulated widely for comment and consultation it is perhaps
worthy of note that the issue of patient safety and how the NHS manage untoward
incidents has been apparently handled so poorly by the organisation established to
oversee how well healthcare providers are able to manage such situations. The draft
document makes reference to some of the relevant literature but this could be more
extensive. One of the sections within the draft document is headed 'Evidence Base for the
Draft Standards for Healthcare Governance' and contains 42 references. However, very
few of the references could be regarded as 'evidence' and would more accurately be
described as 'rationale' in that many are Scottish Executive and other bodies' policy
documents, consultation documents, Acts of Parliament etc. Given that NHS QIS now
includes the Scottish Intercollegiate Network Guidelines (SIGN) it is surprising that its
system for grading evidence has not been adopted across the entire organisation. This
would help to improve the credibility of these standards and demonstrate that managerial
practice is becoming more evidence based, in that way the clinical practice is now
expected to become.
Given the body of knowledge which has been gathered in relation to untoward incidents
and how these can be managed to maximise the learning opportunities for organisations,
it is surprising that these have not been referenced. It is also noted that, with the
exception of the NPSA, none of the Department of Health's documents, which relate to
the management of untoward incidents, are included within the list. There may be a
number of explanations for this including the need for NHS Scotland to be seen to be
'different' from its counterparts in the rest of United Kingdom or that these were not
regarded as adding value to the thinking. Whatever the explanation the result is that there
are inconsistencies between the four countries, which in turn make it difficult to identify
meaningful comparisons on the number and types of incidents, how these have been
managed and the dissemination of lessons learned. This can be particularly problematic
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when it relates to how members of staff who are involved in untoward incidents are
managed. If there are significantly different policies across each country this makes the
work of professional bodies which function at a national basis more difficult. It is also
noteworthy that the draft healthcare governance standards do not include criteria in
relation to research governance.
National Patient Safety Agency
As part of its 'frequently asked questions' (FAQ) section of its web site the National
Patient Safety Agency describes itself as follows: -
'The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) is a Special Health
Authority created to co-ordinate the efforts of all those involved in
healthcare, and more importantly to learn from adverse incidents occurring
in the NHS. As well as making sure that incidents are reported in the first
place, the NPSA is aiming to promote an open and fair culture in hospitals
and across the health service encouraging doctors and other staff to report
incidents or near misses when things almost go wrong.' (NPSA 19th June
2002)
This organisation has no specific focus within Scotland, however its recommendations
etc. are provided to NHSScotland for its consideration. For example its first 'warning'
related to the use of strong potassium hydrochloride at ward and department level and the
recommendations have been adopted within the Scottish Health Service.
The NPSA's most significant development has been in the formation of a framework for
developing a safe organisational culture and environment. This not only includes a seven-
step approach to improving safety but the formulation of a national reporting system in
order that national trends in untoward clinical incidents (or what NPSA has termed
Patient Safety Incident) can be demonstrated and action initiated where appropriate.
Woodward (2004 (a), 2004(b), 2004(c)) outlines in some detail the seven-step model.
The earliest reports in relation to the reporting and recording of such events received
significant criticism from both lay and professional press, the former accusing the
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Department of Health and more specifically the Health Secretary, of attempting to
suppress the report which illustrated a level of incidents higher than was anticipated. The
BBC reported that
'...a storm has erupted over claims that Health Secretary Alan Milburn
tried to prevent the release of the figures to avoid creating alarm among
patients.' (BBC 18th June 2002).
The report which was being cited was the outcome of a pilot study into the use of a
central recording mechanism for adverse incidents and was reported as
'The first-ever detailed study of "adverse incidents" in NHS hospitals has
found thousands in just a handful of trusts over a six month period.' (BBC
18th June 2002)
The joint Chief Executive of the NPSA sought to minimise the impact of the adverse
publicity by indicating that
'One of the major issues the pilot has revealed is the difficulty in
providing the accurate information required by the NPSA. We are
committed to publishing full figures as soon as the further analysis is
complete.' (BBC 18th June 2002)
Sir Liam Donaldson also attempted to fend off criticism of the report by commenting
'What the pilot study has told us is staff are willing to report their errors if
they think the information that they give might help a future patient and
that it is very very good news '.... 'the less good news is we had a lot of
technical problems. Some of the staff found the form too complicated. We
have to go back to the drawing board on some of these problems. We are
looking at ways of solving that before it goes nationwide...' (BBC 18th
June 2002)
Many of the issues however related to the process of recording incidents as well as a lack
of clarity in how the system should be used by practitioners. There was also little or no
attempt to 'grade' the incidents and as such a death was no different from a bandage
being applied incorrectly. The lack of specificity in relation to the type of incidents
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makes it more difficult to quantify those incidents which caused the patient harm and the
degree of harm caused.
Clinical Governance
The term clinical governance was introduced in the 1997 White Paper relating to health
service reforms. For the first time there was an overt recognition that chief executive
accountability for clinical quality had equal status within to corporate governance and
sound financial stewardship. Miller (2000) notes that this concept was described by the
then health minister for Scotland as 'corporate accountability for clinical quality' and also
draws together the reaction to this concept of many medical nursing and managerial
organisations.
Within any organisation's clinical governance framework the issues of risk management
and the management of untoward clinical incidents needed to be addressed and this
prompted significant changes in how clinical incidents should be handled. The
introduction of clinical governance also coincided with the revelations from the Bristol
Children's Hospital which brought into very clear focus the issues of poorly performing
clinicians, the reporting and recording of incidents, the organisation's response to such
events and the management of individuals who found themselves within this nightmare
scenario.
Clinical risk management as a formal process developed from this initiative. Some
clinicians would argue (correctly in some instances) that risk management was not a new
concept to clinical practice and was something practiced each and every time a patient
came into contact with a member of the clinical team. However these new processes
required that organisations had to review how clinical services were being delivered
within the totality of a clinical environment as opposed to the weighing of relative risks
to an individual patient of specific treatments or interventions. Almost inevitably this
brought to the fore the issues of blame and the prevailing blame culture, within the NHS
as a whole. This view was fuelled further by a number of high profile cases whereby
clinicians were penalised for the outcome of incidents, which may or may not have arisen
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as a result of an act of omission or commission on the part of the individual. Such
penalties ranged from suspension from duty (sometimes for very extended periods),
dismissal from their post and in some instances legal action.
Medico-LegalContext
It is perhaps not surprising that medical legal issues have become more prominent within
the dynamic and more risk-laden environment, described above. As a result the concept
ofblame and how it is apportioned has become a subject of particular interest and as such
generated the development of this research study. The work of some prominent authors in
the field of clinical incidents was becoming more widely quoted both from within health
spheres as well as from other sectors. Such authors included Leape, Brennan, Vincent,
Reason, Merry and McCall Smith. From these writings we have developed a clearer
notion of blame and how it should be handled and these have been instrumental in the
development of new policies and procedures within which clinical incidents should be
managed.
Making Amends
Within a consultation document entitled 'Making Amends' the Chief Medical Officer
from the Department of Health outlines a number of different proposals to reform the
approach to the management of clinical negligence within the NHS. There are a number
ofdifferent proposals, which are established in order to create a climate, where: -
> Risks of care are reduced and patient safety improves because medical
errors and near misses are readily reported, successfully analysed and
effective corrective action takes place and is sustained.
> Remedial treatment, care and rehabilitation are available to redress
harm and injuries arising from healthcare.
> Any financial compensation is provided fairly and efficiently.
> Payments of compensation act as financial incentives on healthcare
organisations and their staff to improve quality and patient safety.
> The process of compensation does not undermine the strength of
relationship between patient and healthcare professional.
> Different entry points to expressing complaints and concerns about the
standard of care are well co-ordinated and well understood by the
public and healthcare professionals.
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> The system of compensation is affordable and reasonably predictable
in the way it operates.
In relation to this study it is the first of these areas that is of particular interest. Arguably
the second already exists in the sense that healthcare professionals will on the whole
undertake all appropriate actions to ameliorate the effects of any untoward clinical
incident. Given the issues reported within the literature and further expressed by subjects
within this study and explored within Chapter VIII, there are a number of barriers to the
timely reporting of clinical incidents and near misses. The consultation paper explains
how it is proposed to improve the situation. The CMO suggests that: -
> Statutory provisions would be introduced to encourage openness in the
reporting ofadverse events. This would encompass: -
> A duty of candour requiring clinicians and health service managers to
inform patients about actions which have resulted in harm.
> Exemption from disciplinary action for those reporting adverse events or
medical errors (except where there is criminal offence or where it would
not be safe for the professional to continue to treat patients).
> Legal privilege would be provided for reports and information identifying
adverse events except where the information was not recorded in the
medical record.
As a consultation document this has attracted considerable comment from a wide variety
of different organisations. These include professional bodies, healthcare providers and
organisations representing the interests of patients.
Nursing
Tingle recognised that there had been a number of changes within the legal environment
of the new NHS and this coupled with changes within nursing practice required a rethink
of approaches.
'Avoiding health litigation has become a national priority and quite rightly
so. At the same time nurses are expanding their professional role and are
doing more. This is all taking place within an increasingly litigious
working environment. Hence knowledge of the legal aspects of the health
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care environment has become very important as nurse try to understand
their professional and legal accountability.' (Tingle 2002)
Whilst this observation is true and one which will be recognised by many nurses within
Scotland it could be argued that there has been little at a national level which
acknowledges such changes and provides professional leadership as to how clinical
nurses and nurse leaders can influence the design and management of risk management
processes as they relate to nursing practice.
In response to an earlier call by the ChiefMedical Officer in England for ideas in dealing
with clinical negligence claims, the Royal College of Nursing identified from its own
research that
i. There is an unhelpful tendency by some employers to suspend the
nurse immediately on receipt of a complaint or concern raised by a
patient.
ii. Nurses are often banned from communicating with colleagues and
from attending the workplace during the investigation, notwithstanding
the often-glib remark by management about 'innocent until proven
guilty.'
iii. The fact of a complaint and the decision to suspend are often
communicated in an insensitive manner, and the removal of the nurse
from the premises can be very distressing.
iv. Investigations may take inordinate lengths of time to be completed.
v. There is a lack of consistency in decisions to suspend.
In this response there are no references cited so it is difficult to assess the status of the
'research' referred to in this letter. However some of these issues will be explored further
in Chapters VII and IX, where in the examination of a number of clinical incidents within
an organisation and through the interviews of a number of staff involved in the
management of clinical incidents there is are no issues with regard to suspension. Within
the fifty-one incidents examined in great detail none of the nurses (or other clinical
healthcare professionals) was suspended from duty. This would seem to be a significantly
different experience from that described by the RCN Within the same submission to the
Chief Medical Officer the RCN goes on to suggest a number of strategies to deal with
these issues, including
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i. Guidelines for managers about the use of suspension
ii. Consideration of alternative strategies for keeping the nurse (or other
health professional) at work.
iii. Reconsideration of the ban against communicating with colleagues /
friends during the suspension; training for managers in communicating
complaints, decisions to suspend and so on.
iv. Better support and information to staff during the course of the
suspension.
Nursing organisations continue to provide input into the development of strategic policy
at a United Kingdom level. There is little in the way of specific policy developments in
relation to nursing and arguably this is due to the fact that the issues relating to the
management of clinical errors are not fundamentally different between healthcare
professional groups. However, as stated earlier within a devolved situation within
Scotland there is corresponding input from nurses and nursing.
TheOrganisation'sPolicy Documents
During the time period this study was undertaken the policy documents relating to the
management of clinical incidents were reviewed and developed on a number of
occasions. This reflected the dynamic nature of the area of study during the study period.
This was in part due to the nature of the organisation and some of the key individuals
within the managerial structures as well as the external requirements of the policy makers
for NHS Scotland. As such it was important to ensure that all incidents were reviewed
with the policy framework in place at the time of the incident. This was an important
element in understanding the wider political and social context in which decisions could
be reviewed. During the same time frame similar difficulties were being experienced in
another area under investigation - the issues relating to the provision of consent for
retention of human tissue. In this problem more recent thinking and understanding of the
issues involved were being applied to clinical practice, which took place several decades
earlier. Clinical practice was therefore 'judged' against different standards and within a
different policy framework from that in which is was conducted.
104
The earlier versions of the policy were part of the wider policies relating to the
management of accidents and incidents. A sub-section of the policy related to how
clinical incidents should be managed. This was in the main directed at nursing staff but
should technically have related to all clinical incidents. There was also evidence that
there existed a different policy sponsored by the pharmacy staff relating the management
of medication errors. There was a forum within the organisation's structure to formally
sign off policies but there appeared to be other means by which policies became part of
the functioning within the organisation with no evidence of formal approval from the
appropriate committee within the organisation. Accordingly medication errors had the
potential to be managed through different policies relating to incidents, health and safety,
disciplinary and medicines management. Clearly the potential for confusion is significant
as well as inconsistency between different parts of the organisation in managing similar
incidents. The lack of consistency also results in a difficulty in managing a central
mechanism to quantify such incidents.
In the most recent version, the policy documentation seeks to set out the overall
principles within which the incidents are managed.
'The reporting, recording and investigation of accidents and incidents
should be viewed positively by staff. The intention is to learn from these
incidents and ensure that shortcomings are identified, improvements are
implemented and ensuring that the chances of a repeat incident are
minimised.
The Trust supports a positive, non-punitive reporting system with the aim
being that any investigation will aim to establish the cause of the incident
rather than apportioning blame. Any further actions against an individual
would only occur in case of malicious acts or omissions, criminal or
constitute serious professional misconduct or knowingly failing to follow
Trust procedures. (Subject Organisation's Incident Policy, October 2002).
The policy statement is signed by the Chief Executive in order to demonstrate the
commitment of senior management. The policy document clearly uses the national policy
framework as a guide to the content of this local policy. This includes definitions and the
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incident-grading matrix, which has been developed from a number of different sources
and is recommended by the National Patient Safety Agency.
The new policy within the organisation was being implemented as the data collection
processes were being completed and therefore there is limited evidence as to its
effectiveness. However, whatever evidence was available from the actual clinical
incidents and the staff interviews is explored within the relevant chapters. It is noted that
the changes incorporated within the new policy guidance relate to initiatives from other
parts of the United Kingdom. Such policies and their effectiveness we would expect to
be assessed by NHS Quality Improvement Scotland using the draft standards described
earlier.
Summary
At a national level and subsequently at organisational level there have been a number of
alterations to the policy documents utilised in the management of clinical incidents.
These have in part been influenced by the wider political context. There is an observed
lack of co-ordination between the health systems in different parts of the UK resulting in
an inconsistent system to quantify the number and types of incidents across and between
the four countries. The evidence suggests that NHS Scotland has not developed systems
for the management of untoward clinical incidents to the same degree as England and
Wales. There is little evidence that the organisation charged with the responsibility within
Scotland has either taken cognisance of the systems in place elsewhere or the wider
literature relating to error management - in relation to individuals or organisations. The
opportunities therefore for improvements at individual organisation level are diminished.
The organisation involved within the study has adapted its polices to take account of
changes in approach to the management of incidents. It has adopted some of the
initiatives from other parts of the United Kingdom. At the time of the study this was a
very new approach and whilst the spirit of some new principles was included it had not
fully permeated throughout the organisation. This becomes more evident in the
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examination of the actual clinical incidents described in Chapter 5 and the perceptions of
staff explored in Chapter VI.
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Chapter V
DOCUMENTATION RELATING TO INCIDENTS
Background
There are a number of points to be considered in undertaking research using documents
within the NHS. The principles adopted by historians in examination of archives and
sources are relevant to this study, despite the fact that the documents under investigation
are relatively modern. Nurse researchers have relied heavily on nursing documentation as
a source of data in both qualitative and quantitative methods. The frustrating, consistent
finding of any review of documentation is that it could be improved. The archive used in
the study has been the subject of research in the past. These have however, been used
main to establish trends of accidents and incidents within hospitals rather than as a data
source examining incident management. These have commented on the quality of the
record but there are few which have been used as part of a qualitative study examining
the information as part of a wider process.
Macdonald and Tipton (1996) argue that when researching documentary evidence
nothing can be taken for granted. This is an issue the researcher was mindful of during
the data gathering in order to avoid the possibility of making assumptions about the
meaning of the contents of a document rather than what has been written. Therefore, the
general rule of thumb that 'if it is not recorded then it did not happen' is a principle,
applied during the review of documentation. This is almost certainly the view taken
during any documentary review in a legal setting. This problem in relation to
documentation is also apparent in clinical nursing research. For example, Cockhill-Black
et al (1999) demonstrate this in relation to research into pressure area care and
documentation.
Within the context of nursing research some downplay the role played by documents in
qualitative research - especially from an ethnographic perspective. Morse (1992)
describes documents as providing 'additional slices' of data rather than being a single
source of information and goes on to suggest that any analysis of documentation is likely
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to confirm, extend or contradict findings from other data sources. Within the context of
this study the documentation was the primary source of data with regard to specific
incidents. Whilst the individuals involved in the incidents were approached to take part in
semi-structured interviews, the purpose of the interview was to ascertain their views on
the management of the incident rather than to confirm the actual details of the incident.
Porter (1999) describes qualitative research as an examination of speech and conversation
but adds that qualitative methods can be applied in the analysis of documents. Punch
(1998) argues that the rise in "more fashionable forms of research" such as experiments,
surveys, interviews etc. has resulted in a rich source of data in social research (both
contemporary and historical) being neglected. Punch goes on to point out the irony in that
documentary data was instrumental to the development of social science research.
Fairlie & Brown (1994) examined the reported accidents and incidents involving patients
in a mental health service. Whilst the research used the incident record as a primary data
source the information gleaned from the source was in the main quantitative. For example
the research examined the number of reported incidents and when during the day they
occurred. The research made no real recommendations over the management of the
incidents but did make recommendations as to how the incident might be prevented from
happening again.
Factors Influencing the Change enDocumentation
As described earlier in relation to the policy documents, different documentation relates
to the different policy framework within which incidents are managed. At the outset of
the study the policy required that each incident had an incident form completed and
submitted with any supplementary information from the staff involved and any witnesses.
The design and content of the pro forma had been changed considerably over a period of
time. There are two main reasons for these changes:
1. Organisational changes: These were part of wider NFIS structural changes
whereby units that were directly managed through Health Boards developed into
independent NHS Trusts, later merging to form new, larger NHS Trusts. Most
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recently NHS Trusts have been abolished and individual units have combined to
form unified Health Boards. Two of these structural changes had an impact on the
documentation reviewed over the period of the research. The centralist approach
taken pre and post NHS Trusts demanded that information gathered was done in a
uniform manner using similar documentation whereas the freedom afforded to
NHS Trusts resulted in a proliferation of different systems across different
organisations within similar geographical areas.
2. Policy changes: A variety of policy changes demanded different approaches to
incident management and the need to collect data relating to incidents.
Organisations have been faced with a challenge of minimising the number of
different documents required to meet the various demands. For example health
and safety, violence and aggression, medication errors, accidents, incidents and
risk management issues have all demanded some form of formal monitoring
through pro forma. This has resulted in organisations attempting to pull together
as many of the dataset requirements onto one pro forma. The danger of such a
strategy is that information is missed completely, gathered needlessly or
duplicated.
Documents UsedWithin the Study
The main archive used during the investigation was the incident report. This was in some
cases supplemented by a statement or statements from the main parties involved in the
incident. The supplementary information was used to enhance the basic questions asked
within the pro forma. The 1970s, 1980s and 1990s saw a number of major changes in
nurse management and the role of nursing officers as well as other hospital
administrators. This resulted in a gradual move away from 'administrative' roles towards
more 'managerial' roles. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are now fewer nurses in
administrative positions, which has resulted in deterioration in not only the completion of
but also the accuracy of the documents.
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The importance of accurate completion of documentation is re-emerging within the
health service as clinical risk management schemes are being more fully developed. A
major factor within the Clinical Negligence and Other Risk Indemnity Scheme
(CNORIS) is the accurate completion of relevant documentation and the way in which
this is used to inform changes in practice to prevent a recurrence of a similar incident.
This change in context has parallels with more historical archives where for example
during the Colonial period in India when administration processes were more strictly
regulated, the documentation (both in terms of quality and quantity) was significantly
greater than in either the pre-colonial or post-colonial periods.
The incident report is one of a number of documents, which is part of health service
bureaucracy, used under specific circumstances as opposed to the day-to-day elements of
the patient's record. However, its completion should be regarded with the same degree of
importance as other forms of documentation. The significance of accurate and well
maintained nursing records is well recognised within the profession as well as a number
of different external bodies. Within the profession the governing body United Kingdom
Central Council (UKCC) [later becoming the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC)]
has set standards in relation to nursing documentation and the Department of Health
produced specific training programme relating to the need for accurate record keeping.
From a legal perspective the nursing record is as important as the more commonly quoted
medical record - which should more accurately be called patient health record. It has also
been noted in a number of fatal accident inquiries that the nursing documentation is on
the whole of a higher standard than the medical notes.
Scott (1990) differentiates between four different types of documentary evidence. These
are closed, restricted, open-archival and open-published. Within this research study the
archive falls under the classification of restricted and as such the researcher received
prior permission from the Chief Executive (as the accountable officer) of the subject
organisation to gain access to the relevant documentation. Access to closed and restricted
information can be difficult, despite a more open approach within the health service.
Hughes et al (2000) argue that the legislation, which will improve access, is likely to
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present researchers with significant dilemmas. They go on to argue, "Health service
researchers should regard freedom of information legislation, not simply as a resource,
but a topic deserving study in its own right" Scott (1990) identifies 4 main criteria which
researchers are likely to use in determining the quality of the document under
investigation, namely; authenticity, credibility, representation, and meaning. A number of
basic questions were presented in undertaking a formal critique of the documentary
source.
> Who generates the document?
> How are the documents written?
> How are they read?
> Who reads them?
> For what purposes?
> On what occasions?
> With what outcomes?
> What is recorded?
> What is omitted?
> What assumptions are made by the generator ofthe document?
> What do researchers need to know in order to make sense of them?
Information Requested
The consistent collection tool for incidents was the incident reporting form, designed to
obtain some basic details relating to individual incidents. The form, which asked 8 simple
questions
1. Who was involved in the incident?
2. When and where did the incident occur?
3. Apparent circumstances of the incident?
4. Did the person suffer injury or ill health?
5. Apparent cause of actual or potential injury / ill health?
6. Did the person receive any attention?
7. Name and address and designation of any witnesses to the incident?
8. If the person is a member of staff how long were they offwork?
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The resultant data sets were recorded in the form of free text, tick box or coded
information. Additional information supplemented this basic dataset in the form of
statements from the individual(s) involved and from any witnesses there may have been
to the incident. Other documentation that was relevant to the investigation (for example
the patient's drug prescription and recording sheet in a medication error) may have also
been included in the documentation pack. These were not expected to be prepared in a
uniform manner and there was therefore significant variability in the quality and quantity
of information supplied within each incident. The nature of the incident also had an
impact on the level ofdetail provided.
Completion of Pro forma
From the documentary evidence it was not the case that incident reporting forms were
completed in all incidents. Of the 53 incidents investigated only 10 (19%) had a
completed incident pro forma and the remaining 43 (81%) had no incident form
available. The research recognised that this did not necessarily mean that there was no
form completed but that it was not available as part of the documentary evidence.
However in organisational terms this would suggest that the mechanisms for monitoring
such incidents were disjointed and that there was not a single route for the collation and
retention of this information. Given that there were some documents relating to incidents
then it was possible to confirm the incident had taken place but the Trust policy of
completing a standard pro forma for each incident could not be confirmed as a number
were missing.
One unit of the organisation did not appear to use the relevant documentation for
significant untoward clinical incidents. However, the same unit did appear to undertake a
full investigation albeit using a different method than the policy demanded This part of
the organisation used a multi-disciplinary / multi-professional, critical incident technique
to investigate any untoward clinical incidents. The manager involved in this area
recognised that the organisation's policy was not being followed strictly but argued that
the outcome of the investigation was a more detailed understanding of what happened
and was conducted in a more transparent, less threatening atmosphere. The incident
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reporting forms were used within this unit to deal with 'lower level' incidents, which did
not require the level of investigation warranted through the critical incident technique
described.
This individual application of policy within an operating department of the organisation
was also evident in individual applications of policy between managers within the same
directorate. Within a single directorate two different managers applied very different
approaches to the management of incidents using the same policy framework. The older
'more traditional nurse manager - more like the old nursing officer' (Staff Nurse)
adopted a very strict disciplinary approach to the management ofmedication errors. This
was in stark contrast to another manager who adopted a much more reflective approach
where staff involved in such incidents had an opportunity to reflect on the incident, what
had caused the error and how it could be avoided in the future.
The differences between the two managers were illustrated in the record keeping. The
records from the first manager related only to the initial incident form and the outcome of
a disciplinary process. With the second manager there were detailed records including
witness statements, the 'perpetrator's' account of the incident as well as their own
reflections. This was an interesting finding in that other evidence suggested that the
'more traditional nurse manager' would have taken a more stringent and disciplined
approach to ensuring that the relevant documentation was completed and maintained.
This was manifestly not the case in this example. The adherence to strict bureaucratic
processes is a recognisable trait of what this particular staff nurse described as the 'old
nursing officer' often caricatured by an officious individual carrying a clipboard.
OtherDocumentation
Many of the incidents contained other relevant documents such as statements from
individuals involved, copies of appropriate parts of patient's records and copies of any
relevant documentation. Due the significant differences in approaches of individual
managers there is a wide variation in the quality and quantity of information contained
within this range of documents. Many of the submissions, particularly statements made
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by individual nurses, were hand written with apparently no attempt to check grammar,
spelling etc and therefore it could be argued that there was no check of the accuracy of
the information the statement contained. A number had been typed and then signed by the
individual. This not only ensured that the document was readable it also resulted in a
permanent hard and soft copy should they be required at a later date.
DocumentationRelated to the Investigation Process
The documentation trail in most of the incidents stopped at the point of the formal
investigation meeting and started once again when the investigation was completed. For
example there were no minutes of investigative meetings included within the
documentation packs. Once again the researcher recognises that these may exist but were
retained elsewhere. The exceptions to this were those incidents investigated using a
formal review of processes involving a physical walkthrough the system. Arguably those
incidents, which did not strictly follow the procedures outlined within the policy,
provided fuller information about the incident, the areas for improvement and the agreed
actions. Any qualified nurse should be aware of the need to ensure that documentation is
completed accurately and timeously. This is a requirement of both organisational policies
as well as being part of the standards expected by the governing body.
Collation of Information
The organisation had pulled together a summary report of the clinical incidents over a
period. These reports were taken from the incident reports and varied considerably in the
amount of information, which it contained as well as any follow up actions. For example
one entry was
'Loss of vicryl 8'0 needle at the end of adjustable suture procedure Full
search - tray, floor, clothing, soles. Patient clothing and furniture.'
The information relating to this incident was lacking in various areas. For example there
is no clear indication which clinical procedures had been employed, whether the needle
was eventually found and what further actions could have been taken to prevent a
recurrence. Whilst there is no evidence that this incident resulted in a sharps injury to
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either a member of staff present at the time of the incident or to another member of staff
in the clearing up process, sharps injury as a result of poor practice is one area of
concern, which has been the subject of considerable attention by individual organisations,
professional bodies and the press.
The information collated from the incident reporting forms then formed the basis of
reports that were provided in an anonymous format to provide high-level reports on the
number and nature of incidents. As the incident recording forms were not specific to
clinical incidents these reports related to a wide variety of incidents including verbal and
physical abuse from patients and relatives, health and safety concerns, manual handling
problems and complaints. Clinical incidents tended to be extracted from this process and
passed to the relevant executive director for review.
Summary
The pro forma, which had been developed as part of the policy, was intended to gather
some very basic details about the incident rather than being a comprehensive record of
the incident. As such there is a lack of consistency relating to the information gathered as
well as the method in which it was gathered. Therefore in examining the records there are
varying degrees of breadth and depth of the information available, which was then used
as a formal investigation. These ranged from little more than the actual incident form all
the way through to a frill report, describing the incident in depth as well as a full
description ofwhat should have taken place.
The way in which the documents were completed also varied considerably. This lack of
consistency is something noted by investigating officers. One individual reflected their
concern in a report: -
'I have since been in discussion with X regarding the handling of this type
of situation and I am advised that a group of senior staff and pharmacists
are looking at the whole process.'
In the interim I feel that there is no consistent documented guidance
regarding how this incident should be handled and we would welcome
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some form of draft protocol. I also feel that it is crucial that we have a
system to record and monitor these instances at ward and directorate level
in order to analyse and identify what the issues and training needs are.'
(Charge Nurse)
This clearly reflects a concern amongst those who are expected to investigate such
incidents as to the lack of due process.
The purpose of any documentary system is to obtain as much information about a
situation as is required in order to complete the function of such a system. In this case it
must be to ensure that data are gathered in order to assess the number and nature of
untoward clinical incidents. The pro forma was designed to gather basic demographic
information with more detailed information being gleaned from individuals' statements
from those involved. From the examination undertaken the following deductions may be
made.
> There is wide variation in the completion of each pro forma. Not every reported
incident appeared to have a pro forma available. Where these were available the
details not requiring any specific narrative were completed. In many cases the
information contained within the free text boxes added little to the information
contained in other parts of the form.
> The additional information provided also varied widely. The variable factors
included the nature of the incident, the severity of the outcome and the managerial
unit in which the incident occurred.
> The use of a formalised, pre-determined pro forma tends to offer a degree of
security to both the organisation and individuals reporting incidents that they have
'ticked a box' in ensuring that an incident has been recorded and therefore
reported, rather than using this as a tool for ensuring that incidents are examined
in detail.
> If the adage 'if it is not recorded it did not happen' were to be applied to the
individual pro forma then the information obtained provided little insight into the
incident itself, its causes or its outcomes.
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> There remains a tendency within some reports to record what may have happened
rather than what actually was witnessed by the individual reporting the incident.
> Formal investigations, which adopted a descriptive style involving a
'walkthrough' the incident, provided the most detailed account of the error, its
antecedents, roles played by individuals, weak points throughout the sequences of
events and as a result offered areas requiring definitive action to prevent
recurrence. This format was only undertaken in a small number of occasions
> The newly adopted "root cause analysis process" adopts a similar approach.
However it has a prescriptive approach, which potentially loses some of the
apparent freedom offered by the scheme described above
The issues relating to the accurate completion and maintenance of documentation as part
of formal records within this study reflect those demonstrated within the literature There
were a number of examples where the standard of record keeping in relation to the
process of managing the process rather than the incident itself was very poor. These
included complete documents missing, misfiled documents (e.g. documents relating to






The subject organisation is divided into a number of clinical and non-clinical directorates
The incidents involving qualified nurses fall into three main directorates. The aim of the
research was not to examine the number of incidents reported and therefore there is no
attempt to quantify the incidents. As the research is concerned with only those incidents
involving qualified nurses and there are no studies specifically looking at the number of
incidents in relation to nursing contacts, no comment is made as to whether the incidence
and types of errors involving qualified nurses is similar to other studies. However, it is
acknowledged at the outset that the number of incidents included within the research does
not constitute all untoward incidents involving qualified nurses. The key reasons for this
are:-
> Not all incidents are reported.
> Not all incidents are recognised as such.
> Some incidents may have been managed outwith the recognised reporting system.
> There may be gaps in the reporting mechanism.
> Systems are not geared towards gathering incidents specific to individual
disciplines.
Therefore the incidents included within the study are those involving qualified nurses,
have been managed through the recognised policy and have the relevant documents
available for scrutiny. A summary of the incidents and an analysis of the category into
which they fall are detailed within appendix 3
Directorate I
A total of 15 incidents were examined within this directorate. Whilst the documents
relating to all 15 incidents were reviewed, only the staff involved in 6 of these were
contacted in order to seek consent to take part in the semi-structured interviews. It is not
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appropriate to explain fully the rationale for excluding these members of staff as to do so
could inadvertently reveal the identity of the subject organisation. One of the conditions
of access was a guarantee of anonymity for the organisation and the individuals who
agreed to take part Accordingly, they have been excluded from the interviews but
included in the review of incidents.
Incident 1 (Drug Error)
In this incident a patient received the wrong dose of morphine sulphate. A registered
nurse (RGN), 1st level nurses and an enrolled nurse (SEN), 2nd level nurse were involved
in the procedure. They both reported that they felt they had followed the recognised
procedure to ensure that the drug was safely dispensed and administered to the correct
patient according to the prescription. However, during the investigation they accepted
that they had not followed the correct checking procedures resulting in the patient
receiving the incorrect dose. Within the classification outlined in chapter II this would be
regarded as a skill based error. Both nurses submitted written descriptions of the
processes they employed and how the error was brought to their attention. The
documentation associated with this incident was incomplete in that an incident form was
not available. Interestingly the incident form included within the documentation, was for
a completely different incident altogether.
The outcome was that both nurses involved in the incident were the subjects of a formal
investigation as part of a disciplinary process. The same manager who undertook the
investigation then instituted the disciplinary processes. This does not follow the
procedures as outlined within the organisational policy for clinical incidents. The policy
directs that a manager should conduct the investigation and if disciplinary procedures
were then thought to be necessary the investigation officers present their finding to a
different and previously uninvolved manager who would then decide whether
disciplinary action was necessary and to what level. The practice of conducting the
investigation and disciplinary process concurrently by the same manager was accepted as
contravening the organisation's policy and procedure and had become the accepted norm
throughout the organisation. The outcome in this case was that both nurses were
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disciplined to the level of an oral warning, the first level of a hierarchical disciplinary
action, which has dismissal as its ultimate action.
In the letter to staff confirming the outcome of the investigation and disciplinary meeting,
the manager confirms that the nurses' representative commented that, in mitigation, the
workload and staffing within the ward may have contributed to the incident and that this
should be taken into account. This was duly acknowledged by the manager who suggests
that the times for ward rounds should be reviewed with a view to 'flattening' the
workload throughout the day by reducing peaks in activity. There is also some attempt to
ensure that staff are supervised and educated further to prevent recurrence.
"As confirmed at the meeting, I note you and your representative's
comments regarding the workload / staffing in Ward (number) on that day
and I shall discuss with the ward team to ascertain whether drug rounds
etc can be changed to a different time of the day. This would alleviate the
workload issues there appear to be in the mornings. In addition and as
discussed, I think it would be useful for you to have a clinical supervisor,
this will provide a means of support for yourself. I will discuss this further
with (name), Charge Nurse, Ward (number) and yourself. I will also
arrange for a training session to take place with a representative from the
Pharmacy Department with the objective of you becoming fully
conversant with the procedure for administering controlled drugs."
There is no evidence within the documentation that system changes and support &
training were instituted or whether these had been instrumental in preventing similar
incidents
The nurses involved, as part of the organisational policy had the opportunity to appeal
against the decision. There is no evidence that they chose to appeal this decision. This
would tend to suggest that they accepted that they had made an error and that the
appropriate action to be taken against them was disciplinary action alongside additional
supervision and training, as well as a commitment to review the systems that may have
contributed to the error Interestingly the organisation had in place a system following up
actions for complaints made against the Trust but had no system for following up actions
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agreed as part of clinical incidents. Indeed the follow up actions for any complaint made
was a standard report to the Trust Board, the most senior managerial committee.
Incident 2
In this incident, two patients were both due to receive blood transfusions and were in
beds next to each other in a four-bedded room. Two members of the nursing team
checked each of the two units ofblood, as per the recognised procedure. One member of
staff, the more senior, was called away to collect a patient from theatre. The more senior
member of staff outlines in her statement that she instructed the more junior member of
staff not to commence the transfusions immediately, but to wait upon her return. The
more senior member of staff then left the ward to collect the patient from theatre. The
more junior member of staff, having apparently not heard the instruction not to
commence the transfusion, waited until the units of blood had reached an appropriate
temperature and then commenced both transfiisions, five minutes apart. On returning to
the ward, the more senior member of staff undertook routine vital sign recording and
discovered that each patient had the wrong blood. The transfusions were stopped
immediately and appropriate medical assistance sought. The blood transfusion service
was contacted who advised that as both sets of blood were the same group and there were
no antibodies, it was unlikely that there would be any adverse effects on the patients.
Incident forms were completed for both patients. Within the classification outlined within
chapter II this would be regarded as a violation.
An investigation into the incident was conducted as part of the disciplinary process and
both members had submitted their statements in relation to the incident. Their respective
trade union/professional organisation representatives accompanied both members of staff
to the investigative hearing. These were from two separate organisations
The more junior staff nurse recognised that the correct procedure for commencing a
blood transfusion was to have both nurses check the relevant details and be present when
the transfusion was commenced and, as such, recognised that she had deviated from the
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accepted procedure on this occasion. In mitigation, the staff organisation's representative
made comment on the workload and staffing levels in the ward at the time of the incident
"As confirmed at the meeting, I note you and your representative's
comments regarding the workload/staffing levels of the ward and I shall
discuss this with (Name), Ward Manager, as soon as possible. In addition,
I will arrange for a training session to take place for all staff in the unit on
the procedure for giving blood to patients".
However, the more senior member of staff did not offer areas of mitigation and these
were not acknowledged in the same way in the written communication
"I will arrange for a training session to take place for all staff in the Day
Bed Unit on the procedure for giving blood to patients via the safe
transfusion guidelines. The same education and informative session will
soon be obligatory for all throughout the Trust".
It is unclear from the documentation why two different approaches appear to have been
taken to two different members of staff, both involved in the same incident. The only
variable factor was representation from different staff organisations. It is also interesting
to note that in the letters to the members of staff indicating the outcome of the
investigation/disciplinary hearing, one member of staff receives a first written warning
(i.e. the more senior member) and the more junior member receives a verbal warning.
The investigating manager then corrects this apparent anomaly by indicating to the more
senior member of staff that the disciplinary level should have been verbal warning The
manager then goes on to state
"The body of the letter states the correct disciplinary action, however, the
more junior member of staff receives a letter indicating a verbal warning
in the main heading of the letter, but indicates a first written warning in
the body of the text"... "After careful consideration of the evidence, and
in view of the nature of the incident, I consider you should be given a first
written warning. This warning will be placed on your record for six
months and will be removed after this time. If there is a further related
offence, this may lead to further discipline. This warning has been given
for unacceptable clinical performance in relation to the giving of blood to
patients".
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In the case of the more senior member of staff, the corrected title of the disciplinary letter
is verbal warning, and this is confirmed in the body of the text
"After careful consideration of the evidence, and in view of the nature of
the incident, I consider you should be given a verbal warning. The
warning will be placed on your record for three months and will be
removed after this time. If there is a further related offence, this may lead
to further discipline. This warning has been given for unacceptable
clinical performance in relation to the giving of blood to patients".
There appears to be no justification within the documentation as to why each Nurse has
been given a different level of disciplinary action. Both letters, however, make reference
to additional training and one of the letters, in mitigation, makes reference to workload
and staffing levels within the ward. There is no evidence within the documentation that
further training was initiated, other than a single bullet point in a memo updating action
after the incident which states
"Charge Nurse (Name) is doing the distance learning pack for blood
transfusion trainers and training is being organised for all (ward name)
staff in safe blood transfusion".
There is no specific training noted for the two members of staff involved in the incident.
There is a more extensive discussion around the workload and staffing issues within the
ward, in particular:
1. staffing levels within the ward
2. skill-mix issues within the ward
3. Staff cover at peaks and troughs in workload
4. waiting list patients sent to ward without adequate warning
In this incident, two qualified nurses were disciplined to different levels for their
involvement in the same incident resulting in two patients receiving incorrect blood
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transfusions. There are a number of errors within the official documentation in relation
to the outcome of the investigation/disciplinary hearing. There is no evidence within the
documentation that targeted training programmes for the individuals had been developed
or initiated. A blanket approach to further education in relation to this procedure was
noted, but no confirmation of follow-up action having been completed.
Incident 3
The documentation available for this particular clinical incident does not conform to the
procedure set out within the policy framework. There was no incident report form, nor
any statements from those members involved at the incident. In this incident, two
patients were being managed through an endoscopy area:
• Patient 1, male patient, had a colonoscopy undertaken
• Patient 2, female patient, had an upper endoscopy and a gastric biopsy having
been taken
A specimen from the gastric biopsy, from the female patient, was sent to the laboratory,
the results of which confirmed the presence of a tumour. The patient had an
oesophagectomy two months later, during which times specimens were sent to the
laboratory and the results established that there was no tumour present. Further analysis
from the laboratory, i.e. DNA analysis, confirmed that the specimen belonged to a male
patient, not to a female patient. A report on the male patient concluded that biopsies were
not received by the Department of Pathology. It was therefore concluded that an error in
labelling of the biopsy specimen within the clinical area prior to sending to the laboratory
had resulted in misdiagnosis in the female patient, with resultant major surgery to remove
the oesophagus. Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be
regarded as a rule based error.
The investigation into this incident took the form of a formal review involving
managerial staff, clinical staff from the area and staff organisation representatives
walking through the process involved in a patient's journey through this particular
125
clinical area. At each stage the review team sought clarification on the normal processes,
procedures and practices in order to establish how and where this error could have
occurred as well as identifying what changes were required within the system in order to
prevent recurrence The result was an extensive report into the process with a number of
recommendations In conducting such a review of the patient journey, the review team
made 37 recommendations as to how the process could be improved in order to prevent
recurrence. The report also demonstrated that the activity within this area had almost
doubled within a five-year period and, as such, was now dealing with a significantly
higher throughput of patients than the unit had originally been designed to deal with. By
undertaking such a process the review team was able to identify and pinpoint very
accurately the cause of the incident
"It was evident to the review team that the system to ensure accuracy of
biopsy is dependent upon the correct labelling of the universal container at
the time the biopsy is obtained and that this must then be placed with the
pathology form for completion. In highlighting the stages of the patient
journey, it was evident that the attention given to the checking of the
patient with the case-notes was haphazard, staff verbally name the patient
at each stage, but did not consistently check the case-note unit number
with the patient and their name band. In addition, the number of loose
sheets of paper attached to the case-notes was not consistently checked for
accuracy prior to use. The consequence of this omission of checking
presents a significant risk factor for the patient at each stage of their
journey".
There is no evidence within the documentation that individual members of staff involved
in this incident were subjected to individual investigation and/or disciplinary action. It
appears that a process whereby a review of the current systems was seen as a more
appropriate way of investigating this type of clinical incident. Unfortunately, there is no
documentary evidence to suggest that the recommendations made within the report have
been implemented and therefore whether they have been effective in preventing a
recurrence of a similar incident
In conclusion, this clinical incident arose from the mislabelling of a sample, which
resulted in a patient undergoing unnecessary surgery The investigation into the cause of
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the incident did not follow the organisation's procedures contained within the policy for
dealing with such incidents, yet appears to have achieved its overall aims of identifying
the cause of the problem, some of the reasons why the error had occurred and was able to
made recommendations as to how the whole system within which the patient was
managed could be improved in order to prevent a recurrence
Incident 4
The documentation relating to this incident was very similar to that in incident number 3.
The same manager oversaw both these incidents. In this incident a senior staff nurse
observed a junior staff nurse complete a procedure as part of a pre-assessment process for
patients due to undergo cataract surgery. This involved taking some physiological
measurements of the eye to identify the correct lens required for implantation. During the
process the results of the examination are printed onto paper and this is then used to
inform the surgeon of the lens required. The senior staff nurse noted that the junior staff
nurse activated the printer from the printer itself rather than from the hand piece of the
keratometer. The outcome of this was that by activating the printer itself the results of the
previous patient was printed. Accordingly, it was likely that for a number of patients the
wrong lens was identified for surgery. The issue was further complicated in that some
patients were having their surgery undertaken in a separate institution. It was also
recognised that another new member of staffwas also perpetrating the error. Both nurses
had been undertaking these assessments for approximately 3 months. Within the
classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a rule based error.
The immediate priority in the incident was to ensure that all potentially affected patients
were reviewed to ensure that any problems could be rectified as quickly as possible. This
would have been detected at one of the post-operative checks conducted 3 weeks after
surgery. The majority of the patients (85%) had had their post-operative check within a
short time of the incident and had been found to have no overt anomalies. A number of
patients (20) were noted to have had the assessment undertaken by the nurse in question
but had not at that time had their surgery. The assessment would therefore be repeated on
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the morning of surgery ensuring that any alterations to the lens type could be made in
advance of the surgery.
This incident demonstrated a number of weaknesses that could lead to such an error
within the patient pathway. Through the investigation these were noted and an action plan
was formulated to address each of the weaknesses. The plan identified each of the
problem areas, what action needed to be taken, what progress had been made, who had
the lead responsibility and the date the actions were completed. This detail was included
in a final report submitted by the manager involved to the medical director. The follow up
action was directed through the medical director as some of the patients were being
treated in other centres and the medical director ensured these centres were aware of the
problem and advised appropriate actions. The consultants and the senior nurses within
this clinical setting were jointly involved in pulling together a revised operational policy
to prevent a recurrence. It is clear from the documentation that the actions taken involved
not only those within the affected department but also wider areas such as clinical
physics.
There is documentary evidence that the nurse involved in this incident was requested to
attend an investigative meeting but there is no evidence that this took place and if it did
what it concluded. The nurse involved in the incident and the manager responsible for the
management of the incident had both subsequently left the organisation and therefore
were not part of the cohort of interviewees. Accordingly, it was not possible to have these
issues checked with them personally. Once again an approach, which did not follow the
organisation's policy and procedure, was able to obtain a more detailed account of an
incident and facilitated its effective management.
Incident No. 5
In this incident, a patient was being looked after within a high-dependency area, post¬
operatively, and had an epidural infusion in situ. The epidural infusion was due to be
removed and therefore the pump attached to the epidural, and required to deliver the
medication, was switched off at the time of the incident. At this time, the patient was up
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sitting at the side of the bed, the nurse providing the care assisted the lady to change her
nightwear and then helped her back into bed. In order to remove her nightwear, the
patient-controlled analgesia pump was disconnected at the peripheral venous cannula and
the line fed through the clothing The nurse believed she reconnected the pump
connected to the epidural line correctly.
The anaesthetist responsible for the care of the patient visited and noted that the epidural
infusion line was attached to the peripheral venous cannula and the patient controlled
analgesia infusion line was not attached to anything. The nurse caring for the patient
immediately rectified the error. The epidural pump was switched off at this time and
therefore the patient did not receive anything intravenously as a result of the epidural line
having been connected to the peripheral cannula. Accordingly, the mistake was
identified prior to any of the pumps being switched on and therefore was regarded as a
"near miss". The following day, a meeting was established to review the "near miss".
Taking part was a consultant anaesthetist, a senior manager, nurse manager and staff side
representative. During the meeting, five main points were identified in relation to the
near miss. These were noted in the documentation as follows:
1. Best practice in relation to changing nightwear was breached which
allowed for the incident to manifest itself.
2. Epidural line had become disconnected at the filter unknown to the
nurse who had then connected this line peripherally.
3. Peripheral infusion line and epidural line were not labelled.
4. No difference in giving lines to alert the nurse to potential error.
5 Current epidurals infused via (name) infusion pump which is routinely
used for intravenous infusions only
During the meeting to review the incident, it was noted by those present that there had
been a number of incidents and "near misses" with regard to epidural infusions which had
been reported in the lay and professional press over a period of time, including on the
morning of the meeting. The meeting concluded by making six main recommendations in
order to prevent a recurrence of a similar incident regarding epidurals. These
recommendations were:
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1 All patients who required an epidural infusion should be cared for
within a high-dependency unit.
2. Epidural lines should be clearly labelled at the time of insertion. This
would be the responsibility of the anaesthetist inserting the line.
3. At the time of handover in theatre recover, the line will be visualised
by the receiving nurse
4. Epidural pumps to be purchased which differ from the current PCA
infusion devices to minimise the risk of confusion.
5. Separate education should be set up with regard to the new infusion
devices.
6. Clinical incidents should be discussed in a variety of meetings and all
staffmade aware of the changes in practice.
The documentation relating to this incident took the form of a report outlining the issues
in areas of the incident and a formal minute of the meeting to review the incident and the
recommendations made. Under the policy guidelines, which were in place at the time of
this incident, (regarded as a near miss) there was no requirement to record formally the
incident itself, nor actions taken. It is clear that the relevant parties involved in the
incident and those required to initiate such actions in order to prevent a recurrence of the
same, were involved throughout.
This incident demonstrates an issue with regard to how lessons learned from similar
clinical incidents throughout other parts of the health system are identified and
disseminated. In a similar but fatal parallel example, there have been reported 10
incidents of patients who have died as a result of incorrect intra-thecal injections. In
relation to this particular incident members of the review team were able to cite similar
difficulties elsewhere yet there was no formal mechanism to identify and quantify the
risk, undertake a formal risk assessment, agreeing potential solutions and implementing
change programmes to prevent recurrence.
The documentation does not at any stage identify the individual nurse involved in the
near miss and therefore there is no record of any formal discussions with the individual or
corrective action to be taken. This would clearly be part of the agreed actions to be
implemented with the wider group of staff. This incident illustrates clearly how an
incident or potential incident can be investigated frilly without the need for an in-depth
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investigation concentrating on the role an individual played. All the relevant information
was gathered to allow a relevant multi-disciplinary group to review the circumstances and
provide clear guidance to prevent recurrence. There are clear parallels with systems
developed and implemented within the aviation industry where both actual incidents and
near-misses are reported anonymously and have proven to be a useful tool in the
reduction of incidents overall as well as improving individuals' willingness to come
forward when an untoward event has occurred.
Incident No. 6
This incident took the form of a complaint made by a member of staff against a different
member of staff with regard to his attitude during a cardiac arrest.
The member of staffmaking the complaint reported three main areas:
1. On his arrival he immediately complained that the ambubag in use was not
effective and demanded a replacement. This was duly done. His attitude
was commented upon when he left by me.
2. When resuscitation had ended, he confronted staff nurse (name) at the
nurses' station, complaining about dead? Ambubag and went on to infer
that no checks were made on the equipment by ward (name) nursing staff.
This inference was made in my presence, he continued by pointing his
finger into staff nurse (name) face. I asked him to refrain from doing this,
and if he had concerns to take them to his superior I then returned to the
bay.
3. I came back to the nurses' station to discover that he was continuing his
verbal assault on staff nurse (name) and informed him that the
conversation was now at an end and advised staff nurse (name) to
discontinue conversation with him. He left by informing us that he would
be reporting the matter to a consultant anaesthetist. I told him I would be
informing his superior that I was unhappy with his conduct and this I now
do".
The member of staff was then contacted by his line manager and asked to provide a
written explanation, dealing with the points that had been raised in the formal complaint.
In doing so, he recognised, and indeed accepted, that his conduct was not as it should, or
could, have been and offered his apologies. However, he also commented on a number
of areas of concern with regard to the equipment required for cardiac arrest and, as such,
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found himself in an emergency clinical situation that was very tense and very stressful
He pointed out that a number of pieces of equipment were defective, that it appeared that
at least daily checks on these pieces of equipment had clearly not been undertaken or
such defects would have been detected, and that the other nurses involved in the cardiac
arrest had taken longer than would normally have been expected in order to find
replacement equipment.
This incident was not reported formally through the clinical incident procedure as each
cardiac arrest was formally recorded through a different system, and the resuscitation-
training officer took up any issues with regard to the management of cardiac arrest.
These documents were not available for the study. It is noted however in the report that
the manager involved in investigating the initial complaint had discussed the situation
with the resuscitation training officer and additional training was agreed for those areas
involved in the incident. The situation also demonstrates how the charged environment in
which cardiac arrests are conducted can have an impact on the way individuals react in
particular where there is a poor outcome. It also illustrates the facts that acts of omission
or commission, which are antecedents to the actual incidents impact on the incident
although may play little or no role in the incident. For example the equipment was
apparently not examined regularly Such checks would have brought to light any
problems with the equipment and this could potentially have avoided the situation
arising.
Incident No. 7
This incident took place within an operating theatre toward the end of an ophthalmic
procedure. The procedure involved the use of a diamond knife. Towards the end of the
procedure, the scrub nurse who had assumed that the requirement for the said knife had
come to an end, passed the knife over to the floor nurse, thus rendering it no longer
sterile. The surgeon then encountered a difficulty and required the knife back. There
were no spare knives available and therefore the only one that could be used was that
which had been handed off to the floor nurse. In order to sterilise the knife, the floor
nurse was instructed by the scrub nurse to place this within a bench-top steriliser within
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theatre, which had a short cycle. However, during the cycle required for sterilisation, a
different member of staff came into the room and opened the sterilising equipment, which
resulted in the cycle not being completed, and therefore no guarantee of sterility. The
nursing staff did not know this at the time. The knife was handed back to the surgeon
and the procedure was completed. When the interruption to the sterilising cycle had been
identified, the surgeon was immediately informed who then informed the patient in order
that he could report any problems with a subsequent eye infection. The patient was
followed-up some time later with no difficulties. Within the classification outlined within
chapter II this would be regarded as a rule based error.
The appropriate documentation was completed for this incident and the staff within
theatre were reminded to ensure that bench-top sterilisers were being used properly. This
incident once again identifies the way antecedents of actual incidents have an impact on
the incident itself. In this case the 'error' was the use of an unsterile piece of equipment
believed to be sterile by a number of individuals who played a role in the scenario. The
reaction to this incident is also helpful in demonstrating the 'reminder' culture, which has
developed as a result of a greater understanding of risk.
Incident No. 8
In this incident, it was noted by a member of staff that the equipment used for the
sterilisation of surgical instruments within a theatre had aborted its process mid-cycle
This resulted in there being no guaranteed that the instruments were sterilised However,
this was not recognised by staff and the equipment had been removed and used on three
different patients before the incident could be reported. Ail of the instrumentation at the
time was part of surgical equipment required for intraocular surgery under local
anaesthetic. Some of the pieces of equipment were required for handling other pieces of
equipment and therefore did not come in direct contact with the patient. Others, however,
were used as part of the invasive procedure
When this was pointed out the surgeon involved ensured that patients received
appropriate antibiotic cover to minimise the risk of any resultant infection. There were
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no reports of any complications experienced by patients as a result. Within the
classification identified within chapter II this would be regarded as a rule based error
The appropriate documentation was completed and an investigation undertaken This
included theatre staff involved in the incident as well as the infection control team and
the health and safety advisor. During the investigation, it was noted that normal practice
was for such instrumentation to be sterilised during the night in order to maximise the
instruments availability during normal working hours. Under normal circumstances the
steriliser provided a print-out which identified the times that the sterilisation was
conducted and this was used as confirmation that the cycle had been completed and thus
an assurance that the instrumentation was, in fact, sterile. On this occasion, not only did
the machine identify that the cycle had been aborted, but there was no print-out and this
should have altered the member of staff moving the instruments that the cycle had not
been completed, the equipment could not be regarded as sterile and therefore should not
be used. A number of actions were taken to prevent recurrence of this including:
• targeted additional training for the individual member of staff
• general training for all relevant staff
• additional information for key staff using the sterilisation method
• a revision of the protocol for the release of instrumentation following sterilisation
This incident is similar in many ways to the previous incident in that the final actors
involved in the error were not directly involved in the procedures which ultimately
resulted in the error being committed. It is also interesting to note that both these
incidents occurred in the same clinical facility yet the actions taken to prevent a
recurrence are more stringent and more focussed in this incident than in the previous
incident. There appear to be no obvious reasons why this may be the case, other than the
individuals to whom the incidents were reported were different in both cases. However,




The drug error in this incident was brought to the attention of an acute area following a
complaint by a general practitioner, who identified that one of his patients had been an in¬
patient in the acute area and, during her two week stay, did not receive a key part of her
therapy, this was a cholesterol-lowering treatment for patients who cannot tolerate a more
routine cholesterol-lowering treatment because of an abnormal physiological recording.
The patient had been in the unit for almost two weeks and, having been discharged back
into the care of the GP, he discovered that her cholesterol level was raised. On
investigation, it was noted that the patient had been prescribed a drug on her day of
admission and for the next 13 days six qualified members of staff recorded that the drug
had not been given, although there was no explanation given on the drug recording sheet,
nor was there apparently any action taken in order to rectify the situation. On the 13th
day, a different qualified member of staff identified that the drug was not given because it
was not in stock and took the appropriate action to order the drug. The following day, it
was noted that two members of staff" were involved and neither recorded that the drug
was not given, nor provided any comment. Of the seven qualified nurses involved with
this one patient, only one followed the correct procedure; recording that a drug was not
available, the reason why it was not available and took the appropriate action in order to
obtain the said drug. The incident, having been presented as a formal complaint from a
general practitioner, was then followed-up by the managerial staff. In mitigation, the
charge nurse from the ward outlined a number of issues in relation to changes within the
system which may have contributed to this incident. The main one being that the unit
was accustomed to receiving regular visits from clinical pharmacists but these had
recently stopped.
'There are also several associated pharmacy issues The ward, until earlier
this year, had a pharmacist visit daily, who would check the kardex, order
outstanding drugs and offer advice. I was informed by memo that this
would be reduced to twice weekly but there were no days specified for the
visits. I discussed this with (name), who said she would visit Monday and
Friday. Although expressing my reservations, I agreed to trial this.
However, only rarely did we receive twice-weekly visits, more usually,
only once In response to staff dissatisfaction within the unit with this
service, I spoke to (name) on (date) and asked her to increase her visits to
135
the unit as the ward team felt that we had little, or no, pharmacy service.
The unit was very busy at the time and the reduction in pharmacy service
provision was noticeable. Further deterioration, not only with pharmacy,
but also with the top-up service, was noted and I approached (name) to say
how dissatisfied I was and could he offer me any help in dealing with the
situation. Normal pharmacy visits would usually have picked up the fact
that the drug had not been in stock.'
It was also noted that the one staff nurse who had followed the correct procedure and
requested the drug from pharmacy does not appear to have had a response from pharmacy
and on the discharge prescription, two days after, it was noted that they do not stock the
dose of the drug required. Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would
be regarded as a rule based error.
This incident is of particular interest in that it involved a total of seven qualified nurses,
six of whom perpetuated the original error in not ensuring that the appropriate drug was
obtained from the pharmacy department within an acceptable timeframe. The explanation
presented by the most senior nurse at the time was that the area had previously enjoyed
the services of a clinical pharmacist and the removal of the service was the main reason
for this error occurring in that such an individual would have picked up the discrepancy
and ensured that it was rectified. Therefore, it was argued, the change in the system
contributed to the error. There appears to be no acceptance by the charge nurse that the
change in the system was known by all the ward staff and therefore they were aware that
the pharmacist would not be in a position to detect this problem and accordingly the
nursing staff were responsible for ensuring that the relevant drugs were sought for the
patients. It is clear that the nurse quoted above is seeking to attribute the cause of the
problem to some factor other than a defect in the way nurses functioned within the ward.
Incident No. 10
In this incident, a staff nurse noted that a patient had not been given his anticonvulsant
medication for the previous three days and identified and reported this as a drug error. It
was noted that it had been reported on the kardex that on the three evenings where the
drug had apparently been omitted the same member of staff had been on duty, and that
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other drugs prescribed for the time had been given, but that the anticonvulsant medication
had not been included. A senior nurse to whom the staff nurse pointed out this error,
agreed to take this up with the individual member of staff. This was duly done, however,
the situation was somewhat sensitive given that both nurses were of the same grade
Having sought an explanation, the charge nurse who had omitted to give the drug,
reported that she distinctly remembered giving the drug, but had clearly not recorded the
fact, therefore regarded this an omission of recording rather than an omission of
administering medication. Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would
be regarded as a lapse and a skill based error. The charge nurse who brought this to her
attention then notes in her statement
' At the time I accepted that I had brought the problem to her attention, and
being her peer, felt I could do no more in terms of follow-through. I now
accept, however, that I should have documented this as a drug error and
brought it to the attention ofmy nurse manager.'
It is unclear in the documentation how the nurse manager was informed of this, but
having had the incident brought to their attention, sought clarification from the charge
nurse who had omitted to record the drug. As part of her explanation, the charge nurse
outlined the following in mitigation:
"We were particularly busy that week with 8 patients, 2 of whom were
constant-cares. In addition, we had staffing difficulties, a busy theatre
schedule and the Thursday was particularly bad as we had unexpected
further sickness plus a staff nurse having to go home due to a family crisis.
This meant that, in addition to the ward workload, I had to nurse one of
the constant-care patients, plus deal with the clinic patients. In the 3 days
I worked, I had one breakfast break, 2 lunch breaks and no supper breaks
as the ward demands just couldn't provide for this. I have no recollection
as to how or why I missed documenting the drug on the three nights, and
can only assume that I must have been disturbed on the first evening and
omitted the item. On the second and third evenings, as I was constantly
being interrupted by call-bells, the telephone, and staff and patient queries,
I have copied the letters from the first evenings box, not a practice I
normally pursue, but as I was under pressure this is the only (poor) excuse
I can offer".
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There is no further information within the documentation as to the follow-up action
taken. This incident illustrates a number of issues worthy of further exploration. The
first being the perceived difficulty of the first charge nurse to whom the incident was
reported, in having to report a drug error to a peer and initially assuming that this could
not be followed through by herself The second issue worthy of further exploration is the
mitigation offered by the second charge nurse who omitted the drug.
In this clinical area there were two charge nurses and in this particular instance one
charge nurse was involved in the error and the error was reported to the second who did
not feel that she had a role in dealing with the issue. That being the case it is unclear as to
why she did not bring this to the attention of the person who did have the responsibility to
investigate the matter. There appears to be no suggestion in the documentation that one
charge nurse was attempting to cover up for another although this is a potential
conclusion that could be drawn by a disinterested observer. The areas of mitigation
presented by the charge nurse relate to the relationship between the workload experienced
and the number of staff available i.e. that the former outweighed the letter The charge
nurse does acknowledge that this is a 'poor excuse', however it must be noted that these
factors may have contributed to the overall environment in which this error occurred. The
question that should be asked is whether, if the workload and staff available were in
balance, was it as likely that the error would have occurred? Given that other drugs were
administered and recorded accurately by the charge nurse and indeed other qualified
nurses during the period the errors occurred, it is reasonable to assume that they were as
likely to occur and that other factors may have been responsible for the error It is also
notable that the same charge nurse was involved in incidents number ten and eleven On
both the charge nurse offers explanations whereby she has attempted to attribute the
cause of the errors to issues relating to the organisation rather than to individuals,




In this incident two qualified nurses started the process of checking a controlled drug in
order to change a patient's analgesia being delivered via a syringe pump. During the
process, the emergency alarm sounded in the ward and both nurses went to investigate
and assist. It was then discovered that a patient who had observed another patient trying
to climb out of bed had activated the emergency alarm. The two qualified nurses
involved attempted to help the patient back into bed as he had been doubly incontinent,
they both helped to clean and settle the patient. One of the qualified nurses was then
required to assist with a patient who had just returned from theatre. The same nurse was
then instructed to go for her break. It was at this point she remembered that she had
placed the syringe containing the controlled drug in her pocket at the time the emergency
alarm went off. Having then been distracted by a number of other things within the ward,
the process of checking and replacing the syringe had not been completed. On
discovering the syringe in her pocket, she handed this to the second qualified nurse who
then completed the process on her own and re-started the patient's analgesia syringe. The
formal recording process was not completed (i.e. the controlled-drug register was not
completed to record the removal of the syringe from storage and attachment to the
syringe driver). It was also noted by one of the nurses that the patient was changing his
own syringe as part of a patient education exercise in preparation for discharge and the
long-term use of this medical device by the patient.
The following day, the nursing staff on duty took delivery of a pre-prepared syringe with
the patient's medication and undertook the process of recording its delivery and storage
In doing so, they discovered that it was recorded in the controlled-drug that there should
be a syringe in storage, but on checking, this was not the case. The end result was a
discrepancy contained within the controlled-drug register. The nursing staff who
discovered the discrepancy then took steps to establish whether or not the patient had
actually had their medication changed This was established and therefore it was clear
that the discrepancy was a recording discrepancy rather than the patient's failure to
receive the appropriate medication. The correct steps were then taken to report the
discrepancy and amend the record to reflect the situation accurately.
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The two members of staff who had been involved in the initial process were then asked to
provide statements for the management team in order to assess where the error lay
Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a skill based
error and a lapse
Both members of staff provided statements which reflected the explanations which had
been given. In the statements they both make reference to the workload within the ward
and whilst they do not explicitly conclude that the heavy workload was the cause of the
error there is an implicit link between the error and the workload.
'StaffNurse (name) and myself helped the patient back into bed, however
the patient was doubly incontinent We washed the patient and changed
his clothes. On completing this task Staff Nurse (name) immediately
attended to a patient who had arrived back from theatre whilst I attended
to other patients. The ward was extremely busy.'
'Unfortunately, due to pressure of work, I omitted to sign the controlled
drug book for the aforementioned syringe driver or record the same in the
patients kardex.'
The two members of staff involved in this incident were qualified nurses, one of whom
was a permanent member of staff within the ward and another who was a bank member
of staff. As outlined earlier, both were asked to provide formal statements as to the
events of the evening in question and the appropriate managers assessed these. The
permanent member of staff was felt to require additional training in the area of the
management of controlled drugs and, as such, a request to the senior nurse for the ward to
assess the individual in
'Administration and control of opiate drugs, understanding of drug
administration policy and procedure for all medications, able to
demonstrate on two separate occasions the drug administration procedure
as per hospital policy,'
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The senior nurse from the ward reports two months later that all of these objectives had
been achieved and noted:
'I found (name) to be competent in drug administration. (Name) appears
to have lost some of her confidence in this area, but I hope she will
quickly regain it I will attempt to give her any further support'
For the second member of staff who was a member of bank nursing staff, it was noted
that no further action was necessary as she was dismissed from the Trust for another
incident elsewhere and not related to this incident under investigation. This incident
would be regarded as a classic example of a lapse and clearly illustrates an omission
(failure to record the syringe in the controlled-drug book) by the two nurses as a result of
a distraction (doubly incontinent patient trying to get out of bed). It is noted that there is
no formal disciplinary action taken against the staff involved but a period of supervised
practice was the more appropriate action. However it could be argued that this was
'excessive' given the circumstances and the impact reported by the ward manager would
appear to substantiate this view in that the confidence of the member of staff had been
adversely affected as a result of the lapse and the subsequent actions. Arguably such a
loss of confidence in one's clinical practice could in itself be an antecedent of a further
error.
Incident No. 12
This drug error happened as a result of a poorly written drug Kardex
"On the night of (date) into (date) on Ward (name), a patient in the ward
called (patient name) had MST 50mg given at 0030 due to a
misinterpretation of a poorly written drug Kardex. The drug was written
in the column after 2200, appearing to be 0000. The problem was noticed
immediately and the house officer on call was alerted at 0035 and (patient
name) was given the adequate dosage of the antidote Narcan at 0045.
(Patient Name) was immediately commenced on XA hourly recording of
vital signs and attached to continuous oxygen saturation monitoring.
(Patient name) was aware of the situation throughout and did not appear to
suffer any undue problems during the course of the night. The matter was
reported."
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The second qualified nurse involved reflects this account offered by her colleague. The
incident, having been brought to the attention of the relevant manager, the manager then
requested that the ward charge nurse facilitate a meeting with the two staff to set
objectives relating to the incident and requesting that the charge nurse provide
"correspondence relating to their safety to practice in terms of medications
administration". Within the documentation available, there is no evidence of any
intervention or assessment having been undertaken, nor that the manager received any
assurances with regard to these two members of staffs ability to administer medications
safely. Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a
rule based error.
This incident illustrates a particular issue with regard to nurses apparently committing an
error as a result of a poorly written prescription chart. This is an area which causes
considerable discussion as to where the problem and cause of the error actually lies, i.e.
does the fault lie with the medical practitioner whose prescription was unclear, or does
the cause lie with the qualified nurses who made assumptions with regard to the lack of
clarity around the prescription. Within the documentation there is no copy of the patients
drug kardex, therefore it is difficult to assess how unclear the prescription was or, indeed,
whether the drug had been administered on other occasions. The correct procedure for an
unclear prescription is to have it re-written in such a way that there is no lack of clarity
with regard to the drug, its dose and its frequency.
Incident No. 13
In this incident, a staff nurse administered 30mg of Dihydrocodeine; having checked that
the last time the drug had been administered was six hours previously. When the nurse
then went to sign the kardex, she realised that another nurse had given the patient the
same drug 30 minutes beforehand whilst she had been in a different area. This had not
been recognised at the time as it had been signed having been given in a column headed
"Other l imes". On discovering the error, the nurse contacted the relevant medical staff
and manager in order to report the problem It is noted by the staff nurse "at no time did
the patient suffer any ill effects from having Dihydracodeine 60 mg instead of 30 mg "
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The manager, having reviewed the statement submitted by the staff nurse, asked that the
charge nurse in the ward arrange to check the practice of the staff nurse involved on two
separate occasions on all aspects of the administration of medicines procedure. The
manager also requested the charge nurse to confirm in writing that the charge nurse was
satisfied that the nurse was conversant with the appropriate policies and procedures
Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a rule bases
error
There is no evidence within the documentation that this assessment was undertaken, or
that the charge nurse had satisfied herself that the staff nurse was clear on the appropriate
policies and procedures. The other area to note with regard to the available
documentation is that an incident form was available although it was for a different
patient and a different incident although the same member of staff was involved. This
was another example of documents relating to different incidents being apparently mis-
filed as well as a lack of documentation confirming that appropriate agreed actions had
been taken and proven to be effective. The impact of this lack of follow up was that the
likelihood of a recurrence was not reduced, which should be, and was the stated aim, of
the risk management policy within the organisation.
Incident No. 14
This incident involved the management of an emergency situation within a ward and how
it was affected by other incidents elsewhere within the hospital. The incident under
investigation involved the sudden deterioration of a patient which merited an emergency
call, known as a fast bleep, for anaesthetic assistance. This was very shortly followed by
a request for the cardiac arrest team to attend the ward. However, the cardiac arrest team
were within accident and emergency area, resuscitating a patient who had been brought in
by paramedics. In a very short period of time, i.e. 6 minutes, a third request for the
cardiac arrest team was made from another ward. The situation was therefore 3
emergency calls in different area of the hospital, all requiring the attendance of the
cardiac arrest team. Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be
regarded as a skill and rule based errors
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This, in itself!, was a very unusual set of circumstances and one which the organisation's
Resuscitation Committee took some time to review and identify any recommendations
which could be made should it happen again However, the incident under investigation
had a number of other aspects which resulted in a less than optimal management of a
cardiac arrest situation in a ward. In the report, a number of these areas were outlined:
1. Maintenance of the Ward Management Equipment
"The emergency equipment within the ward was not maintained to a
satisfactory level"
• Emergency equipment not checked regularly
• Several staff unfamiliar with the working of vital equipment. This
Included wall and portable suction, oxygen cylinder, defibrillator
• Essential resuscitation items were missing from the trolley
• The Ward trolley appeared unclean and dishevelled
2. Resuscitation Training ofNurses
"There were a total of 3 qualified staff on duty within the ward at the time of
the incident. Ward (name) had been closed the previous hour and a very
experience staff nurse also came to assist. In addition, the directorate charge
nurse attended. Much criticism has been made of the direct skills displayed
on the whole by the ward nursing staff. It would, however, appear that the
lack of leadership at the arrest contributed to what then appeared to be poor
performance from the staff'.
The investigation into the incident was commissioned by the nurse manager for the area
and undertaken by the resuscitation-training officer. In his / her report, the resuscitation
training officer noted a number of specific problems within the area.
" 1 Cardiac arrest trolley poorly stocked - ward had not followed stock
guidelines issued or used agreed check sheets. The cardiac arrest
trolley was rarely checked. Ward staff were unfamiliar with the
layout of the trolley. The portable suction machine was not
complete and fit for use. Staff were unfamiliar with its use.
Oxygen cylinders were not full and ready for use. There appeared
to have been a lack of responsibility taken for checking the
emergency supplies on the ward.
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2. Nursing attendances at resuscitation training from Ward (name)
was very poor with no staff attending since (date) [one year prior
to the incident], (Two nursing staff had booked in for training in
(date), but the class was cancelled due to poor numbers),
3. Even at basic level, there seems to have been an apparent lack of
will from the nurses present to be involved in delivering CPR.
4. There was no sense of priority with poor ability to complete one
task prior to distraction by another. This led to significant delays
in the early stages of resuscitation.'
The resuscitation-training officer goes on to summarise a number of more general
problems, i.e.
" 1. The team in Ward (name) were unaware that the cardiac arrest team were on
Standby in A & E. When there appeared to be a delay in the Arrest Team
arriving, panic seemed to affect staff present in Ward (name). Sufficient
staff were present so that one could have gone to the next Ward and got
the defibrillator to enhance the early stages of resuscitation. Initially,
there was a lack of recognition by medical and nursing staff that the
patient's condition was deteriorating so seriously. No one took control.
2. There appears to have been a failure to summon the emergency team at the
earliest stage.
3 There appears to have been an error in the telephone exchange in calling the
junior surgical team to the arrest. (Name) is reviewing this.
4. Nurses did not complete tasks they were asked to fulfil. Medical staff lacked
sense ofpriority and direction.
5. Lack of leadership initially when the nurse found the patients condition
deteriorating and secondly when the medical staff took over the management of
the event
6 Communication throughout the whole situation was very poor. There was no
spirit of teamwork, the surgical and medical doctors did not communicate clearly
with each other, leading to a grave lack of clarity regarding the patients
management."
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The resuscitation-training officer then goes on to make a number of comments about the
situation and recommendations for the future.
Having received the report, the general manager for the directorate requested that the
points of action outlined in the resuscitation training officer's report be actioned The
report within the documentation clearly identifies all actions taken for each of the issues
raised within the resuscitation-training officer's report. The nurse manager details at the
end of her report,
"in conclusion, this incident highlighted a number of points for all staff,
not only the nursing staff of Ward (name). Unfortunately, this incident
has been discussed widely throughout the directorate prior to all
information being established, and has resulted in misinterpretation of the
factual information later presented".
This final comment in the nurse manager's report illustrates a problem with any clinical
incident in that there can be considerable discussion in the area with regard to the
incident which, in turn, influences some of the information which is made available.
This can result in a lack of completeness, or indeed, accuracy of some of the details
which, in turn, makes appropriate recommendations and action for change difficult.
This incident demonstrates how a number of different apparently unconnected sets of
circumstances come together and contribute to the overall situation. The fact that the
emergency team is required in three different parts of the organisation at precisely the
same time is by any standard a rare occurrence and one for which it is not sensible to
plan. It would be impractical in the extreme to suggest that there should be three
emergency teams available at all times. When to this fact is then added the apparent
failures to maintain equipment, a lack of appropriate equipment to deal with the situation
in hand, failures in communication, lack of leadership, and lack of appropriate training it
becomes clear that the incident had the potential for a disastrous outcome. As individual
difficulties they may have had little impact on the overall situation however having been
brought together the effect was greater than the sum of their parts. Miller (1992) argues
that a similar list of'failures' (equipment, training, communication and leadership) were
146
responsible for the eventual demise of the Titanic following its collision with an iceberg
mid-Atlantic.
Directorate II
The documentary evidence available for the clinical incidents within this directorate was
very different from that available from the first directorate. The first set of documents is
a summary of 11 incidents, 8 of which affected a patient, and 3 of which affected a
member of staff. The document is headed up "Incident Reports Further Investigations"
and suggests that these incidents warranted some further investigation beyond the
completion of an incident form, although none of the incident forms were available
Basic information included the date of the incident, the ward, the person involved, the
type of incident and any information and/or comments. These are summarised as
follows:
> Incident 1 involved a patient who fell and the comment made being "staff trying
to be more vigilant and remind patient not to attempt mobilising without help".
Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a
rule based error
> Incident 2 involved a patient who had a burn or a scald "No bed-making during
patient meals. Two members of staff to turn mattress." Within the classification
outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a skill based error.
> Incident 3 involved a patient who fell, comment is "cot sides already up and cot
supports e.g. bumpers in place". Within the classification outlined within chapter
II this would be regarded as a rule based error.
> Incident 4 involved a patient who was being aggressive. "No psychiatric referral
made, was on Chlordiazepoxide regime due to excessive alcohol intake Also
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prescribed Haloperidol. Medication had no effect that evening, settled and
causing no more incidents."
> Incident 5 was a patient who clearly fell Comment made "hoist taken out of
circulation, reported to Estates, reinforced to staff involved Health and Safety
issues". Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded
as a rule based error.
> Incident 6 involved a member of staffwho sustained a strain/stroke sprain. "Felt
right increase painful, sent to A & E. X-rayed, sprained wrist strapped and sent
home". Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded
as a skill based error.
> Incident 7 involved a member of staff who slipped. "Domestic Supervisor
contacted. When Domestic asked why there was no warning sign, reply was 'It's
not my fault there are not enough signs. Speak to Domestic Supervisor'". Within
the classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a rule based
error.
> Incident 8 involved a patient displaying an irate manner towards staff. Comment
made "Agreed to advise medical staff re her concerns about discharge planning".
> Incident 9 involved a patient who was confused and became abusive. Comment
made "At the same time as this happened, the doctor and myselfwere seeing to an
acutely sick patient who required Diamorphine. I was on my way to get this when
the incident happened. The Registrar heard the commotion from the doctors'
room and came to help. Because we then had to restrain him and get security,
there was a delay in getting Diamorphine for the other patient"
> Incident 10 involved a member of staffwith right hand and wrist injury. "While
transferring a patient to the Stroke Unit, we had to use lift The level of the floor
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was uneven, Staff Nurse (name) and myself were entering lift with bed and
mobile drip stand. The drip stand wheel was caught whilst moving into lift and
my hand was caught between the bed rail and drip stand" Within the
classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a rule based
error.
> Incident 11 involved a patient who became aggressive. "Five of the night staff
have done the dementia training. Day staff did have problems, logged as
incidents. One patient was particularly confused, demented and aggressive, she
was getting "specialed" when her behaviour was bad at her usual nursing home".
The information relating to the above incidents was incomplete in terms of the
requirements laid out within the policy framework. In relation to this particular study,
there was no further information which the researcher could follow-up and therefore the
documents relating to the incidents could not be examined any further, and the staff
involved could not be contacted to take part in the interviews.
The researcher was keen to explore why documents relating to these incidents had not
been completed or retained in the same way as others. One explanation offered was that
the manager involved at the time of these incidents had subsequently left the organisation
and it was thought that these had probably been destroyed whilst that individual was
clearing their office Given the requirements for storage and maintenance of these
records in place at the time, these should not have been destroyed, but retained within the
organisation for a period of time.
The next 6 incidents all related to drug errors and, once again, the documentation
available for each of these incidents was incomplete. The available documents for each
of the incidents varied, but all related to some form of investigation/disciplinary action.
Incident 12.
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The only document relating to this was a letter to a member of staff indicating that a
meeting had been arranged to investigate an alleged dmg error, and informed the
individual that
'As the investigation may lead to a decision to proceed with disciplinary
action, you are advised of your right to be accompanied by a Trade Union
or StaffOrganisation Representative, or a friend.'
Although there is no detail as to the nature of the drug error within the letter to the
member of staff it is clear that the process being employed to investigate the issue was
the disciplinary process. This would appear to be the preferred method of the manager in
post at the time although this changed when the manager changed and a more reflective,
less punitive approach to the investigation was utilised.
Incident 13.
The documents available relating to this incident included the letter asking the member of
staff to attend an investigative meeting, a letter indicating to the member of staff the
outcome of the same meeting and a copy of some drug documentation relating to the
incident. Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a
slip and a skill based error. The outcome of the meeting was communicated to the
member of staff as
After an adjournment to consider the evidence, we reconvened and I
indicated that we would not proceed, in this instance, any further. We
have agreed to review our procedures and education practices in light of
this situation and will set up a review in the near future.'
In the letter sent to the member of staff following the investigative hearing, the charge
nurse who undertook the investigation concludes
'We met to investigate the circumstances, which led to (patient name) being
given the wrong dose of insulin via an infusion device. I outlined the case, I
explained that the meeting was held to accord you the opportunity to state
your case and for me to establish the facts.'
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In this particular incident, the "investigation" was conducted by charge nurse who was
accompanied by a more senior manager and was therefore clearly a learning opportunity
for the charge nurse as well as a formal investigation. Included within the documents
were a number relating to the incident, including a prescription sheet, drug infusion chart
and a diabetic chart. Within these charts there are a number of issues relevant to the
investigation.
Prescription Sheet
The prescription sheet has no name and no unit number for the patient and therefore it is
difficult to see how nursing staff were able to relate these prescriptions to an individual
patient. In the section marked 'parenteral medicines', there are four medications
prescribed; one having been scored out on the same day it had been prescribed. For one
of these drugs, the dose is marked as "3,500" but no units identified. In the section
marked 'parenteral medicines', once-only prescription, a single dose of Augmentum is
prescribed but there is no indication that this had been given, and there is identified
within this chart, a sliding scale of insulin to be delivered according the patients blood-
glucose readings. There is one set of rules for the insulin infusion rate which have been
crossed-out and substituted by another, none ofwhich has been signed by the prescriber.
Drug Infusion Chart
This chart requires a number of pieces of information relating to the patient; the patient's
identity, i.e. unit number the patient's ward, the pump type, serial no. and the date - all of
which were available and completed within the chart. It also requires the name of the
drug, the concentration, the diluent fluid and the information relating to the prescriber. In
this pro-forma, the diluent fluid was missing as was information relating to the prescriber.
It was also noted that the date requested does not tie in with the date on the prescription
sheet.
Diabetic Chart
This requires the patient's name and identifier, i.e unit number and ward. Name and
ward is available, but not the unit number The chart requires the blood glucose level to
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be monitored on a pre-determined time-scale. Some of these are missing. It is noted that
although the insulin doses are recorded, there are no initials to confirm whether or not
this had actually been given and to identify the administering nurse.
From the documentation available relating to this incident it is clear that the individual
nurses involved were the subject of the formal investigation during which it was evident
that the issues requiring to be addressed related to what the manager described as
'procedure and education practices'. Whilst these are not specified by the manager it is
clear from the lack of information contained within the charts described above that the
accepted normal practice required to be addressed It may be deduced that the charts did
not contain the required information to identify the patient. Despite this the charts were
used by different staff on a number of occasions and was therefore usual practice This is
despite the fact that being able to match individual prescriptions against each individual
patient is a prerequisite to being able to administer medication safely.
Incident 14.
The only document available for this incident is a letter to a member of staff, asking them
to attend a meeting to investigate an alleged drug error.
Incident 15.
The only document relating to this incident is a letter to a member of staff confirming the
outcome of an incident The document itself contains a brief description of the incident
under investigation
'We met to investigate the circumstances which led to (patient name) being
found dead in bed at 7.30 am. The post mortem showing that he had died at
3.00 am. We met to establish the facts. You admitted (patient name) had
asked not to be disturbed, you have not checked him in the morning stating
he was self-care.'
Having done so, the manager then goes on to record the outcome of the investigation as
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'After an adjournment to consider the evidence, we reconvened and I
indicated my intention not to proceed, in this instance, any further. You
have, however, as a result of this case, reviewed your systems and now
confirm to the day staff, on handover, an up-to-date report for all patients.'
The reason for the investigative meeting appears to be the fact that a patient was found
dead in his bed at 0730, a post mortem having established that he died at 3am. It is
difficult to identify what 'error' merited the instigation of a formal disciplinary process
against a nurse. There is no indication as to the cause of death. There is no suggestion
that the death was as a result of any act of omission or commission on the part of the
nurse, other than the nurse did not check him between 0300 and 0730. The nurse
commented that this was due to the fact the patient was 'self-care'. There may be a
reasonable case to understand the actions through the night it appears to be an excessively
punitive process to subject a qualified nurse to a disciplinary process in order to obtain
such information. Hypothetically, what would have been the case if the nurse had
checked on the patient at 0245 found him to be asleep and as there was no need to check
him again until the morning did not check him again until 0700 then the result would still
have been the same i.e. the patient would have died at 0300. It is difficult to see what the
review of systems suggested within the letter was likely to suggest to prevent a patient
dying between checks by a nurse
Incident 16.
The only documents relating to this incident are a letter to members of staff asking them
to attend an investigative meeting to "Investigate a drug error". It also contains a letter
recording the outcome of said meeting. The manager, in the letter outlining the outcome
of the meeting, gives a brief description of the reason for the meeting, being
'We met to investigate the giving of (patient's name) drugs to (different
patient's name). I outlined the case against you, that you dispensed the
drugs, did not follow procedures, did not check arm bands, and gave drugs
to (patient's name) which belonged to (different patient's name). I
explained that the meeting was held to accord you the opportunity to state
your case, and for me to establish the facts.'
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Having outlined the reason for the meeting, the manager then goes on to identify the
member of staffs explanation provided on the day
'You admitted that you had been on (Ward area) unusually for you, and
you felt there was a lot going on in the ward and you had been interrupted
a few times. You realised you were not concentrating, you apologised.'
Having outlined this position as presented by the member of staff, the manager then goes
on to identify the outcome of the meeting
'After an adjournment to consider the evidence, we reconvened and I
indicated my intention not to proceed with disciplinary action. You have
learned a valuable lesson, however, and are well aware of the potential
danger to the patient.'
In this incident the nurse involved presented a number of explanations for what are
technically violations in that the nurse failed to follow basic procedures in order to ensure
medication is administered safely. Given that there may also be described as a slip or
lapse in that steps were either taken or not as a result of distractions. Despite this there
appears to be no specific action required of the nurse as a result of the incident. It was
noted by the investigating manager that the member of staff had learned a lesson however
there was no indication of a period of supervised practice to establish the level of
competence of the individual in question, as was the practice elsewhere within the
organisation. Arguably if the nurse was 'willing' to violate the accepted procedures for
the safe administration of medicines in the ward in this case (which was not the nurse's
normal ward) then the same procedures would be violated elsewhere. Within the
classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a slip
Again, it would appear that a number of different pieces of documentation relating to this
error were not available. Once again, on seeking clarification, the researcher was
informed that the manager involved in this incident had since left the organisation and
these were the only remaining documents.
From the documents relating to the drug errors, there are a number of points of interest
and worthy of further consideration:
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■ In some letters asking members of staff to attend an investigative meeting, the
incident is described as "an alleged drug error" whereas in others it is described as
"a drug error" There appears to be no differentiating between what is an actual
error and an alleged error. The term alleged would normally be used until the
investigation was complete and had confirmed that an error had been committed.
The lack on consistent terminology in relation to the incident management does
little to instil confidence in the process and its integrity.
■ In two separate incidents, they are being used as a learning exercise for a more
junior member of staff. However, in one, the more junior member of staff takes
the lead and, in the other, the more senior member of staff takes the lead. The
documentary evidence would suggest that each of the novice managers were at
similar levels of experience in this field of managerial practice. Whilst it is
accepted that novice managers have to become familiar with the relevant
management processes it seems that there is a lack of consistency in the approach
being adopted and there is no acknowledgement to the member of staff involved
the reasons for the apparent differences from the stated policy.
■ None of the incidents appear to involve any advice from professional pharmacy
staff. It is accepted that many medication errors are very straightforward and the
involvement of professional staff would add little value to either the
understanding of the error or to the investigative processes. However, in at least
one of the incidents described above (incident 13) there are a number of complex
interactions and arguably the involvement of a pharmacist would have been an
important part of the learning process.
■ Only one of the incidents identifies any changes to current practice in the
organisation and one relates to an individual's change in practice. This
demonstrates that this part of the organisation was not using such incidents as
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learning opportunities nor was it sharing the potential lessons with the wider
organisation.
• Although all incidents were apparently managed under the disciplinary policy, no
disciplinary action has been instituted This brings into question the need to use
this policy to manage this situation. It is recognised within the literature that the
use of the disciplinary process can have a very negative impact on the individual's
confidence and belief in their own practice and as such could in itself be a
contributing factor to any subsequent error.
A different manager to the one who managed incidents numbered 1-16 in Directorate II
has managed the incidents described hereafter. There are some notable differences not
only within the processes employed but also in the stated outcomes of the incidents.
These will be illustrated within each incident.
Incident 17.
The documentation for this incident is very different from any of the others. It consists of
a statement surrounding the incident from a qualified nurse who made the error and a
qualified nurse who discovered the error. The third piece of documentation is described
by the individual involved in the incident as a 'reflection of the incident'. It outlines the
incident in some detail whereby the nurse administered a diuretic to the wrong patient
The nurse then describes the feeling and the actions taken
'My whole body sank. It felt like I was falling a great distance without
going anywhere. I was the most terrified I had ever felt (this from a man
who has jumped from aircraft, climbed down buildings, raced motor cars,
jumped off cliffs and bungee-jumped). A horrible feeling, a wave of
nausea and of panic. It felt that time had stood still, one terrible moment
of stillness. Then the training kicked-in. I informed the patient, spoke to
the JHO, Junior House Officer, and SHO, Senior House Officer, and
Nurse in Charge.'
Then followed the documentation of the event.
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I then had to continue with the rest of the patient's drugs, a nerve-racking
experience, with me taking more than necessary steps to ensure the right
patient got the drugs. I was like a man obsessed: name, unit no, name,
unit no., check name band, check unit no., an unending series of name,
unit no., name, running through my head. It felt that my soul had been
sucked straight out ofme, a vacuum filled my heart.
The staff nurse then goes on to describe further feelings as well as identifying where he
felt he had gone wrong, how it could be addressed, and what he had learned, and
concludes
'This incident has made me very aware of the power a Staff Nurse has,
and the responsibility that goes with it. A very potent reminder and
something I feel the University failed to stress and something which you
don't experience as a student'
There is no evidence amongst the documentation that there was any formal investigation
into this incident, but that the manger had taken an approach allowing the individual
nurse to reflect on the situation to identify the circumstances surrounding the incident,
what had gone wrong, and how this could be prevented. Although the individual
involved in the incident identifies a number of objectives for himself, there is no evidence
that these had been formalised and achieved. The nurse involved also raises an important
issue within the reflection with regard to the role of the pre-registration education and its
relevance to preparation for practice, post-registration. In the reflection the staff nurse
states that this is one part of professional practice not adequately covered by the
university and not something normally experienced as a student nurse. This would be
valuable feedback to the educating body but there is no evidence that this was shared and
therefore yet another opportunity lost to learn from an incident. Within the classification
outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as a skill based error and a slip.
Incident 18.
In this drug error, the correct drug was given to the correct patient, but at the wrong time
The documentation includes an incident form, a brief statement from the individual who
discovered the error, the patient's drug kardex and a hard copy of an e-mail between two
senior nurses regarding the issue. The patient's prescription sheet identifies 8 columns
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for times of administration, 4 of these columns have pre-determined fixed times, and 4
are blank to allow for variations. One of the drugs was due to be administered between
two of the fixed points. This was recorded on the drug kardex by an additional time
being identified with an arrow added, indicating between the two fixed times. This was
felt to be the root cause of the problem. Within the classification outlined within chapter
II this would be regarded as a skill based error. The copy of the e-mail identifies three
main actions to deal with this incident:
1. The clinical director was made aware of the issue and asked to address
the concerns around correct prescribing. The clinical director also
made a suggestion with regard to how this could be prevented in
future.
2. The pharmacist to be advised of the incident and to be invited to
comment on the clinical director's suggestion for improvement. A
senior nurse to be informed that the incident could be highlighted via
the clinical governance structure.
This incident once again demonstrates the inter-relationship between the individual
prescribing the therapy, the individual administering the therapy and the tools available to
ensure that the symbiotic relationship remains a safe one. In this incident the need to
involve the professional pharmacy staff is recognised at an early stage. The error has
resulted from the prescriber attempting to adapt the prescription pro forma to
accommodate a requirement, which does not fit the predetermined regime. Those who
were expected to administer the drug using the same prescription pro forma were not
aware of the presciber's intentions.
Incident No. 19
The documentation relating to this incident, an alleged drug error, includes the patient's
drug prescription and recording sheet, an extract from the patient's medical record,
statements from the two nurses involved in the incident, a statement from the senior nurse
to whom the incident was reported, a copy of the incident report form, a copy of a letter
informing the member of staff involved in the incident of an investigative meeting, a
minute of the investigative meeting and a letter to the member of staff outlining the
outcome of the investigative hearing. Therefore, tor this particular incident, there is a
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complete set of relevant documents. Within the classification outlined within chapter II
this would be regarded as a skill based error.
In this incident, a patient was due to receive an oral analgesic, a controlled drug. The two
members of staff on duty checked and measured the quantity of drug required using a
syringe rather than a small medicine cup as the volume required (2.5 mis) could not be
accurately measured within a medicine cup. Both nurses then took the medication to the
patient in order to administer it. As one of the nurses was bending down to lower the cot
sides, the other nurse proceeded to inject the medicine into the patient's intravenous
venflon. The non-administering nurse then noticed the error and quickly told the nurse to
stop, however, the majority of the 2.5 mis had already been injected. The result of this
was that 2.5mls of a solution which was intended to be taken orally had been injected into
a patient's vein.
The incident was reported immediately to a member of the medical staff who was
available in the area who asked that the intravenous venflon be removed from the patients
arm and reassured both nurses that it was unlikely that the patient would come to any
harm The situation was reported to the consultant on-call who agreed with the advice
given by the junior member of the medical staff The two nurses then reported the
incident to the senior nurse on duty who ensured that the relevant action had been taken
and asked both nurses to complete the incident form and to write formal statements
regarding the incident.
Both nurses state within their written accounts of the events that the incident was
recorded in the patient's record. This is verified by inspection of a copy of the record
included in the documentation. However, in the minute of the investigative meeting, it is
reported that the member of staffs representative requested that the meeting note "that
the medical staff did not feel the need to write on the patients notes". It is unclear why
this point is being made, given that the nursing staff record in their accounts that the
incident was recorded within the patient's notes and there is no suggestion from any of
those involved that the medical staff had instructed that it should not be within the
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medical record. However, the part of the patient's note which was available within the
documentation set relates to nursing information as opposed to medical information, and
this may account for any discrepancy. It is notable that the staff representative raised this
as an issue Given that the error related very much to nursing practice and was recorded
in the relevant nursing documents, it is unclear why the representative would raise this
issue as part of a nursing investigation other than to potentially illustrate the difference in
the approach between how medical and nursing staff are managed during such incidents.
This is an issue which has been noted in a number of areas. However, in this particular
incidence, there is no suggestion that the medical staff were in any way involved in this
incident
During the investigation, the nurse involved, i.e. the nurse who administered the drug,
was given the opportunity to outline the events of the incident. The member of staff and
her representative were given at least two further opportunities to identify any particular
issues which they felt were pertinent to the incident. The manager leading the
investigation also sought clarification as to whether or not there were other things
happening in the area, which may have caused some difficulty, "(name) asked if there
was anything else about the ward that night". It is clear from this that the manager is
attempting to establish whether or not there were any mitigating circumstances which
might have caused the nurse to make such an error. The nurse involved replied,
'(Name) asked if she meant was anything distracting her. Stating no, that
there had been one sick patient, but they were not focussed on anything
else. She outlined that she had already administered drugs by IV and they
administered a lot by IV in (ward name). However, she stated that this
was not an excuse.'
The meeting then adjourned and reconvened indicating that the manager's decision was
to proceed with disciplinary action. At this point in the proceedings, the member of staff
and their representative are offered an opportunity to delay such process or whether they
wish to have it completed there and then, and they said they wished to have no delay.
The outcome of the deliberations was that the nurse should receive a verbal warning for
her actions. This was confirmed in writing soon after the meeting
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This incident throws into high relief a number of issues of interest in the research.
> The documentation available with regard to this incident appears to be complete
in relation to the incident itself although the details of the investigative process in
relation to the second nurse are not available and there is no evidence that this
actually took place.
> The patient had three separate prescription sheets; two of which had been
completed with the patient's name, unit number, age and consultant, but the third,
which was a continuation sheet, had no patient identification recorded This
would confirm some findings within the literature that the consistent and
frustrating conclusions in any study examining nursing records is that they remain
incomplete.
> It would appear that both nurses involved in the incident received a letter inviting
them to separate investigative meetings. However, the documentation pack only
includes a minute from one of these meetings as well as the outcome to one of
these meetings, i.e. to the member of staff who actually administered the dose
incorrectly. There is no documentation or information available to understand
why this was the case.
> This is of particular relevance as the investigation of the first nurse led to
disciplinary action. The only indication as to why this incident should have
resulted in disciplinary action was what the manager described as the 'potential
seriousness of the actions taken'. This would appear to be consistent with some
findings within other studies whereby punishments given to nurses related either
to the seriousness or potential seriousness of the outcome. Given some of the
other incidents described above there appears to be little to differentiate this from
other incidents and as such illustrates a lack of consistency in determining the
outcome of such investigations.
> During the investigative hearing, the staff representative makes an issue of the
medical staff apparently not feeling the need to write in the patient's notes. This
illustrates two issues previously outlined in this study and within the literature; the
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difference in approach to the management of incidents in relation to doctors and
nurses and the inter-relationship between these two groups of staff.
> There is no indication that there was any requirement for any further educational
support in order to prevent a recurrence. This is despite the different approach
adopted by the new manager in this directorate.
> There is no indication that the lessons learned from this incident are shared either
within the directorate or across the organisation.
Incident No. 20
The documentation relating to this alleged drug error included a handwritten version of
events from the nurse involved in the error, the incident form, the patient's prescription
sheet, drug recording sheet and record of some e-mails. In the statement, there is no
indication as to the exact nature of the drug error, other than an incorrect dose, i.e. there
is nothing to suggest whether the dose was too small or too large. It is recorded on the
incident report form that a larger dose had been given than had been prescribed. The
statement from the nurse spends a significant amount of time identifying the
circumstances in which they were attempting to dispense medicines safely.
"I work in a 30-bedded (type of ward) on night duty. Two trained staff
and one NA cover the ward. On the night in question, I was attempting to
dispense the medication accurately in bay 4 in (ward name) in order for
patients to have their medication and enable patients to settle for the night,
and enable myself to move to the next 6-bedded bay and 2 side rooms
under my care. Unfortunately, the bay was very busy with confused
patients, patients climbing out of bed, patients becoming distressed at lack
of attention. As staff nurse and NA were busy at the other side of the
ward, I was trying to dispense medication and attempting to assist
distressed and confused patient at the same time. I also had to answer
several telephone queries regarding patients in my care. Due to these
circumstances, I unfortunately dispensed the incorrect dose of medication
to (patient name)".
There is no documentary evidence that this incident was fotlowed-up in any way in terms
of an investigation or discussion with the individual. It is clear, however, that the
demands upon the individual were such that they distracted them from safe
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administration of drugs and as such would be described in a technical sense as a lapse.
The documentation illustrates some of the difficulty regarding the use of descriptive text
in that some important detail is not recorded. In this instance the text does not record the
nature of the incorrect dose (i.e that the amount administered was greater than that
prescribed). Within the classification outlined within chapter II this would be regarded as
a slip.
Incident No. 21
The documentation relating to this alleged drug error is a summary of the events from the
senior nurse to whom the incident was reported. A staff nurse, whilst coming on duty,
was checking a patient to discover that an infusion of a medication had been diluted in
50% Dextrose, rather than 5% Dextrose. The infusion was labelled and signed by two
members of staff who had been on duty the night before. The appropriate action was
taken on discovering the error, i.e. the infusion was stopped and replaced with the correct
diluent, patient was observed and blood taken to check for plasma glucose levels. Advice
was also sought from relevant medical staff and pharmacy staff. The documentation pack
did not include any further information in the form of an incident form or statements
from the two members of staff involved. A senior nurse, however, reports that
'Both staff have been asked to do a report on the incident with reference to
the key points regarding the correct checking procedures, UKCC
Guidance, and what they have learned from the incident, and what steps
they will take to prevent a repeat occurrence We have discussed where
and how the error arose.'
The senior nurse to whom the incident was reported was also concerned that there was a
lack of consistency in the recording and monitoring of such incidents and concludes her
report by stating
"I feel that there is no consistent documented guidance regarding how this
incident should be handled and would welcome some form of draft
protocol. I also feel it is critical that we have a system to record and
monitor these incidents at ward and directorate level in order to analyse
and identify what the issues and training needs are".
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It has been suggested that having two nurses undertaking the checking procedure does
not offer any greater guarantee of accuracy This incident demonstrates this to be the
case. The comments made by the senior nurse also demonstrates the already noted lack of
consistency in the management of clinical incidents at a local level.
Incident No. 22
The documentation relating to this incident takes the form of a review meeting involving
senior nurses, pharmacist, risk manager, health and safety manager and other relevant
staff. The review itselfwas described by the senior nurse calling the meeting as a critical
incident review in relation to the incident and was noted as
"Last Monday/Tuesday an incident occurred within the (name) directorate
which had a domino effect on several other patients in two other wards.
The impact was detrimental to patients and nursing staff and the outcome
was less than favourable".
An incident occurred in one ward whereby a patient was verbally and physically
aggressive towards members of the nursing staff. He was allegedly suffering from
alcohol withdrawal, which appeared not to be effectively controlled by medication. It
was decided that he should be transferred to another ward where a side room would be
available, thus minimising the disruption to other patients. In order for this to happen, a
patient within the receiving ward had to be boarded to yet a different ward. The patient
who was thought to be the most suitable, was one who was due to be discharged the
following day with a complex discharge package arrangement. The day following the
incident, two patients were due to be admitted but, due to a lack of beds, they could not
be admitted immediately and some bowel preparation was commenced with one patient
prior to a bed being available and, having agreed to use one of the patients' toilets, was
unfortunately incontinent in a communal area The nursing staff involved with the first
patient, i.e. the individual suffering from alcohol withdrawal, felt that the medical
management of symptoms was less than optimal and did not follow the available
guidance for the management of such agitated patients, and this contributed to the
"domino effect" on this other incident.
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The patient who had to be boarded out of his ward to accommodate the agitated patient
had in place a complex discharge plan which disintegrated as a direct result of the patient
being moved from one ward to another. The review of circumstances noted that
"The discharge facilitator went to ward (name) to discuss with the nursing
staff the following discharge planning arrangements:
■ Informed medical staff that (patients name) was now on Ward (name) and
required a medical review and a discharge prescription
■ Re-routing the ambulance
■ Informing diabetic specialist nurse ofdischarge plans
" Liasing with a social worker, district nurse liaison officer and pharmacy
department"
The review then goes on to note that, as a result of the patient being moved from one area
to another, the following sequence of events led to an undesirable discharge:
■ Although his discharge prescription was written and signed by a
doctor, it was incomplete and was dispensed with some of his drugs
missing.
■ The diabetic specialist nurse did not arrive until the afternoon. The
ambulance came early and (patient name) left without seeing her.
Consequently, he had no blood glucose monitoring equipment, no
insulin syringes
■ Information on immediate discharge letter unhelpful for new
temporary GP
■ Discharge facilitator spent 4-5 hours sorting out the mess along with
district nurse liaison officer
The nursing staff involved in all of these incidents reported that:
1. If patient A, who was agitated as a result of alcohol withdrawal, was being
physically and verbally abusive to nursing, medical, other healthcare staff and
potentially at risk to other patients had been managed adequately by the medical
staff in accordance with laid down guidance for such circumstances, he would not
have required to be transferred to another ward and therefore no need for patient
B to have been boarded out.
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2. Patient B's discharge plan which had been well-prepared and well thought out,
had gone awry as a result of an inappropriate and unnecessary move of the patient
from one ward to another
3 Patient C found himself in a very embarrassing and demeaning position, having
been faecally incontinent in front of patients and relatives as a result of bed not
being available because of the incident described above.
The action taken as a result of this sequence of events was:
1.Firstly the medical staff involved with the management of the patient
with alcohol withdrawal symptoms were informed of the available
guidance on the management of such cases
2.That the protocols for the management of alcohol withdrawal should be
reviewed.
3.Any decision relating to patients being boarded out within the
directorate should be deferred to the most senior nurse available at the
time whose decision should be regarded as a final one
4.Any member of staff concerned about a planned discharge should
contact the discharge facilitator who is aware of all planned
discharges.
The meeting concludes that the above actions were thought to have already been in place
by some of the staff present but it appears that not all key staff are aware and that more
work around this issue seems important.
This incident very clearly illustrates the potential effect that a set of circumstances can
have on other parts of an organisation which would appear, on the face of it at the very
least, to be completely unrelated. This is an issue which is described vividly in a number
of pieces of literature whereby it should not be assumed that the final event is, in itself,
the only set of relevant circumstances to the final incident.
The nurse manager concludes at the end of her report "... this incident highlighted a
number of points for all staff not only the nursing staff ofWard (Name)" Unfortunately,
this incident has been discussed widely throughout the Directorate prior to all information
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being established and has resulted in misinterpretation of the factual information later
presented.
This final comment in the nurse manager's report demonstrates a problem with any
clinical incident in that there can be considerable discussion in the area with regard to the
incident which in turn influences some of the information which is made available. This
can result in a lack of completeness, or indeed accuracy of some of the details, which in
turn make appropriate recommendations and action for change difficult.
The complexity of this incident only serves to illustrate once again how circumstances
within one part of the organisation can impinge negatively on another and exacerbate the
impact of an untoward incident even where they appear to be entirely unrelated As
described in a previous incident within a different directorate a number of different
factors have come together to result in the outcomes described above. It would appear
that similar 'failures' have all played a role - i.e. equipment, leadership, communication
and training. Whilst the example cited by Miller in relation to the Titanic has been used
there are other high profile incidents which have found similar issues for example the
Piper Alpha oil platform fire and the explosion of the American space shuttle Challenger
shortly after take off.
Directorate HI
From this particular directorate, four incidents were presented to the researcher. The
documentation relating to all four incidents took the form of critical reviews of incidents.
These were:





The exact nature of each of these incidents will not be described in any detail as it is
likely to reveal the identity of the organisation which agreed to take part in the study, but
which requested that the anonymity of the organisation and its staff be maintained
Therefore, the researcher took the view that these incidents should be commented upon in
terms of the process rather than the incidents themselves. However the very brief title
used above illustrates the nature of the individual incidents.
All four incidents took the form of a critical review They were undertaken and led by a
senior member of the multi-disciplinary team but involved all relevant parties. The final
reports provide descriptions of the incidents, any relevant statements from those members
of staff and/or patients involved, copies of relevant policy procedure and guideline
information and any recommendations for future practice.
The format of the reports suggests that a different approach was undertaken by this part
of the organisation to the others already discussed. They involved a wider group of staff
including those who may not necessarily have been involved in the incident but who
could nonetheless contribute to an understanding of its cause and how 'things could
change to prevent a recurrence'. This wider, more inclusive approach reflects the type of
clinical work undertaken within this directorate as well as the multidisciplinary style
adopted in delivering such clinical care. Although the staff involved were not part of the
interview process within the research the manager involved agreed to be interviewed and
the views expressed are included in the analysis.
Summary
The clinical incidents described within this chapter represent those reported through the
subject organisation's recognised channel for reporting clinical incidents involving
qualified nurses. There is a broad spectrum of incidents although the largest single
incident type was medication errors. This reflects the finding within the literature and is
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consistent with other studies. A number of issues have been raised through the analysis
and include;-
> The application of processes within and between parts of the organisation is
inconsistent despite being part of the same policy framework.
> The apparent inconsistencies between managers in the application of policies, the
investigation and management of incidents and the eventual outcome of incidents
was evident not only across the organisation but within single managerial units.
> The lack of use of learning opportunities within and between parts of the
organisation was evident throughout the analysis This in part was demonstrated
by similar incidents occurring in the same area within a short period of time
> The inconsistencies between different staff groups (mainly nurses and doctors) in
the management of clinical incidents were also evident in a number of different
incidents. This was in the main (although not exclusively) related to medication
errors.
> The attribution behaviour demonstrated by some of the nurses involved in
incidents and their explanations for the causes.
These issues are brought together in Chapter IX as part of the overall conclusions of the





Following the in-depth examination of the clinical incidents fiom the subject
organisation, phase III of the research study was the completion of semi-structured
interviews with those staff identified in phase II. The cohort of staff included the nurses
directly involved in the incident, the nursing staff responsible for the management of the
investigative process and any other relevant personnel implicated in the incident or its
investigation. The final group of staff to be approached was representatives from staff
organisations and professional organisations involved in supporting and representing staff
during the investigations. The main purpose of these interviews was to investigate and
understand individual's perceptions of the structure, process and outcome of the
management of the investigation. In particular, this was an opportunity to explore with
nurses involved whether they felt that the incident had been managed fairly and whether
they felt that blame had been apportioned unjustifiably.
As outlined within chapter III, one of the limitations of the study is the potentially small
number of volunteers prepared to take part in the study. This is due to the very sensitive
nature of the topic under investigation and the impact it may have had on the volunteer.
The researcher recognised that this form of self-selection had the potential to provide a
bias in the responses. For example, there was a danger that those who volunteered may
have a particular personal agenda relating to the incident or to the way it was managed.
Having accepted this limitation, the researcher was able to guide the semi-structured
interview to minimise the effect of any possible bias
MakingContact
The researcher identified those members of staff to be contacted from each of the
incidents examined in the phase II of the research programme. A total of 31 staff were
contacted by letter. The initial contact served a number of different functions. The letter
from the researcher introduced the researcher, outlined his background, confirmed the
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permission received from the organisation and explained the outcome of the submission
to the Local Research Ethics Committee. The letter also enclosed a consent form with a
pre-paid envelope for the individual nurse to respond, and an information sheet outlining
the aims and objectives of the study along with contact details of the researcher and the
research supervisors should there be any questions the individuals wished to raise. Copies
of this documentation are included in appendices 1 and 2. Relevant details, which could
identify either the organisation or any individuals, have been omitted. Each subject was
asked to complete a pro forma, confirming that they were prepared to take part in the
study and the method by which they would prefer to be contacted, i.e. by letter, telephone
or e-mail. Also included in the consent form was the option not to take part in the study
and the researcher requested if this were the case, the member of staff explained why they
would prefer not to take part in the study as it was felt that this would be potentially
useful information.
Responses to Invitation to TakePart
In the first return 12 responses were received, ofwhich 6 nurses agreed to take part in the
study, 5 were not prepared to take part in the study and one had been returned as the
member of staff had moved away. Some weeks later a reminder letter was sent to those
who had not responded with further copies of the information sheet and consent form.
Following the reminder letters a further 8 subjects agreed to take part in the study, with
one other stating that they would not be willing to take part. The breakdown of the
response rates are presented in table 8 below. An analysis of the responses is then
provided in table 9
Table 8: A Summary ofResponse Rates
Number %
Number of nurses contacted 31 100
Total number of responses 20 64.5
Returned unopened 2 6.5
No Response 9 29.0
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Table 9: An Analysis of Responses
Number %
Total number of responses 20 100
Willing to take part 14 70
Not willing to take part 6 30
It was felt important to ascertain why individuals did not want to take part in the study. A
total of 6 (30%) subjects who returned their consent form stated that they did not wish to
take part in the study. Four provided reasons and 2 provided no reason. The four reasons
provided were :-
> Due to past experiences I would prefer not to take part in this
study.
> Not prepared to discuss my clinical practice outside
employment-related issues.
> Personal reasons.
> Feel as though I have been over said incident in full already -
don't want to go through it again.
At the outset of the research it was difficult to predict how many nurses would be
prepared to take part in this part of the study. Given the sensitive nature of the subject
matter and the voluntary nature of participation it was anticipated that the response rate
could be relatively low. The 14 staff (70% of respondents) willing to take part in the
study provided an acceptable foundation for obtaining a spectrum of views relating the
management of clinical incidents. As the number is relatively small it would be difficult
to provide a breakdown between those who were managers and those who were staff who
were themselves investigated without potentially compromising anonymity. However,
within the cohort of 14 respondents there is a mix of clinical nurses, nurse managers and
others involved in the process.
Each semi-structured interview was recorded using audio equipment with the consent of
the individual member of staff and conducted in an open format in order to elicit as much
qualitative information as possible with regard to the individual's perceptions of the
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management of clinical incidents. Efforts were made to try and avoid an in-depth
description of the incident, although perhaps this was inevitable. On some occasions
interviewees took the opportunity to outline their version of events. The researcher
developed a broad framework to ensure that all the relevant information was obtained
The structure and areas to be covered are outlined in table 10
Table 10: An Outline of the Interview Framework















This framework was utilised by the researcher in each interview. By the nature of
qualitative study it was neither possible nor desirable to follow a strict format of
interviews. However, these were the main areas of investigation and as such the same
framework was followed and utilised in undertaking an analysis of the data generated
through the interviews.
Structure
The Perceptions of Policies and Procedures
The policy framework within which clinical incidents were managed had changed
throughout the period of the study and the main areas of change have been described
earlier. There were some very mixed perceptions about the usefulness of the policy
documents used within the organisation. Not surprisingly the perceptions of investigators
were different from the investigated. It was also clear however that within these two
groups of staff there were different perceptions. Managers tended to use the policies as
173
flexibly as they could, some to the point where they almost ignored the policy
completely Some, who had never been involved in the investigative processes,
previously, reported that they followed the policy closely.
'It was helpful because I have never until that point been involved in ati
investigation of an error. People who were used to doing this were able to
guide us through it and as it was a new policy the people who were
involved in writing it were there and they helped.' (Interview 4)
One manager stated
'We tend not to follow it to the letter unless there is a real possibility of
someone having to be dismissed ' (Interview 1)
This individual manager then went on to describe the principles followed in undertaking
an investigation. This suggested that the policies and procedures were ignored completely
as they felt that they had a more appropriate, less threatening and more productive
method of investigation. When pressed as to why they had adopted this approach and
why others had not, they replied
'I think that it is down to individual experience, confidence and abilities. It
also depends on the culture and environment... I have a lot of experience
in different areas and am very confident in my managerial style and
approach and therefore have no difficulty in defending the approach I take
I appreciate that different senior nurses find themselves in different
circumstances and environments, which don't allow them to do things
differently. I do think this is a very 'nursey' related issue and a product of
how nursing has been managed over many years.' (Interview 1)
This view was reflected by another manager who stated: -
'I use the policy as a guide rather than as a set of instructions, which needs
to be followed to the absolute letter, I think that the approach within the
policy is very rigid and tends to lead you down a path you may not
necessarily wish to go down. My predecessor took what I would call a
very traditional nursing way of dealing with people who had been
involved in an error, particularly drug errors where they have to undergo
an investigation and potentially are disciplined at the end of the process. I
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know that there are discussions to try and change this approach but it has
been the way that nurses have dealt with drug errors for years and it is
very difficult to get people to change their approach quickly.' (Interview
2)
Nurses who have been subjected to the investigation process also reported different views
of the usefulness of the policies. The view of the individuals tended to reflect their
perceptions about the process and outcome of the investigation. For example one nurse
who was disciplined at the end of the process, when asked if the policy was helpful,
responded
'Not at all helpful for me. They are designed to help managers only to find
blame with whoever was involved in an incident. My trade union rep. tried
to convince me that they were there to help me get fair treatment but they
are only designed for one thing - to blame the person who has made a
mistake and to discipline them or even sack them. They are written by
managers for managers with no thought to how that makes the member of
staff feel or what it might do to their career.' (Interview 5)
Another subject had a significantly different experience and view of the process. They
reported
'To begin with I wasn't even aware that the Trust had a policy for when
something went wrong, but my trade union made sure that I had a copy
before any meeting. To begin with, I did not think that they would be of
any help because, as I said I had never been involved in this situation
before. However, my trade union rep. talked me through what would
happen and that was helpful. It was just as well they did because the
investigative meeting that took place really didn't follow what the policy
said should happen.' (Interview 8)
The changes in the policy framework had seen a significant shift over the course of the
research and had moved away from relying on the disciplinary process to undertake
investigations to one which was more open and used techniques from other industries (for
example root cause analysis). There was a spectrum of views as to how this change had
improved the process and outcome.
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'I think that this has gone down very well. I think in the first instance
people were suspicious of it because an incident happens you write out
your incident form you'll look at your risk assessment of it and I think that
some people because the risk assessment was being done think, there was
a realisation from the employee where it had went wrong it was more clear
cut because they were walking through it perhaps with a risk analysis or
whatever I would say readily using the incident form and risk register
far better than they were even a year ago. The fear has gone. People don't
think that because something automatically has happened that they are
going to be facing an investigative.'(Interview 3)
The changes in the policies and procedures also led to some confusion as to the processes
employed within a given situation.
'Some of them are a little bit ambiguous in as much as they don't tell you
which direction to take and I tend to look for a lead in that, and that would
be primarily because ofmy newness to this role if you like. I suppose if
you had done it in the past you would know which way to go, but for me,
the last incident which I dealt with, was part of the investigative team if
you like, or the co-ordination of the, other people, I took my lead from
(name). However, some ofmy personal knowledge and knowledge of the
area in which the incident happened, did come in very useful and the
(organisation name) were involved as well and that was a bit scary in as
much as I wasn't expecting the, hostility, I think is the only word I can
use.' (Interview 7)
There remains however some confusion over the role this plays alongside the
investigative process that is likely to involve a member of staff in disciplinary action.
One manager, when asked specifically about the new policy and the root cause analysis
process, argued
'That gets fudged though - because the problem is, if someone could or
should be disciplined that has caused a problem because before you have
an open discussion about what went wrong using root cause analysis the
union rep is saying we need to get the investigative out of the way first.
They seem to be running in parallel but I am not sure they are tied
together ' (Interview 6)
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Summary of Perceptions of Policy
The perceptions of the helpfulness of the policy framework were coloured by the nurses'
backgrounds & experiences, the role the individual nurse played in the process and the
outcome. Managers with more experience in their role and more experience in
undertaking investigations tended to use the policy flexibly and as guidance rather than as
a set of rules to which they must adhere strictly. Less experienced managers and those
who had not been involved in the process previously tended to use the policy documents
as a 'roadmap' to guide them through the process and to ensure that they were not caught
out by procedural errors. One trade union was noted by a number of respondents to have
a tendency to try and derail the process in favour of their members by identifying
procedural errors committed by managers. As a result individual investigations were
terminated and no further action taken. This approach and the differences in style evident
between managers were acknowledged to potentially create a perception of inconsistency
across the organisation. Whilst the issue of derailing investigations was mentioned by a
number of respondents, there was no evidence within the incidents examined in phase II
that this was a tactic employed by staff organisations. It is also clear that such an
approach did nothing to assist the process of identifying the root cause of an incident and
therefore facilitating a potential solution.
For staff who had been the subject of an investigation there were mixed views about the
helpfulness of the policy. This ranged from accepting that the policy and procedure were
fair although did not reflect what actually happened, through to a complete mistrust in the
document itself, which they saw as being a management tool that was used to apportion
blame irrespective of the cause of the error under investigation. The view expressed from
individuals who represented staff during the process described the policies as fair but that
there are occasions where the interpretation of the policy leads to inconsistencies in
approach and outcome. This in turn created the perception that the processes are unfair
and inequitable. One representative also reported
'Sometimes I would say ... at times they are actually more fair to the
employee than to the management.' (Interview 3)
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Generally, it was acknowledged that whilst at the time of the research there was very
limited experience in using the new policy framework; it was helping to shift the
emphasis away from a punitive process to one that allows an open review of an error.
There was some concern about what happens when there is a requirement to follow both
a root cause analysis of the incident and a formal investigative process of an individual's
role within the incident.
Perceptions of'The Culture'
In undertaking the interviews the researcher did not introduce the term blame at all. It
was only explored further if raised by the research subject. All those interviewed raised
the issue of blame and most referred to the 'blame culture'. There were three main areas
explored in relation to blame.
1. The organisational culture and blame
2. The issue of nursing and blame
3. A blame free culture
The Organisational Culture and Blame
It was important to review this organisation as part of the wider culture within the NHS,
it was neither useful nor possible to separate the two It also became evident throughout
the interviews that it was difficult to divorce the organisational culture and the wider
perceptions and expectations of the general public. All of which had an impact on the
individuals' perceptions of the culture.
It was generally felt that in the organisation there was a culture of seeking to blame
individuals for errors. It was also accepted that this was a reflection of the wider NHS as
well as political and societal views. There was a lot of anxiety about how the media and
in particular the tabloid press used untoward clinical incidents to present sensationalised
headlines. They rarely if ever presented all the facts and that in turn did not reflect
accurately the true nature of the problem. This in turn led to some politicians being seen
to jump on the bandwagon and to demand that full investigations are undertaken to
identify who was at fault. None of the incidents reviewed in phase II had received any
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interest from the press. A number of interviewees however were able to cite incidents
from the subject organisation, which had received local and national press coverage. In
their view these had been sensationalised in order to add interest to the story One of the
interview subjects was very clear in their views of the culture that had developed.
'For example no matter what happens, no matter how trivial the incident is
we are subjected to an investigative hearing which makes you feel like a
criminal.' (Interview 5)
The organisation's culture in part reflects the way in which its leaders chose to lead. It
was commented by two different interviewees that the demonstrated behaviours of senior
managers within the organisation did not reflect the approach and style suggested within
the different policy documents Both these individuals had been involved in what they
described as 'serious' clinical incidents. One of the incidents pre-dated the time period of
the study and was therefore not included in the earlier phase of the research, however the
reflections of the member of staff were pertinent but had to be viewed within the
organisational culture at the time of the incident. The interviewee acknowledged that the
culture had changed since that time.
'The (name ofpost) was not at all helpful at the time of the incident. I was
not directly involved although it happened in the area where I worked, so I
could see what was happening from the sidelines. Staffwere marginalized
and some were even excluded. It was clear that not all the relevant
information was being gathered and the wrong conclusions were being
drawn as a result The style and approach adopted by (name) really
affected the way the nursing staff felt about the whole issue and it left a bit
of a bad taste for quite a long time.' (Interview 11)
The appointment of the risk manager and the changes in approach outlined within the
policy resulted in a perceived change in the organisation's culture, although one
interviewee remained sceptical that the rhetoric within the policy was matched by
observable behaviours among senior staff and in particular senior nursing staff.
'The policy says all the right words about wanting to learning from errors
and to support staff through the traumatic times but that is not always what
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happens. If you happen to get a particular manager then that might be the
case but I could name a few names of senior nurse managers who
definitely do not take that approach and they have a reputation for being
really hard when it comes to disciplining staff for their mistakes. Mind
you I have also heard it said that managers who don't discipline staff are
just a soft touch so I suppose they cannot win really.' (Interview 12)
The culture within the organisation was recognised as a major weakness in encouraging
individual nurses to report errors.
'You go back 5 years ago, someone did something wrong. Some people
were very honest and would hold their hands up. A lot I think was put
under the carpet because there was fear of an investigative with a
disciplinary. Some people are very, very scared in that they actually think
that they are going to lose their job.' (Interview 3)
When this issue was explored a little further as to whether the changes which had taken
place within the organisation had resulted in a change in the perception this subject's
response was interesting
'I think now people, some people, still don't believe that, because some
people still perceive fairness and equity to be chosen as to who gets
fairness and equity.' (Interview 3)
From this individual's experience the issues relate not so much to blame within the
culture but the fact that individuals are not treated consistently and fairly across different
parts of the organisation The issue of consistency across the organisation was raised by a
number of the subjects. Again this related to both managers who were responsible for
undertaking the process and individuals who were being investigated. There was
evidence that managers were discussing their approaches with each other in an informal
setting to ensure consistency between the managerial units.
'I think that in any structure any manager would tiy and maintain
consistency at least within their patch and sometimes it won't be
consistent everywhere else but you really try to be consistent and fair.. .To
be honest |I meet up with my counterpart frequently and if there is any
issues then we discuss them but it is very informal That is how we
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discovered the drug error issue because I was indicating that we had a
problem in a certain area and she said likewise.' (Interview 6)
Summary of Perceived Organisational Culture and Blame
There was throughout a number of interviews comment that cultural changes had
occurred not only as a result of changes in leadership and management approaches but
also through changes in the approach taken by individual members of staff and staff
groups. There was a view that nurses were no longer prepared to accept the position
sometimes endured by an earlier generation of nurses. Qualified nurses were now
perceived as having wider life experiences by the time they qualified and fewer were
entering nurse education directly from school. The change from schools / colleges of
nursing often physically and culturally embedded within hospitals to academic faculties
within universities has broadened the experience of students. Many student nurses are
entering the profession at a later stage and bring a more mature approach to the culture
and rituals within nursing as a whole. They are less likely to accept instruction in an
unquestioning way
'I think there's probably been a general change in the culture. I think
people are much more happy to say I can't do that because I haven't had
the training now, and certainly from a nursing point of view I think that is
happening currently.' (Interview 9)
'We've also got a younger generation as well, and as the generations move
forward they will pick up and do things, or not do things, depending on,
you know, and people are more aware. They know their rights, they've
got the internet now that they didn't have before, they've travelled more,
they've seen the bigger picture, bigger than when I started my nursing,
you were just sitting there and it was you and the sister and that was it.'
(Interview 7)
Having explored the wider organisational culture with regard to the management of
incidents and the apportioning of blame it was appropriate to explore the cultural issues
relating specifically to nursing within the context ofblame.
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The Issue of Nursing and Blame
This was explored in a lot of detail as in many ways this was the main part of the
research question All of the subjects who were interviewed recognised a particular
approach, which seemed to be peculiar to nurses and nursing It was very much felt that
'nurses were very hard on other nurses'. On exploring this further a number of different
explanations were offered. These included:-
1 It is a way in which standards are recognised and maintained.
2. It is part of your development as a nurse.
3 It is how a profession behaves, it is what is or should be expected.
One manager commented
'I think we have always been hierarchical and keen to manage our own
profession but I think we maybe have done it with an iron rod.' (Interview
9)
It was also reflected that there remains a group of nurses in practice who were trained in a
particular way - through the apprenticeship system where hierarchical structures were a
very strong feature and there was a regimented approach to both the care of patients and
the management of nurses. Individuals were able to identify this with very specific people
who were in managerial posts currently or that they had come across in their professional
practice One manager accepted that this was part of the culture in which they had trained
but had tried to move away from this approach and when presented with a view which
had been expressed in a previous interview that ' nurses who have managed through the
old school of nursing were more likely to look for blame and discipline than a younger
generation' responded
'I would agree with that entirely, absolutely 100%. And I am one of the
older ones I try not to do that, I try to look for a more open approach to
thins and look for solutions as opposed to looking for blame. It's easy to
blame somebody... the difficult part is to say here's the solution. I don't
think the younger generation are prepared to accept the blame now.'
(Interview 7)
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One of the interviewees who had been involved in an incident was very clear about the
reasons for this
'Nurses have always been hard on nurses. I suppose it goes back to the
days of the bossy matron and we all remember what they were like. Well
if you are old enough you can. But even more recently there have been
some real bitches of nursing officers who thought it was part of their job to
make life miserable for nurses in whatever way they could. . During my
training you did not even speak to staff nurses and sisters never mind
nursing officers. You were trained to respect more senior staff and what
they say goes. So when you become qualified you do the same and you
always knew that if you made a mistake you were in big trouble You
ended up in the admin office for a rollicking. That usually made you even
more scared and even more nervous about doing anything in case you got
it wrong.' (Interview 14)
Staff representatives have seen a move away from the punitive approach taken by nurses
in the past. Asked whether they felt that nurses have received unmerited punishments one
response given was
'I think in the past. If I were to go back 5 years I would say yes. But not
recently. I think there has been a move because of clinical incident and
risk management that the investigative meeting is more lenient - lenient is
not the word but it is the only word I can describe - people are more
empathetic to what has happened.' (Interview 3)
There is recognition that on the whole nurses are deeply affected by an error and the
potential harm it may have caused patients. It was reported by both managers and nurses
involved that when a nurse is involved in an error they feel very guilty about what has
happened One manager reported that an individual nurse who had been involved in an
incident was not at all concerned that her registration may have been at risk but only that
no harm had come to her patient. One manager reflected that the staff who were involved
in an incident
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'...were absolutely devastated, they were shocked that it had happened.
. .they weren't getting an awful lot of feedback from anybody else so I
think they felt isolated in that situation that nobody else went to speak to
them or tell them what the process was going to be. So the feedback they
were getting was almost one of 'well we're being blamed for this' '
(Interview 4)
Summary of Nursing and Blame
The perception amongst the interviewees was that nurses were more likely to seek to
blame another nurse when something went wrong. They offered a number of potential
reasons for this which reflected some of the literature. Almost inevitably this drew
comparisons between how doctors and nurses manage clinical incidents. All those
included in the study commented on the differences between the two different groups and
consensus of opinion was that there was a balance to be achieved between the perception
of the very hard line seen to be taken by nurses and that of a laissez faire approach taken
by medical staff. The reasons for this are complex and related once again not only to
approaches taken within each professional discipline but also the relationship between
doctors and nurses. For example the case of a doctor issuing an instruction to a nurse that
she knows to be incorrect but is assured by the doctor that if anything goes wrong he will
accept the responsibility is one which all the participants recognised. They expressed a
hope that it was no longer a common occurrence but nonetheless it did happen. More
worryingly, there were still nurses who accepted this approach and would undertake an
instruction following this assurance. This was confirmed by a representative from a staff
organisation who recollected that in the recent past they had represented a member of
staff who found themselves in position of being "bullied" into doing something The
representative also commented that the problem really related to the nurse's concern for
the patient on the one hand and on the other, a junior doctor's perceived authority and
power to insist that something is done.
'... But the patient may be in a lot of pain or nauseous and the view is "I'm
too busy, just do it and I will write it up when I come." The nurse is
caught in no-man's land with a patient suffering .' (Interview 3)
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In describing an incident, which involved a relatively inexperienced staff nurse and a
junior doctor, one interviewee described the perception of a hierarchical relationship
between the two individuals
'However, rank was pulled, well we felt, that was our perception,. . well
he was tired. This nurse went through all this investigation and there was a
consequence at the end of it, where there appeared to be no consequence
for the junior doctor, well, I don't know whether there was a consequence
because we don't get to find out and I think that's maybe the difference.'
(Interview 6)
The perception of the outcome is
'They are treated very differently they get a wee word in their ear and that
is it.' (Interview 9)
Some respondents did acknowledge that they would not necessarily know what the
process and outcome would be if a doctor was involved in a clinical incident but that
there was a very clear perception that a 'slapped wrist' was the norm.
'.. .there appeared to be no consequence for the junior doctor, well, I don't
know whether there was a consequence , we didn't get to find out, and I
think that's maybe the difference. You never quite get to the bottom of it
or get an end result. From a nursing point of view the processes are you
start there and you finish here and everybody knows about it they
shouldn't but they do. But with a medical incident you start here. . and
you don't hear anything about it... there doesn't appear to be a
conclusion ..but not everybody who is involved gets to know the
conclusion that happened to other people.' (Interview 10)
It was also clear that previous experience, either directly or indirectly, of the way in
which errors were managed coloured the approach adopted at a later stage. One
interviewee described an incident that occurred prior to their nurse training a number of
years previously and the effect that had on her. In this case the incident demonstrated to
the individual how she would not approach such an issue once she had qualified.
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'It was a list for Ts and As or something, and the staff nurse gave me the
breakfast to give to this young child which I did and, of course, the child
was for the operation that day and, of course, she came to me and said just
tell them, don't tell them I gave you the breakfast to give, just say you
done it yourself, and I was very young, she was, to me, the top of the tree,
so I did it and I took all the flack that came with it, and she never ever
even came back and said thank you very much for doing that Again, it's
about lessons isn't it, that was a valuable lesson that I learnt as a very
young person, here you've got to take, and her response was well you'll
not get the sack because I hadn't actually started my training. But it was a
valuable lesson, and obviously stuck with me because I've remembered
after all this time. I haven't come across that in my experience with
people' (Interview 7)
In a different set of circumstances and within a different training style one interviewee
recounted an experience of a drug error as a student nurse
'I also remember as a student when a staff nurse gave the patient the
wrong drug and she was so terrified that she swore me to secrecy by
telling me that I would be blamed for the mistake as well. It was only a
vitamin so I did not think it would be too bad. But when I think back on
that it was really terrible. Actually what the really terrible thing is that I
know a lot of my friends who I trained with were in the same boat.'
(Interview 8)
Having identified the issues of blame and how it is apportioned both within nursing as a
distinct discipline as well as within a wider organisational context, it is important to
explore what type of culture should be adopted in order to improve the management of
clinical incidents. The literature contains extensive references to a 'blame free' culture
however there was little in the way of demonstration as to what a blame free culture
would look and feel like.
A Blame Free Culture
The issue ofblame having been raised by the interviewees, the researcher then introduced
the concept of a blame free culture, an issue that has been discussed widely within the
professional and lay press. The term 'blame free' has been used without a clear
understanding as to what is meant by the term. It appears to be used as an expression to
convey a culture in which individuals feel that they can openly report clinical incidents
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without fear of reprisals. It is debateable as to whether what is actually meant is a culture
in which there is no blame, as this does not recognise that there are situations for which
individuals should be blamed for their actions or inactions. There is no sense that this is
what some commentators expect to see and there is no indication that this is a culture
which patients and their carers would accept. In particular there were a number of issues
in relation to this concept, which merited further exploration.
1. Did individuals recognise the culture there were currently in as being one of
blame free?
2. What did the concept actually mean to them?
3. Was it even a desirable outcome?
It was generally accepted by the nursing staff interviewed that they did not function
within a blame free environment. It was also argued by some that this was not desirable.
There was a recognition that a more appropriate environment was a just and fair system
One interviewee who throughout the interview had been very critical of the systems and
general approach to the management of incidents felt that there were times that it was
appropriate to blame nurses for something for which they were culpable but that this
should not be the norm and that nurses were not offered the same 'protection' within the
organisation as would be afforded to them in a court of law.
'If you have done something which is really bad and done it deliberately
then you need to be punished. You know if you have done something
wrong and the patient dies or is seriously ill then that is different, but not
for every little mishap. Nurses are just pursued for every little mistake and
that makes it worse.. but when you have committed a crime then you are
innocent until the police and the courts can prove that you are guilty. With
nurses it works the other way round. You are guilty until you can prove
that you are innocent.' (Interview 5)
Another interviewee argued that the acceptance of blame when something went wrong
was very much embedded in an individual as part of their own personal development and
could be attributable to childhood experiences of what happened when something has
gone wrong.
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'I think it goes back to our childhood, you're going to get the blame for
that, you're going to have to take the consequences and I think the
consequences they perceive could be very great, it's the stigma, they've
got this on the record, or they're in the office again, it's that sort of stigma
attached to it.' (Interview 7)
As was demonstrated within the data looking at specific incidents there were attempts to
try and attribute the cause of an error away from the individual directly involved (see
incident 10 in chapter VI). This may be seen as a very child-like reaction to being found
out in that there is a tendency to deny a wrongdoing even if the evidence is irrefutable. At
the other extreme however there is some evidence where nurses accept that something
has gone wrong and that they must be to blame and simply accept this as inevitable. The
attribution of blame (away or towards self) is well recognised and recorded in social
psychology literature.
When asked what a blame free culture meant to one manager the reply was
'I do not honestly believe that there is such a thing because if someone is
being negligent then they should be blamed for it. I think that you can try
for an open one which be just and should be fair but I don't think you will
every get a blame free because quite frankly if your conduct is something
which is not in keeping with your profession well they should be blamed
and they should be dealt with. So I think it is probably unrealistic.'
(Interview 6)
'Yes (name) very much talks about a kind of just culture, that's not a no-
blame culture, because I do not agree with a no blame culture but I do
think a just culture is the way forward. I think people are getting better at
talking about a just culture, but I do think it needs to be led from the top
and now that we have a risk manger in post ... but you're talking about a
fundamental cultural change and that won't happen overnight.' (Interview
9)
Is a Blame Free Culture a Desirable Outcome?
There was general agreement that a blame free culture is not a reality nor is it a desirable
goal. The term 'blame free' implies that no matter the circumstance no one will be
blamed The nurses involved in the study did not see this as a reasonable or acceptable
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professional stance. They recognised that there are circumstances in which individual
professionals need to be held to account for their actions but it is the way in which this
exercise is conducted which will influence the overall culture. It is also clear that the calls
for a blame free culture are in part an attempt to address the issue of sanctions applied to
nurses and other healthcare professionals. If the first reaction to an incident is to blame
and punish then seek explanations, individual practitioners will continue to be reluctant to
discuss these issues openly. Blame will remain the dominant feature of the organisational
culture.
Process ofManaging an Incident
The processes involved in managing a clinical incident involved the formal recording of
the incident, provision of additional information, formal reporting to a more senior
individual, an investigative process and a final outcome Those nurses who were
interviewed described this process broadly however; there were invariably differences in
emphasis according to the type of incident. Most made it clear that the primary aim of
nurses involved in an incident was to ensure that the patient was safe and that all
appropriate steps had been taken to ensure that any harm or potential harm to the patient
was dealt with promptly.
The Formal Recording of Incidents
As described earlier this is done through a system of recording the main details around
the incident and information concerning the patient and member(s) of staff involved. In
exploring whether there were any significant barriers to reporting incidents a number of
comments were made by the respondents. For example the pro forma used was seen as
having some limitations with one manger commenting
'The incident form is a bit of a disaster really. It tries to get so much
information crammed into one form that it reduces some details to nothing
more than a tick box and the boxes that are there to add in the details are
too small. Almost always you end up having to get the staff to write a
statement it's the only way to get all the information you need to
undertake the investigation.' (Interview 12)
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One of the nurses involved in an incident described how she felt that some managers
appeared to be more interested in making sure that the paperwork was completed and
showed little regard for either the patient or the member of staff. This she felt did nothing
but heighten her already anxious state about what had happened.
'I completed the incident form as you were supposed to and I was also
asked to write out a statement of what happened. Some of the information
was the same as had been provided on the form and so it was duplicated
and a waste of time. I was also concerned that I could have been writing
something down that they would use against me later on. It really is quite
hard to know what to say and what not to say. So I stuck to the facts.'
(Interview 13)
It was recognised within the literature that poor reporting mechanisms and processes
designed to deal with incidents could themselves be barriers to staff reporting incidents
The researcher was keen to explore whether there was any evidence that staff were
deliberately not reporting incidents and the reasons why. This prompted a very mixed
response from the interviewees.
'...well that's not my perception. I think that people are certainly much
better at being open, I think it is a cultural change, I think we're not there
yet, I think getting there and I think some of us are getting there sooner
that others. But no my experience is that people are not lifting up the
carpet and sweeping things under it. From my own experience a doctor
made a comment about 'well, we'll just forget that' and it wasn't allowed
to happen so it is reassuring that whilst somebody tries to sweep things
under the carpet, it wasn't allowed to happen.' (Interview 3)
'I think it is very difficult for people to report their errors, however, it is
worse if they don't report them and they are found out later. Then it begins
to look as if they are trying to cover something up. . .l suppose I can
understand somebody who thinks well no-one's come to any harm and
there's nothing else anyone can do anyway so I won't bother. That way I
won't get into trouble, everybody won't know about it and then we're
back to 'is this going to be on my file will I lose my job' etc
etc.'(Interview 14)
'I still think that nurses will try and hide things rather than admit to
making a mistake Well who could blame them -- they know they are
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going to be blamed and that they will be disciplined and that will stay on
your file. They are supposed to remove it after six months or something
but I don't think they do. I think it is on your file forever and that they can
use it in references and everything. You cannot expect me to believe that
this is just forgotten about after six months - you have to be kidding. So to
answer your question I would not be surprised if nurses tried to hide
mistakes rather than own up.' (Interview 5)
A copy of the pro forma was maintained within a folder and kept at ward level. This was
by necessity freely available to all staff to record incidents and as such the details of
previous incidents were accessible. This lack of confidentiality was a concern raised by
one manager during an interview and suggested that the process be adapted to ensure the
nurse's confidence is maintained.
'As you know at the minute if you made - even if it is an alleged drug
error, that would come in on an incident form and I have concerns that the
members of staff will always get their names put in there with an alleged
drug error and where is the confidentiality? What we have advised the
charge nurses is that if that issue arises then they should take their copy
out and locks it away because it is not fair to the staff either to have that in
open display.'(Interview 6)
The Process of Investigation
Whilst the policy relating to clinical incidents is very clear about the procedures required
to undertake an investigation there was a significant degree of variability in how these
were approached by each manager. This appeared to reflect the managers' experience and
background as well as the nature of the incident itself This led to a perceived
inconsistency in the approach adopted and it not being clear which approach would be
adopted in a given set of circumstances. This was evident both between and within
managerial groups. For example, in some cases drug errors were managed using a formal
investigation process and some were managed using a process of reflection. An
explanation offered related to the need to be flexible in relation to the severity of the
incident i.e. the more severe the incident the more likely that the process would be a
formal investigation. For what were regarded as 'minor errors' the process was more
likely to follow a reflective process. One manager described their use of the policies as
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'I think they are useful as guidance as to what should be done but I do not
see them as subscriptive (sic), because a lot of it is to do with the
individual incident and the individual concerned and what has happened
but it is useful to have a policy so that an investigation has a structure but I
think it is important to look at things individually One drug error is not
the same as another, I think you also have to be as prescriptive as you
must look at it as an individual incident and it is not just a repetition of
what has been done before and we do not just repeat what happened
before we must look at it in depth,' (Interview 10)
This flexibility however resulted in a sensitivity of there being a set of rules for one and a
different set for another. This was noted by all groups as being a problem. The outcome
being that if a nurse was involved in an incident the process and outcome varied
according to a number of factors
> The perceived severity of the incident
> The impact of the incident on the patient
> The managerial unit within which the incident took place
> The manager who was on duty at the time
> The manager involved in the investigation
> The area in which you worked
> The union representing the individual nurse
> The representative from the union
This flexible approach was achieved at the expense of a perception that there were times
when it was seen as unfair. There was a growing perception, for example, that the
processes involving reflection was a 'soft option' and that the investigative process was
more punitive Managers were keen to point out that it was not regarded by them as a soft
option and corroborated this view by referencing the views of staff who had undergone
the process (this involved a piece of written material that was submitted by the member
of staff to the manager outlining the incident, their role, an understanding of the actual
and potential consequences of their actions or inactions and a demonstration of
understanding ofwhat had gone wrong).
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There appeared also to be a lack of consistency in how this process may be used on its
own or alongside the formal investigative process. Some reported that this was used as a
stand-alone process and others that this was used as well as the formal investigation. The
flexibility also introduced variability in terms of deciding the severity of the incident
This was in particular related to drug errors. For example, some quoted that any errors
involving a controlled drug were automatically a formal investigation rather than a
reflective approach. It was apparent throughout the interviews that there were a number
of areas clearly seen by all as being more serious than others. Medication errors involving
controlled drugs were regarded as one such area. In exploring this issue a little further it
was noted that this was for two main reasons.
The first relates to the impact or potential impact (in the case of a near miss) of a patient
receiving either the wrong controlled drug or the wrong dose. This was regarded as
greater than the patient being given the wrong vitamin or paracetamol (the two most often
quoted examples). Yet there seemed to be no recognition that a number of drugs could
have equally devastating effects on the patients but are not classified as controlled under
the terms of the Controlled Drugs Act.
The second related to the legal implications of something going wrong in relation to
controlled drugs. They were viewed as being different from non-controlled drugs because
of their legal status. This relates more to the safe storage and handling of the drugs within
the ward area as opposed to the role they play in the patient's clinical management
In a small number of cases the formal investigation took the form of a system review
where the managers, staff and their representatives formally reviewed the systems,
policies and processes involved in the incidents As the research period was coming to an
end the new processes involving root cause analysis were beginning to have an impact
and it was evident that this format would be utilised increasingly However, prior to the
introduction of the new policy this system was adopted in two major incidents In these
cases the main stakeholders physically walked through the processes and procedures
involved in the incident in order to gain an understanding of the environment, the
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intricacies of the clinical processes and interactions of staffgroups (both clinical and non¬
clinical), the potential distractions and to examine the 'hand offs' between one part of the
process and another which might have contributed to the incident
This process was commented by both managers and staff as being a very helpful one and
was regarded as being less threatening to the individuals involved. It also demonstrated
where changes could be made to 'live1 systems of work and processes as opposed to an
abstract understanding of what should happen in theory and what actually happened in
practice. The reports produced from this exercise were more detailed and more specific in
recommendations for change There was a clear action plan that resulted in those
involved being able to identify where the problem lay and to contribute to the process of
rectifying any deficiencies
The investigative process was not surprisingly recognised as being a stressful situation
for all involved but in particular to the member of staff under investigation. It was
commented by a number of interviewees that even the language associated with the
process has a legal basis for example 'investigation', 'hearing', 'witnesses'
'representation' 'mitigation' and 'statements'. One nurse who had been subjected to the
process drew a number of parallels from the legal processes.
'For example no matter what happens, no matter how trivial the incident
is, we are subjected to an investigative hearing that makes you feel like a
criminal Just look at the way you have to ask witnesses to come along to
be questioned by managers and your union rep. It's like being in court
only it's a manager that is your judge and jury. You cannot call that fair.
They have the power to sack you on a whim.' (Interview 13)
Later, the interviewee drew further analogies from the legal processes by stating
'It's just like the courts. You try and make the punishment fit the crime '
And
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'.. when you have committed a crime then you are innocent until the
police and the courts can prove that you are guilty. With nurses it is the
other way round. You are guilty until you can prove that you are
innocent.' (Interview 13)
Within Chapter IV a description of the situation as outlined by the Royal College of
Nursing was o ffered in relation to some of the issues its ongoing research had concluded,
in particular the practice of suspending nurses at the outset of an incident. Throughout
this research there was no indication that this was a practice within the subject
organisation. One manager described how they felt that a nurse should have been
suspended as the individual was potentially a danger to patients and was at risk of
committing a similar error However, an alternative course of action was undertaken
preventing the need for suspension and the associated trauma It is clear that the
experiences and practice within this organisation are significantly different from those
described by the RCN.
'As far as I am concerned at that point I should have been phoned at home
because this person should have been suspended until we knew what was
going on. This person has no recollection as to why she has not signed for
drugs, there is also the issue of 'is she actually just forgetting to sign for
them? Has she actually given them and has she actually given the right
things.' So I think there was a huge issue surrounding this. ...
I then telephone the charge nurse to find out and ask when the nurse is
back on - 'Oh she is off sick. When is she meant to be on - the weekend,
we cannot have her back here. I am not having her on duty giving out
drugs until we know what is going on with her.' We have got to think of
patient safety and her own registration. If we are at the stage that this
registered nurse cannot give drugs then we must suspend her so that I
know what is wrong. In the meantime I am going to refer her to
occupational health - I am going to make a management referral but she
self referred in the interim.' (Interview 6)
Clearly from this incident the issue of suspension was regarded as the best option of
ensuring safety not only for the patients but also for the individual registered nurse. As
suggested by the RCN in their submission to the CMO an alternative strategy was found
to ensure the safety of patients to provide the necessary support for the nurse and to
establish the root cause. In this incident the nurse was found to have a medical condition
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that was appropriately managed and there were no further problems relating to her ability
to practice.
One subject who had some experience of being both an investigator and subject of an
investigation commented that
'I felt that it was a bit hostile, it was almost looking for blame and I
thought we were going down this route of "we have a problem how can
we resolve it and make it not happen again" as opposed to looking for
blame.' (Interview 7)
The Outcomes
Having undertaken one of the processes there were a limited number of potential
outcomes for the member of staff involved and for the organisation.
> No action against the individual member of staff
> The member of staff undertook a reflective exercise
> The member of staffundertook a period of additional education
> The member of staffwas disciplined to an appropriate level
> There were changes to the systems within the organisation
> Formal action plan was agreed
The major theme in relation to outcomes was similar to process in that there was a
perceived lack of consistency within and between managerial units. Some reported that
every incident, no matter what the cause or outcome, would result in some form of
additional education and training for the member of staff. This was not universally
applied As noted earlier within the review of the documentation, where there had been
an agreement for further training or supervised practice, there was evidence that this has
not been formally evaluated in all cases. The managers who were interviewed were clear
that this was followed up by the ward charge nurses and they would ensure formal 'sign
off to the process. One described how a member of staff she was dealing with insisted
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that the charge nurse had formally reviewed her. She required the reassurance that she
was fit to practice and would not be a danger to her patients.
'The policies are there to ensure consistency, but I think where you do
have individuals, there is an opportunity for inconsistency which does
make it very unfair and you can understand the people who feel slightly
bitter over perhaps an incident that they're being reviewed or investigated
against, if they know that somebody else has made the same mistake and
their experiences were quite different. So I think it is difficult.' (Interview
3)
The level of disciplinary action was also viewed as being inconsistent. There were
significant issues surrounding the expectation of the member of staff, their representative,
the manager involved and their manager. The member of staff appeared to expect to have
some form of disciplinary action taken against them. Their expectation was based on
previous experiences - either themselves or other individual cases they were aware of.
This also coloured their view as to whether they felt that they were dealt with fairly or
consistently with previous cases. One nurse comments
'I have a friend who used to work in this Trust but doesn't work here
anymore, who was involved in a drug error and she seemed to have a
much harder time than I did. She had to go to more than one meeting and
she did get a disciplinary warning and was told that if the same thing
happened again she could find herself sacked. She really felt as if she was
being blamed for something that happened that really wasn't her fault
because she gave the patient a wrong dose of drug, but she had given the
dose that was prescribed by the doctor. The doctor had prescribed the
wrong dose. She ended up in a lot of trouble and absolutely nothing
happened to the doctor, well ,at least nothing appeared to happen to the
doctor.' (Interview 13)
It was reported that the manager and the staff representative would have an informal
discussion about the likely outcome based on the facts of the case in advance of any
formal investigation recognising that this could change in tight of additional information
being presented at the formal hearing. It was also reported that managers had some
evidence to suggest that staff representatives were preparing their member to receive a
more severe penalty than was being suggested in order that when a lesser penalty was
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given the staff representative was seen to have influenced the decision down the way.
This was a detail which was presented in the research after discussion with trade union
representatives and therefore was not commented on by them Managers also perceived
that they were being scrutinised by their line managers in relation to the outcomes of
processes One commented
'I have been involved in a number of disciplinary hearings and almost
without fail my manager indicated that if they had been involved they
would have delivered a more severe punishment. So for example if I gave
a member of staff an oral warning, my manager would say that they would
have given a written warning or even a first and final warning. But as I
pointed out on several occasions they were not in possession of all of the
facts and that they could not determine an outcome based on a few details.
Which to be fair to them they accepted but it does illustrate the point that
senior nurses expect staff to be disciplined and they are even prepared to
suggest the level without the facts.' (Interview 11)
Additional Education and Training
Providing additional education and training was viewed as being an essential outcome
that was usually in conjunction with some other outcome for example disciplinary action
or reflection. This required the involvement of other members of staff and raised some
concerns over maintaining the confidence of the member of staff. This could be the ward
charge nurse or a member of staff from the practice development department. This
typically took the form of some supervised practice to ensure that the individual's
practice conformed to the organisation's policies and procedures. This outcome was
recognised as requiring an investment of time and effort from the individual member of
staff as well as other individuals from the organisation. One of the main problems
associated with this format was that it became a more visible and public outcome For
example, it would not be routine for a long standing qualified member of staff to have to
undertake a specific procedure under the supervision of either the ward charge nurse or
practice development nurse. Thus the incident and its consequences for the individual
member of staff" becomes evident to the wider team
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System Changes
Throughout the interviews it was clear that there has been very little change made to
systems and processes. There was some evidence that this had taken place in only a small
number of incidents. It was interesting to note that even where there were a number of
similar incidents in the same area or across different parts of the organisation these had
not been more formally reviewed with regard to the process or system. For example, one
manager observed that there had been a 'glut' of drug errors within a ward area over a
very short period of time. When this was discussed with another manager from a separate
part of the organisation they reported a similar problem in another ward. Despite this
there was no review of whether the errors were occurring as a result of a latent fault
within the system - more the assumption that these related to individuals and that it was
nothing more than a coincidence that a number of similar incidents had occurred within
two different areas across the organisation.
The system reviews described earlier were examples ofwhat could be achieved where the
investigation concentrates on systems ofworking rather than simply investigating the role
an individual played within a particular incident. There was little evidence to suggest that
these were shared more widely than those individuals who were directly involved in the
incidents and a few other senior managers within the organisation. It was therefore a
missed opportunity to demonstrate how a different approach to the management of an
untoward incident could lead to a more productive outcome for the individuals involved
and the wider organisation. One of the managers interviewed was asked 'Do you tend to
find that investigations concentrate on individuals rather than a system of working or a
process?' responded
'I try and make it process, the systems because it's usually the systems
which are at fault. People will follow the process or follow the systems
that you have in place so I think it's about looking for changing the
processes and changing the systems. You will as we spoke about earlier,
have individuals who no matter how much you train them or no matter
what you do with them they will still do it wrong and something has to be
done about that, but then again you could still say is that the system you
have in place that's not picking these people up or is the organisation as a
whole not looking at it's systems properly and saying well take for
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example sickness absence if you like rather than an individual?'(Interview
7)
Wider Learning
The issues of wider learning were discussed extensively during the interviews and the
major barrier to sharing information appeared to be the need to maintain the confidential
nature of the incident and the investigation. In one of the managerial units there was a
process whereby certain clinical incidents were discussed as part of a forum where the
charge nurses met on a regular basis. It was reported that it became apparent that those
present were aware of the situation because they had discussed it informally among
themselves. This process allowed individuals to share what had happened and how it had
been resolved. The manager involved in this process reported that this developed into a
'double-edged sword'. In a positive way the charge nurses were able to support each
other. However, it also illustrated a problem in that if a particular incident was being
described by a charge nurse, and another may comment 'yes that happened in my ward'
and that had not been reported or dealt with.
The managers recognised that there was very little learning of lessons from the incidents
within the managerial units but that there was even less learning across the organisation.
Once again the reasons for this were explored and the ability to undertake such a process
whilst at the same time maintain an acceptable level of confidentiality was seen as
challenging. It was however at the same time acknowledged by managers that the
hospital grapevine had already ensured that the incident was widely known and
commented upon. There seemed to be little acceptance that it was possible to present the
cases anonymously to allow the organisation to share the lessons which should be learned
in order to prevent a similar incident occurring in a different part of the organisation. This
was an issue which was beginning to change with the development of the root cause
analysis process that was managed by a disinterested member of the wider management
team. This allowed an objective presentation of the information relating to the incident
and the changes required to prevent its recurrence. A manager included in the interviews
observed that lessons were not being shared and suggested a potential method of ensuring
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anonymity and reducing the tendency for individuals feeling that were being blamed.
When asked specifically how lessons were learned, replied,
"Word of mouth. Well you could ask the question and you try to be as
confidential as you possibly can. but word, these things do tend to have a
habit of getting out, and through whatever fault, now that could be the
nurse themselves telling people, not the fact that the managers are telling.
I don't think, in relation to drug errors, I don't think there is enough
feedback. Now individuals don't need to be named, but there could be
some feedback, the fact that, this incident happened, and this is what we
did about it. Because often the person who's made that mistake feels that
they're very isolated and that they're the only people that have made this
mistake, and I think if we can share, widely, what's happened without
mentioning the individual's name, and what we've learned about it, I think
people would be happier. Then we would be coming to a culture that if
this happens every 3 months, then there's feedback of incidents, people
then wouldn't feel that they're being blamed and sought out, as an
individual.' (Interview 11)
The apparent lack of ability for the organisation to learn lessons from incidents either
within or between its own managerial units, resulted in there being little opportunity to
review incidents which were reported at a wider regional or national level. These tended
to be restricted to the formal notification processes that facilitated the distribution of
information relating to known hazards, usually related to specific pieces of technical
equipment rather than processes.
Ii was recognised by one of the interviewees that the organisation was not good at sharing
information - whether that was good or bad experiences.
"What 1 would say is that we are not good at sharing. We're not good at
sharing the good practices or the bad practices and we're not good at
sharing outcomes. It's like that's dealt with that's fine and it maybe raises
its head maybe a couple of years down the line when a similar incident






The final phase of the data gathering process consisted of a review of determinations
from fatal accident inquiries (FAIs). There are a number of reasons for examining this
data. These are:-
> To examine a process designed to establish the facts surrounding a clinical
incident as opposed to one designed to establish fault or apportion blame.
r To examine a process which comments on the impact of systems of working in
relation to the outcome of a fatal clinical incident.
r To review the final determinations in relation to nursing practice and to examine
how nursing care was examined through this process.
> To determine whether the processes adopted within fatal accident inquiries are
transferable to healthcare organisations in order to improve their investigative
processes in clinical incident management.
r To outline any recommendations for improving the current fatal accident inquiry
system.
As explored within the review of the literature this form of inquiry is the Scottish
equivalent of the coroner's court within England and Wales but there are some important
differences and these were described within chapter III. The main purpose of the inquiry
is one of fact-finding and it is not intended to find fault. Given the nature of the
requirements of the determinations of fatal accident inquiries it is arguably difficult not to
be seen to be identifying fault, either at an organisational or personal level. However, a
key principle is that such inquiries are established in order to determine facts and not
culpability. Sheriff E J Bowen reiterates this in the determination following an inquiry
and he notes
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"Lord President pointed out in Black v Scott Lithgow Ltd 1990 SLT612
the sheriff is given no power by section 6 of the Fatal Accidents and
Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976 to make a finding as to fault."
..."For that reason and others a Fatal Accident Inquiry is not the
appropriate forum for consideration of issues of fault of the type that
might provide the basis for an action for damages."
Whilst Lord President Hope's outline is a well-accepted principle, the determinations
used within this chapter show that facts which are established during an inquiry may be
used later, whilst recognising the actual determination may not be admissible in a future
judicial process. The main reason being the determination is expected to identify whether
any failures in the system of work contributed to or could have prevented the death.
Sheriff Bowen does suggest that
"The court is entitled to examine much wider issues, including areas of
practice generally, and is entitled to direct criticism in such terms as seem
appropriate if satisfied upon examination of the facts that it is right to do
so.'"
Under Section 6 (1) of the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act
1976, the sheriff is expected to determine 5 different aspects of the circumstances
surrounding the death. These are
a) Where and when the death and any accident resulting in the death took place.
b) The cause or causes of such death and any accident resulting in the death.
c) The reasonable precautions, if any, whereby the death and any accident resulting
in the death might have been avoided.
d) The defects, if any, in any systems of working, which contributed to the death or
any accident resulting in the death.
e) Any other facts that is relevant to the circumstances of the death.
SOURCE, NATURE AND FORMAT OF D ATA
The source of the data for this phase was those determinations lodged on the Internet web
site for Scottish Courts (www.scotcourts-gov.uk). The dates for the opinions range from
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5th March 1999 to 21st January 2004. Prior to undertaking this part of the data collection,
it was established whether the subject organisation had been the subject of recent
inquiries or whether there were any pending. This was not the case. The organisation had
been the subject of FAIs but they preceded the timeframe within which the examination
of clinical incidents was undertaken. Similarly, there were no impending inquiries. The
ability to examine an organisation's management and outcome of an incident alongside
the process and outcome of a FAI would have added a further interesting dimension to
the study.
A total of 41 determinations were reviewed. These are listed in full within the
bibliography. A breakdown of the places of death is presented below in table 11. The
final determinations are open documents and are available to the general public. For this
reasons they have not been anonymised within this analysis.









Many of the inquiries did not yield any data relevant to this study and therefore a
selection has been used in order to illustrate issues germane to the study. As a result these
are in the main those fatalities that occurred in hospital.
Gordon Scott Niven
This 16-year old male was admitted to hospital following a fall from his bicycle. His
behaviour in the accident and emergency department was aggressive and inappropriate.
The consultant requested (authorised) his removal by police officers to a local police
station. His condition was noted to have deteriorated and following examination by the
police surgeon he was returned to hospital where he was found to have a skull fracture
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and raised intra cranial pressure. He was referred and admitted to the local neurosurgical
unit. He later died. Under section 6(1) d the Sheriff determined
""That the said accident and subsequent death were not caused by or
contributed to by any defect in a system ofworking."
The sheriff does criticise the decision to have the patient arrested and taken to the police
station, a decision the Sheriff feels was both wrong and insensitive given the
circumstances. The sheriff then goes on to say
"I express no view of the matter of whether the decision was one that no
reasonably competent medical practitioner would make in the exercise of
ordinary care."
The sheriff makes this point as it had been submitted to him that he could not level "any
criticism at any doctor unless it was shown that his conduct could not be so regarded."
The sheriff recognising that the submission was based on Hunter v Hanley rejected the
submission on the basis that the court has no power to find fault (and refers to the Lord
President's determination in Black V Scott Lithgow Ltd) but illustrates the court's
entitlement to comment on wider issues. For example, the cause of death was recorded as
a head injury as a result of falling from a bicycle and the sheriff hypothesises that the
death could potentially have been avoided if he had worn a protective helmet, and before
turning to the main points relating to how Gordon was cared for, comments;
'In the first place I have made a finding that the use of a protective helmet
might have avoided this death. I make that finding - and indeed do so at
the forefront of my findings - in the knowledge that the use of such a
helmet does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of serious head injury
in severe bicycle accidents and indeed might not have done so in this case.
I also acknowledge that Gordon's parents may well have done all that they
reasonably could to persuade him to wear a helmet but met with the usual
resistance, which people of all ages put forward to being encumbered in
this manner. This case however demonstrates just how easily a cyclist may
sustain a fatal head injury. Gordon was not on a public road. He was
probably not travelling at great speed. No motor vehicle was involved. He
was simply playing as boys do on a makeshift ramp when a sudden stop
propelled him over the handlebars onto hard ground. If the widespread
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publicity that this case has attracted highlights that danger as much as the
more sensational aspects the inquiry will have been of value for that
reason alone."
This determination demonstrates a number of issues with regard to the value of FAIs. For
example, it served as an objective view that the care received by Gordon was entirely
appropriate, it attempted to redress some of the balance in relation to media coverage and
at the same time raised the awareness of the need for cyclists to wear protective helmets.
Group of Intravenous Drug Users
During the period of April to August 2000 there were 18 intravenous drug users whose
deaths later became subjects of individual fatal accident inquiries. The inquiries were
presided over by the same sheriff who, rather than making the same point in each
determination, referred to the outcome of the inquiry into the death ofAndrea McQuilter.
In all the determinations the sheriff concluded That the death of the deceased was not
caused by any defect in a system of work.' The media at the time raised the concern that
a number of deaths among this group were perhaps a cause for concern in that local
health and social systems were failing this group of the community. There was both
implicit and explicit criticism of health services. In particular the perception that drug
abusers did not receive the same level of clinical care afforded to non-drug abusers.
Whilst the sheriffs determinations concluded that systems of work contributed to the
deaths, the headlines at the time were seen as criticisms of health services within
Glasgow. The Sheriff Principal makes reference to the 'perceptions' within his
determination.
"During the course of the inquiry evidence repeatedly touched on the issue
of "perceptions" of drug users, and indeed of those who support them, as
to the quality of medical treatment available to drug addicts. This is an
area of delicacy I approach with caution, not least because 1 am in no
doubt that to attempt any wide ranging examination of standards of
treatment of drug users goes beyond the scope of a fatal accident inquiry.
It would be equally wrong to attempt to deal with the question of whether
there is any justification for a perception that drug users are treated
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contemptuously by medical and nursing staff. It is manifestly obvious that
they are a difficult group to deal with and treat."
Sheriff Principal Bovven, later in his determination, having explored some further issues
around the perceptions of drug abusers and their access to health services particularly
within the secondary care sector, goes on to conclude
'The above consideration lead me to the conclusion that the problem
surrounding this issue of perception may to a significant extent be
intractable. I am, however, satisfied that it is a problem which is
recognised and being addressed.
In drawing his determination to a close the Sheriff makes only three recommendations.
One relates to the need for wider publicity in relation to the dangers of contracting fatal
infections as a result of injecting heroin. The second relates to the need to further research
into the treatment of specific infections and the last deal with the distribution of written
information to medical and nursing staff. As is evident only one of these relates to the
management of the outbreak of infection amongst this group of patients, which resulted
in so many deaths. This is part reflects an observation made earlier in the determination
that the injecting of heroin is fraught with significant risks to the individuals health and
well being and that death is not an uncommon outcome for those involved. The Sheriff
Principal recognised that death was almost inevitable as a result of the abuse of heroin
and the outbreak of a particular infection, that the health systems acted appropriately and
that there was nothing more that could or should have been done that could have avoided
the deaths under these circumstances.
Maureen Smyth.
In this case the patient attended the accident and emergency department at Monklands
General Hospital. Following a diagnosis of acute gout and a query over septic arthritis
and blood samples taken for analysis, Mrs Smyth left the hospital and stayed with a
friend for 4 days until her condition improved. During these four days a number of
attempts were made by the hospital to contact Mrs Smyth's GP service to inform the
relevant practitioners of the blood results, which concluded that Mrs Smyth had a serious
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infection. During the next 10 days there are a number of circumstances involving a
number of different medical practitioners, the consequence of which being the
appropriate action to treat the infection was delayed. Mrs Smyth died 13 days after her
initial attendance at the accident and emergency department.
The Sheriff involved in the fatal accident inquiry into this death made a number of
comments on various sections of the determination. Under section C of the act the sheriff
is asked to determine whether there were any precautions, which could have prevented
the death. In this case the sheriff identifies that there were reasonable precautions
however he records that he
'was not satisfied on the evidence that there was a real possibility that
such precautions would have avoided the death."
Under section D of the act the sheriff is asked to determine whether there were any
defects in the systems of work. In this case the sheriff identifies 4.
1. There was a lack of any system, whether computerised or manual,
at Medicare for recoding calls on patients, which would enable a
Medicare doctor to know of any recent contact between other
Medicare doctors and the patient in question.
2. The system of work in the Bruce Medical Centre with regard to
laboratory results was also defective.
3. The system in the Bruce Medical Centre for dealing with Medicare
slips was also defective.
4. The system in relation to the making of house calls to patients of
the Bruce Medical Centre was also defective.
By way of completing his determination the sheriff stated
"I acknowledge that some of these defects in working systems may well by
now have been attended to and put right. However, to any extent that they
have not been attended to, it seems to me that they ought to be as quickly
as possible."
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This determination illustrates how the process of a FAI can be used to identify problems
with systems of working. It offers the organisations involved an objective view of the
issues to be addressed. Currently there is no formal system within the process to identify
whether these issues have been addressed and the weaknesses rectified. Perhaps the only
way this will be known is if another death is investigated and similar issues are raised
once again. In order to address this apparent anomaly it is suggested that the system could
be extended to require organisations responsible for the systems of work, which have
been criticised, to follow these up and to submit a report within a given timescale. This
would complete a process of having identified any defect, action is taken to rectify the
problem. This process would be akin to the procedures adopted by the Health and Safety
Executive, a body with the authority to issue an organisation with specific instructions to
improve an unsafe system of working.
Hamish Adamson
This inquiry relates to a newborn boy whose death was certified on the day of his
delivery. The baby's mother had been admitted to Creswell Hospital. Dumfriesshire in
order that her labour may be induced. Having identified the cause of death, Sheriff
Kenneth Ross identifies a number of defects in the system of working which contributed
to Hamish's death. These were described as:
a) failure at Cresswell to have a proper and clearly understood policy for the
induction of labour by Prostaglandin gel in respect of:
1. time of commencement
2. monitoring of the foetus and mother during induction
b) Failure at Cresswell to have a proper clearly understood policy on
preparations for emergency caesarean section operations required in the
course of labour in respect of:
1. the circumstances in which the need for such emergency
operations is categorised as immediate
2. a realistic time for completion of such operations from the decision
to operate until delivery
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3. The need for one member of the operative team to assume
responsibility for co-ordinating and monitoring such preparations
c) failure to have sufficient midwifery staff on duty to cope adequately with
the workload at Cresswell on the 17th and 18th September (i.e. the day of
induction of labour and birth of Hamish).
Any incident which results in a death is a major traumatic event for all those involved.
When that death is of a child, or in this instance, a newborn baby, the resultant trauma is
significantly intensified. Many people would have some sympathy with the parents of
the child who would perhaps look for someone to blame for such an incident, and it is not
difficult to imagine that the staff involved in the incident would find it difficult not to
blame themselves for the outcome. This incident illustrates, perhaps more than any other,
the need for such Inquiries set up under the 1976 Act. which allows an independent
individual the opportunity to review all the circumstances surrounding the event and to
take that opportunity to establish the facts and not faults, whilst at the same time
identifying any defects in the system or reasonable precautions that might be taken, other
relevant facts as well as making recommendations.
In his determination into the circumstances of Hamish Adamson's death the sheriff finds
a number of other relevant facts. These were:
a) the dedicated 3333 telephone line for use in emergencies is not always
used by staff at Creswell when requesting the attendance of. for example,
anaesthetic staff
b) not all relevant records of telephone communications from and between
hospitals of Dumfries & Gallowa\ Acute Maternity Hospital Trust are
retained
c) The team system of midwifery care at Creswell did not ensure that Mrs
Adamson received continuity of care during her stay in Creswell
d) there are no clearly understood arrangements at Creswell for obtaining
cover ifmidwifery staff are unexpectedly unable to attend for duty
e) the procedures at Creswell for informing staff of changes to any guidelines
or in the practice to be followed are informal and unsatisfactory
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f) The procedure for dealing with patients' concerns after or during treatment
prevents further direct contact with the patient once it is known that legal
advice is being sought by the patient
g) The procedure for dealing with patients" concerns after or during treatment
does not conclude with specific advice on how to access the formal
hospital complaints procedure
h) there was no proper or adequate inquiry by the Trust into all the
circumstances of Hamish's death, nor any proper or adequate review of
the circumstances which preceded his death
i) there appears to be confusion about the meaning of (Guidelines on
Induction of Labour) issued by the Royal College of Obstetricians &
Gynaecologists in 1998
Having identified the defects in the system and the other relevant facts as viewed by the
sheriff, he goes on to make 26 recommendations in order to improve systems ofwork and
hopefully prevent a recurrence of another incident in the future.
William Sneddon, Lemond Mulroy, David Brodie MacFarlane, Agnes McCool,
Archibald Haining,
This fatal accident inquiry was a little unusual in that it examined the deaths of five
individuals in the same hospital and indeed during the investigation it was suggested that
under the terms of the Act such an inquiry was inappropriate. The sheriff disagreed that
the need for such an inquiry was inappropriate and outlined the reasons why. This
explanation is outlined later. In his determination, the sheriff deals with each of the
deaths in turn and makes a determination under each section of the 1976 Act. In relation
to this particular piece of research, the main areas of interest are those around any
systems defects, other facts relevant to the circumstances of the death and any
recommendations. Therefore, the analysis relates directly to these areas.
/) H 'illiam Sneddon
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The sheriff determines that there were no defects in the systems of working and there
were no other relevant facts around the circumstances of death and he makes no
recommendations.
2) LemondMulroy
There were no defects in the system of working which contributed to the death. The
Sheriff noted one relevant fact which was:
"Some aspects of Mr Mulroy's nursing care while in Ward 7 were
unsatisfactory and caused distress to him and his wife".
It is probable that these were the result of a shortage of nursing staff on the ward and the
Sheriff makes two recommendations in light of these findings.
3) David Brodie MacFarlane
The Sheriff determines that there were no defects in the system of working which
contributed to this individual's death and demonstrates two relevant facts surrounding the
circumstances. These were:
"there was an unexplained delay in changing Mr MacFarlane's analgesia
to a syringe driver with Diamorphine after an ultrasound scan revealed the
likely existence ofmetastatic lesions of his liver".
" Mr MacFarlane was fasted unnecessarily for several days after the
ultrasound scan was carried out".
As a result of this finding the Sheriff makes one recommendation.
4) Agnes McCool
The Sheriff determines that there were no defects in the system of working which
contributed to this death and identifies one relevant fact to the circumstances, that is:
"The radiologist's report on the x-ray taken on Mrs McCool's admission
to the Infirmary was not seen by the treating consultant before her transfer
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to Kirkcudbright Cottage Hospital and the completion of the discharge by
the treating Consultant".
As a result of these findings the Sheriff makes two recommendations.
5) Archibald Haining
The Sheriff determines that there were no defects in the system of working and outlines
two relevant facts:
"Pressure on the intensive care unit resulting from a staff shortage caused
the closure of the High Dependency Unit where Mr Haining was a patient
there". As a result, he was transferred to one of the wards. He was re¬
admitted to the Intensive Care Unit the next day.
"While in the ward there was a lack of nursing attention to Mr Haining
between about 12 noon and 14.00 hours, during which his condition
deteriorated".
As a result of these findings the Sheriff makes one recommendation.
In his determination Sheriff Ross spends a significant amount of time outlining the
reasons for undertaking this inquiry, given the circumstances of each death within the
same Institution, and concludes
"In the present inquiry there were in my opinion matters of serious public
concern which justified the holding of an inquiry
and having identified some of the issues within each of the individual deaths, goes on to
say
"all those who died were being or had been treated in the same hospital.
Some of the information available to the Procurator Fiscal was suggestive
of poor nursing standards in several of the cases. The issue of the
appropriateness of transfers between wards arose in more than one case. I
do not think it is reasonable to seek to criticise the crime for drawing all
that together in the public interest".
Clearly in his determination Sheriff Ross seeks to balance a view on the one hand, which
is that the counsel for the Trust involved felt that it was inappropriate to hold such
inquiries into these deaths, whilst the procurator fiscal felt that there were such issues
being brought into the open that it was in the public interest to have the inquiry
undertaken. The sheriff also notes that the circumstances around the deaths and the
subsequent fatal accident inquiry innovated considerable interests from the media and as
such he makes comment on this issue in his determination.
"This inquiry appeared to generate considerable media and public interest.
Unfortunately media coverage perhaps because of constraints of space or
time rarely gives a complete picture of all that is said at an inquiry of this
length. For these reasons I have tried to set out the larger picture in
greater detail. It is important to emphasise that none of the evidence
established or even suggested that any of the deaths was caused by any act
or omission of the medical or nursing staff at Dumfries & Galloway Royal
Infirmary, nor was there any reasonable precautions whereby any of the
deaths might have been avoided. The evidence identified defects in some
systems of working and deficiencies in some of the nursing care, which
was given, but this must be placed in context. One of the nursing
witnesses referred to the thousands of patients who had passed through her
ward since the events described in the evidence. While what happened in
the cases I have described was in some instances unacceptable and
upsetting, it does not justify any lack of trust in the doctors and nurses and
other medical and auxiliary staff who work at Dumfries & Galloway
Royal Infirmary. Indeed many of the witnesses were impressive examples
of their profession and it is clear that they took a caring and responsible
attitude to their work and to the patients under their charge. It is also clear
however that they worked under considerable pressure of resources".
The final comment by the Sheriff raises a number of issues of interest in this research.
Primarily this relates to the way in which such incidents are portrayed within the media
and the impact that has within the general public on the level of trust that the community
can have in their local hospital and the doctors, nurses and other clinical staff who
provide the care there. In this instance the Sheriff is making the point very clearly that it
was right and proper for such an inquiry to take place to establish the facts surrounding
each of the deaths, and that in this instance the general public in whose interests the
inquiry was conducted, had no cause to have any loss of faith or trust in clinical staff
within the hospital. At the same time however, he concludes that the organisation has a
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number of issues, which require to be addressed within the systems of working which
would improve the environment in which such clinical care is provided, whilst
acknowledging that all staff within the health service are working under considerable
resource pressures.
Imran Khan
The Fatal Accident Inquiry into the death of Imran Khan, a 15-year-old boy, who died at
the Victoria Infirmary in Glasgow in 1998. was in some ways similar to the inquiry into
the 5 deaths in Dumfries & Galloway Royal Infirmary. It also generated considerable
comment in the press and media. In his determination the sheriff principal identifies that
■"Imran Khan was 15 years of age at the time of his death. On the 13th
February 1998. he was the subject of a vicious attack in the course of
which he was stabbed repeatedly. While the stab wounds penetrated his
chest wall, as the result of the help of a complete stranger at whose door
he arrived, he was conveyed very swiftly to the Victoria Infirmary. He
w as found to have a collapsed lung which was treated by the insertion of a
chest drain. Unfortunately he died 7 days later as a result of toxic shock
syndrome. The purpose of this inquiry has been to examine the events
between the time of his admission to hospital and his death on the 21
February 1998 to determine whether failures in care led or contributed to
his death. It is no part of the function of the inquiry to examine the
circumstances or background of the assault".
In his determination the Sheriff Principal outlines the processes of care which Imran
received during his stay. Given that the inquiry quite rightly did not deal with the
circumstances surrounding the assault on Imran, it is perhaps not unsurprising that the
fact that he was so brutally assaulted was sometimes lost in the media coverage and the
unfortunate by-product was the intense critical comment on the care he received whilst in
hospital.
The Sheriff principle picks up on these issues and concludes
"in all the circumstances I do not consider that the evidence discloses any
reasonable precautions whereby the death of Imran Khan might have been
avoided, or that any defects in a system of working contributes to his
death. It is not appropriate to make any findings in terms of Paragraphs C
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and D of Section 6 (one of the fatal accidents and sudden deaths inquiry)
Scotland Act 1976".
The Sheriff clearly recognises that the comment made in the press was in some
circumstances unjustified and goes on to include
"it should not be inferred from the conclusions of this inquiry that
everything in the Victoria Infirmary was carried out by the book". There
are plainly imperfections in the notes and the fact that Imran was missed
from a ward round on Wednesday and perhaps on the Sunday cannot
escape notice, but it would be surprising to expect perfection in record
keeping, or indeed in medical practice, in a hospital which receives more
than 70,000 patients a year into it's Casualty Department alone. Such
imperfections are no justification for an atmosphere of near hysterical
criticism and the distrust of the Victoria Infirmary that appears to have
been generated at least in certain sections of the media and would not have
expected a patient with an injury such as Imran sustained to die. The very
fact that he did, coupled with the misplaced interpretation of Dr Proctor's
notes, and other factors, including the death of another boy of similar age
in the same hospital (albeit in wholly different circumstances), have
fuelled the fires of sensationalism. What must be emphasised is that even
modern medicine cannot be expected to provide a 100% guarantee of
success and that the factors which caused Imran's death were exceptional.
Nothing I have heard leads me to conclude, or even suspect the existence
of a general lack of care or want of professionalism on the part of nursing
or medical staff at the Victoria Infirmary".
The way in which such incidents are portrayed within the media is a recurring theme and
one which requires comment as part of this research, in as much as the reporting of such
circumstances and inquiries, which the Sheriff himself describes as near hysterical
criticism innovated at least in certain sections of the media, only serve to destroy the
public trust in clinical care provided in your local hospital, which is clearly unjustified
The sheriffs observation that 'modern medicine cannot be expected to provide 100% of
success" is also very relevant to the organisational management of clinical incidents. As
discussed previously the complex nature of the interactions involved in healthcare
delivery, make clinical incidents inevitable. The acceptance of such inevitability, among
professionals and the general public, will be a significant move forward in the
management of clinical incidents.
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Darren Denholm
In the determination of the inquiry into the death of this 10-year-old boy, the sheriff
identifies: -
r Seven reasonable precautions by which his death could have been avoided
> Nine defects in the systems ofworking which contributed to the death
> Seventeen other relevant facts pertaining to the circumstances of his death
> Eighteen recommendations for future practice
This was a landmark case in bringing about the change in undertaking general
anaesthetics within dental practices as identified within recommendation 17 of the
determination.
'Consideration should now be given, by the Executive or Parliament if that
is required, to the discontinuation of general anaesthesia for dental
treatment in dental surgeries and to it being restricted to hospitals with
intensive care units.'
This case attracted a considerable amount of publicity and comment within the media and
identified a number of weaknesses, which required to be addressed. It would be too
simplistic to view this as a death of a child caused by an adverse reaction to an
anaesthetic agent, which was identified as leading to the cause of death i.e. a cardiac
arrhythmia. A number of other issues in relation to managing clinical risks were also
apparent in this case. They included; ensuring that the patient (or in this case their parent)
were aware of the risk of treatments, poor communication between the referring and
treating clinicians, the process of obtaining appropriate consent, the employment of
appropriately qualified medical staff, appropriate training of other staff in dealing with
emergencies, lack of monitoring and poor facilities in which to undertake such
procedures. It is clear from this particular inquiry that a number of key issues emerged
which had an immediate and lasting impact on the delivery of dental care.
Sharman Weir.
In this inquiry the death of a young mother during childbirth was examined. The sheriff
in this case made a number of observations with regard to the circumstances surrounded
the death. Like the determination made within Darren Denholm case a number of aspects
contributed to the events. The inquiry itself was thought to be the longest undertaken in
Scotland at that point and the determination of Sheriff Reith is some 124 pages in length
and presents a number of issues that are of interest to the study. In this respect the
determination is worthy of detailed examination in relation to each of the sections
outlined within the Act as being part of the final determination.
Section 6(l)(a): where and when the death and any accident resulting in the death took
place. The sheriff states that having identified where and when the death occurred,
"I have no comment to make on my finding under this sub section. The
issue was not in dispute'
Section 6(l)(b): the cause or causes of such death and any accident resulting in the death.
The sheriffmakes an interesting observation within this section and comments
'The ultimate cause of death is not in dispute. All were agreed that Ms
Weir died of an intra-cerebral haemorrhage. However, the chain of events
that led to this is very much less clear.'
Section 6(1 )(c): the reasonable precautions, if any, whereby the death and any accident
resulting in the death might have been avoided. By way of explanation in this section the
sheriff outlines what is required in this part of the determination. There is a detailed
discussion about the issues of fault in that the solicitor acting for the medical staff
contended that the solicitor acting for the family had used the language of fault, which is
inappropriate for an inquiry of this nature. The example cited from the written submission
from the family's solicitor proposed "...the fault lies with the consultants..." This was
later modified and the family's solicitor asked the court to make specific findings in fact
in relation to three specific questions.
1. Are the protocols and practices followed by the Queen Mother's
Hospital out of line with standard practice?
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2. More subtly, do the doctors in the Queen Mother's Hospital have an
insufficient understanding of the underlying balance of risk?
3. Did the doctors correctly appreciate the severity of her condition?
fhe contention of the solicitor being that the death could potentially have been avoided if
the doctors had [a] followed standard practice, [b] had a sufficient understanding of the
underlying balance of risks and [c] correctly appreciated the severity of her condition.
The sheriff identifies that she had some difficulty in deciding whether it was appropriate
to answer the questions outlined above as they were potentially
"...inviting a rather wider answer than a finding of facts relevant to Ms
Weir's death and instead inviting a conclusion in relation to the protocols
and practices followed b> the hospital more generally, which might be
more appropriate to a public inquiry into the running of the hospital rather
than a Fatal Accident Inquiry such as this.'
This clearly demonstrates recognition that despite the objective of a fact-finding exercise
there are some attempts by those involved to establish fault and blame. Whilst the final
determination cannot be used in any subsequent civil action it is clear that this is an
opportunity to make clearer any issues of liability, fault or cause (as recognised by Levy
and McRae 2004) through the inquiry's ability to detail certain facts.
Section 6(l)(d): the defects, if any. in any systems of working, which contributed to the
death or any accident resulting in the death. . It was noted that the solicitor representing
the family of Ms Weir was not seeking a determination under this section and therefore
this was not commented upon by the sheriff.
Section 6(l)(e): any other facts that are relevant to the circumstances of the death. Within
this section the sheriff identifies a number of issues. These are presented in full in order
to appreciate the range of issues raised.
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(a) that there has been consistent advice in reports on Confidential
Enquiries into Maternal Deaths in the United Kingdom ("CEMD
Reports") drawing attention to the need for consultant involvement in
relation to women admitted to hospital with pre-eclampsia;
(b) that the CEMD Report for 1988-1990 emphasised the continuing lack
of awareness of the potential seriousness of seemingly mild symptoms and
signs and the treacherous nature of pre-eclampsia, and a persisting failure
by consultants to alert juniqr medical staff to these dangers;
(c) that the CEMD Report for 1994-1996 recommended that each unit
should identify a lead obstetric consultant to develop a system for the
management of patients with pre-eclampsia and eclampsia. This was to
include protocol development and updating, and appropriate staff training;
(d) that a fair and reasonable implication of the CEMD Reports is that it is
someone with the requisite experience and insight in relation to pre¬
eclampsia. including the variability of that condition, who is required;
(e) that the Queen Mother's Hospital has not appointed a lead obstetric
consultant to develop a system for the management of patients with pre¬
eclampsia and eclampsia;
(0 that had Ms Weir been under the care and management of Dr Hanretty
instead of Dr Roberts, it is unlikely that a decision for delivery would have
been made at an earlier stage;
(g) that had Ms Weir been under the care and management of Dr Cameron
instead of Dr Roberts, it is unlikely that induction of labour would have
been commenced before the evening of Wednesday 20 October 1999;
(h) that there has been no material change in the system for the
management of patients with pre-eclampsia at the Queen Mother's
Hospital since the death ofMs Weir;
(i) that it is likely that on Monday 18 October 1999 no doctor of registrar
grade (or SHO 3 equivalent) or above was advised of Ms Weir's admission
to the ante-natal ward;
(j) that it would have been in accordance with good practice for a doctor of
registrar grade or above to have been advised that day of Ms Weir's
admission to the ante-natal ward;
(k) that no obstetrician of consultant grade saw Ms Weir until after the
acute event at 1410 hours on Thursday 21 October 1999;
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(1) that it would have been in accordance with good practice for Ms Weir
to have been seen by a consultant obstetrician within the working day
following her admission, namely on Tuesday 19 October 1999, in order to
determine the immediate and subsequent management in detail;
(m) that in the week commencing Monday 18 October 1999 Dr Roberts'
adhered to her ordinary working routine. Her week in the absence of
Dr Hanretty on holiday differed only in responsibility;
(n) that the episode of visual disturbance on Tuesday 19 October 1999 was
not brought to the attention of a senior doctor;
(o) that it would have been good practice for the episode of visual
disturbance to have been brought to the attention of a senior doctor;
(p) that DrChitra did not note the systolic blood pressure reading on
Tuesday 19 October 1999;
(q) that Dr Branchfield did not note the systolic blood pressure reading on
Tuesday 19 October 1999;
(r) that Dr Solanki did not note the systolic blood pressure reading on one
occasion on Thursday 21 October 1999;
(s) that it would have been good practice for the systolic blood pressure
readings to have been noted in addition to the diastolic readings;
(t) that Ms Weir's blood pressure readings following the visual disturbance
on Tuesday 19 October 1999 were not normal, albeit that anti¬
hypertensive treatment was not required;
(u) that the repeat blood tests which DrChitra had on Tuesday
19 October 1999 instructed be repeated on Wednesday 20 October 1999
were not repeated in accordance with that instruction;
(v) that it would have been good practice for the blood tests to have been
repeated on Wednesday 20 October in accordance with that instruction;
Within this long and very complex inquiry and its determination it would appear that
there is some difficulty in being able to adhere to the objectives of a FA1 in not finding
fault when there are clearly a number of issues that are very relevant to the events leading
to the death. As illustrated above in the comments made by the sheriff in relation to
section 6( 1) e of the determination there are a number of areas of best practice which
patients might reasonably have been employed but the clinical staff involved in this case
and therefore could be regarded as being contributory factors in the death. It is then
difficult for interested individuals (in particular, members of the family) not to make what
would appear to be a logical step towards apportioning blame. In fact what the
determination is outlining are issues of fact and not offering an opinion as to whether it is
reasonable to assume that there is cause and effect relationship. The list above
demonstrates issues in relation to the available knowledge though the confidential
enquiries into maternal deaths, the systems within the institution in which the death
occurred and the actions of named practitioners involved in the patient's care. It is
therefore understandable that families involved in this legal process sometimes find it
difficult to differentiate between the aims and objectives of the inquiry (i.e. to find facts)
and their own personal needs (i.e. to find cause that in their minds at least equate to fault
and blame).
Summary
The determinations of fatal accident inquires are a potentially valuable source of
information relating the management of clinical risks. They are established in order to
determine the facts surrounding a death. It is interesting to note that the determinations
made by sheriffs are not presented in a standard format in terms of physical layout of the
report or the content. Whilst is may be argued that neither of these issues should detract
from the main messages contained within the determination it would be more helpful to
organisations and to the families of the deceased if these could be written in a more
accessible format. For example, as described earlier there are 5 headings under which
each determination is made. If there is no specific comment to make, some sheriffs record
that there is no determination to make under that heading, whilst others state that they
have not been asked to make a determination whilst another determination simply does
not mention that particular section. It is argued that an indication that there is no
determination to make is more meaningful that no mention at all.
Whilst it is clearly articulated that the purpose of a FA1 is to establish facts and not fault
it may be difficult for families to accept that at the end of this process the legal system
will not have established who or what was at fault. There is some evidence however
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within determinations that there are tactics employed to allow relevant facts to be
established which can then be used at a later date although the final determination of the
sheriff is not admissible in any later judicial proceedings. However, as Levy and McRae
(2004) point out
'As in 1895 the legislators have recognised a possible area of conflict. In
getting to the truth of the cause of death it may be necessary to examine
witnesses against whom blame may be levelled. Following the 1895 Act,
the 1976 Act provide that the examination of a witness or haver is not to
be a bar to criminal proceedings being taken against him. Thus the driver
of a car involved in a fatal road accident may be called to give evidence at
an inquiry under the 1976 Act and may also be prosecuted under the road
traffic legislation. To safeguard his interests to some extent, the Act also
provides that no witness is to be compellable to answer any questions
tending to show that he is guilty of any crime or offence, a restatement of
a well-established rule of law in Scotland.'
It is also interesting to note that there is no statutory requirement for organisations to
follow up on recommendations made within determinations. As illustrated within the
determination into the death of Darren Denholm, the sheriff has the ability to bring into
high relief particular issues, which may require a change in statute, in order to prevent a
recurrence. It clearly would be poor and potentially dangerous practice for an
organisation not to respond to the recommendations made by a sheriff and would be
damming if a similar incident occurred. It is argued that some form of feedback may be
useful as part of this legal process to confirm that the issues, which arose within an
inquiry have been examined and addressed by the organisation under scrutiny.
Data Summary
The data generated within the research project has been acquired from a number of
different relevant sources in order to facilitate greater understanding of the structures,
processes and outcomes of the management of untoward clinical incidents.
> Policy documents from a local and national level have been utilised to generate an
understanding of the framework within which individuals are expected to
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function. Throughout the period over which the study was conducted a number of
policy initiatives were introduced. This resulted in not only an increasing volume
of data sources but a moving target in terms of policy frameworks
r 1 he examination of Fatal Accident Inquiries allowed an exploration of the issues
relating to how unexpected deaths were examined through the legal processes.
These inquiries are not restricted to deaths within health services and therefore
provided useful comparison between health and other systems. The comments
from the presiding sheriffs outlined specific issues in relation to the circumstances
of deaths and whether there were any failures in the system of work which may
have contributed to the death. The sheriffs" opportunity to make comment on
"other relevant facts' also proved to be a useful source of data for wider aspects of
the study, for example the role of the press in creating the atmosphere in which
such events are reported.
r The documentation that has been utilised in managing untoward clinical incidents
has been utilised to understand the nature of the incidents which have been
investigated within the organisation. These have provided a valuable source of
information relating to how incidents have been managed, how many incidents
were managed through this mechanism, who was involved in the incidents as well
as who was involved in their management and some understand as to why
incidents have been managed in the way they were.
r The interviews with those staff involved provided valuable qualitative data on the
perceptions of how well these incidents were managed from the perspective of
individuals who were responsible for managing the process as well as those who
were subject to the investigations.
The final chapter will draw together the themes of the data and develop areas for further
debate and discussion as well as making a number of recommendations to improve the
management of untoward clinical incidents.
Part 3




Within the NHS and amongst the general public there is a growing concern about the
level of clinical incidents. The present policy, political and professionally driven
initiatives seek to minimise the impact of, and wherever possible eliminate the risk of.
clinical incidents. The complexity of delivering healthcare and the human interaction
involved therein, are such that clinical incidents are inevitable and therefore the
management of such incidents must play a central role in a healthcare organisation's
clinical governance strategy. The research study set out to examine how clinical incidents
involving qualified nurses were managed within an organisation. The study had five
distinct phases of data collection and these have been described in Chapters V, VI. VII
and VIII. The findings are drawn from all sections and presented with reference to the
original aims and objectives of the study.
1. HOW ARE UNTOWARD INCIDENTS INVOLVING NURSES MANAGED?
At a national level a number of policies have been introduced in order to ensure that the
management of clinical incidents is improved. These have been driven by initiatives of
the various healthcare professions as well as government departments to ensure
professional practice does not compromise the effectiveness of healthcare interventions.
The analysis of such initiatives demonstrates that some have been more effective than
others in improving the management of errors. This is illustrated b\ the fact that the
establishment of a national recording and reporting mechanism for incidents has yet to
provide any meaningful information in relation to the quantity and type of clinical errors.
The data generated from a pilot scheme undertaken in England and Wales demonstrated a
number of weaknesses in relation to the collation of clinical incident information and
therefore not viewed as carry ing great weight. However, the development of the National
Patient Safety Agency has begun to develop service-wide approaches to the management
of some very high-risk processes (e.g. the storage and use of high-concentration
potassium).
The devolvement of healthcare matters to the Scottish Executive has resulted in differing
approaches within NHS Scotland than those developed in other parts of the United
Kingdom. The formation of NHS Quality Improvement Scotland facilitated the
development of a more integrated approach to the management of risk by bringing
together, under a single organisational structure, the clinical elements of risk (previously
dealt with through the Clinical Standards Board for Scotland (CSBS)) and the non¬
clinical elements of risk (previously dealt with through the Clinical Negligence and Other
Risk Indemnity Scheme (CNORIS)).
One notable difference between these two elements of risk management (i.e. clinical and
non-clinical) was the different assessment processes adopted. The CSBS approach
involved self and peer assessment of standards requiring organisations to provide tangible
evidence of achievement of given criteria within the pre-determined standards. CNORIS
on the other hand adopted an external review process whereby organisations were
assessed by an external body commissioned by the Scottish Executive to assess the
achievement of criteria. There are advantages and disadvantages to both methods of
assessment however it is perhaps the lack of consistency in approach which has attracted
most comment. Since these two bodies have come together under the same assessment
framework a system of peer review has been adopted to evaluate an organisation's ability
to manage clinical and non-clinical risks.
The first report by CSBS relating to the generic standards dealing w ith these areas of risk
concluded that NHS organisations within Scotland had not made the management of risk
a high priority. Unfortunately, the new draft healthcare governance standards against
which NHS Scotland organisations will be evaluated fall short of articulating clearly
achievable standards, a viable monitoring mechanism and a feedback process for the
introduction of improved systems of working. The alterations made to standards and
assessment methods as a result of the amalgamation of the evaluating organisations will
also mean that it will be difficult to identify whether an organisation has improved its risk
management processes from previous assessments. There is little evidence within the
draft governance standards that the available literature regarding incident and error
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management has been referenced in relation to the development of criteria within each
standard statement.
The problem of accurately and consistently defining an untoward incident remains.
Within NHS Scotland there is no recognised system for defining incidents and therefore
there are no accurate data relating to the incidence and prevalence of clinical incidents
overall. Consequently, there is no accurate assessment as to the level and nature of
incidents involving qualified nurses. The literature contains a number of studies, which
attempt to quantify the level and nature of clinical incidents but all acknowledge the
difficulty in determining a more accurate understanding of the problem and identify a
number of reasons for this. There are no studies available, which examine exclusively
incidents involving qualified nurses and therefore the quantity and nature of incidents
seen within this organisation cannot be compared with others.
The difficulties in obtaining a clearer understanding of the number and nature of errors
identified within the literature were reflected within the subject organisation. In the main
these include the fact that errors are not recognised as being errors and therefore cannot
be reported as well as individual clinicians failing to report recognised errors. There was
also evidence that some nurses did not fully understand that all recognised errors should
be reported. Whilst the study ultimately did not examine in detail policies and procedures
from other NHS organisations, the structural organisational changes within the NHS over
the past 15 years had seen a move away from a centralist approach to a more local
devolved managerial approach. This freedom resulted in the adoption of a number of
different processes within different organisations. The more recent move back to a
centralist approach which brings these disparate systems together has served to illustrate
these differences. During the interviews both nurses and managers commented on the
potential difficulties when the organisation became part of a wider, single NHS entity.
The lack of a consistent approach does not allow at either a local or national level the
opportunity to benchmark error rates. The lack of consistency also prevents a national
overview of the errors and their impact.
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Local Policy Development and Implementation
At an individual organisation policy development and implementation level, the
management of clinical incidents has been incorporated into the overall clinical risk
management strategy within the study organisation. Previously, different types of
incidents were managed through different processes. Some were managed as 'accidents'
and managed through a health and safety system. Some were managed as 'clinical
incidents' and managed through the relevant clinical hierarchy. Some were managed as
'incidents' and managed through a local recording and monitoring process. In relation to
clinical incidents involving nurses, these were managed through the nursing management
structure. Within this there was a degree of confusion as to what constituted an 'accident'
and what could be reasonably be described as a 'clinical incident". These apparent
artificial boundaries were recognised and the policy framework was reviewed and altered
to take account of, and rectify these apparent anomalies. The analysis demonstrated that
the policies and procedures were not being rigidly adhered to and this was argued as
demonstrating a flexible application of policy to different situations.
The organisation has developed an incident policy designed to deal with a broad range of
incidents, accidents, near misses and those incidents that require to be reported through
the national health and safety structures (RIDDOR) scheme. The single reporting
structure also required that a standard incident form be used in all cases. This does raise
the question as to whether clinical incidents involving nurses should be managed through
a discrete mechanism. The perceptions from a number of the respondents in the
interviews was that nurses were de facto the only discipline to follow the systems set out
for investigating incidents. Whilst the main comparisons were made in relation to
medical practitioners, comment was also made in relation to allied health professionals.
There was little evidence to suggest that incidents involving nursing staff should be
managed within a discrete process. However, it was reported that it was essential that
nurses lead the process of investigating incidents involving other nurses.
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There is one group of incidents where consideration should be given to having a discrete,
additional process i.e. medication errors. The frequency, nature and complexity of these
errors are such that these would merit a separate process and additional information could
be retrieved and used as part of a feedback mechanism within the organisation to help
improve the management of medicines. This was not evident in the subject organisation
(although some respondents were aware of discussions around this development) and as a
result there was an incomplete picture of the circumstances of the medication errors and
the potential actions to resolve any weaknesses. This was exacerbated by the lack of
involvement of other healthcare professionals whose skills and expertise would add
significant value to the process (e.g. clinical pharmacists)
The sentiments expressed within the subject organisation's policy document were not
reflected consistently in the way incidents are managed. Those who were interviewed did
not feel that the organisation had yet reached a stage where the managerial processes
were 'positive and non-punitive' (the aspiration outlined within the study organisation's
policy). There was recognition that recent changes within the organisation were now
beginning to have an impact in the way these issues were being addressed. These changes
included the adoption of a root cause analysis process and the appointment of a risk
manager who had a specific role in managing the process. Some nurse managers
described approaches to managing incident investigations during the interviews, which
did not match the reality of completed investigations. Where this was evident the
description offered during the interview tended to reflect the statements within the policy
and described a 'positive and non-punitive' approach. The evidence from the nursing
staff and the examination of the outcome of incidents would suggest a negative and
punitive approach. There were examples where this was not the case. At the stage of the
policy implementation it would be difficult to attribute such changes to the new policy or
simply to approaches adopted by individual managers.
Managerial Approach to the Management of Incidents
The policies tend to be used flexibly by those managers who felt comfortable with their
own management style and approach but tended to be interpreted and applied rigidly by
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managers who were less experienced or who had not been involved in managing clinical
incidents previously. There was no attempt within the study to examine the personal or
professional attributes of the individual managers involved in managing the incidents
under investigation. However, nurses who were the subject of the investigative processes
were able to identify traits in managers who adopted particular styles and approaches.
A number of themes emerged from the examination of incidents and interviews.
Managers were more likely to follow a disciplinary process whilst some managers more
likely to follow a 'reflective' / educational process. It was observed by a number of those
interviewed that managers who demonstrated 'traditional nursing officer' traits (i.e. the
approach described by Bassett as the scientific approach to management) were more
likely to follow a disciplinary approach. This managerial group was observed to have
spent most of their career in an acute, general hospital, hierarchical environment. It was
observed that nurse managers with mental health / psychosocial backgrounds were more
likely to follow the reflective / educational process (i.e. a similar approach to that
described by Bassett as the behavioural approach to management.). It was also notable in
some instances where managers described a more behaviourist approach to the
management of incidents but the reality demonstrated, through the documented incidents
and interviews, the application of the scientific approach.
Some managers found the process of undertaking an investigation a difficult one in terms
of being able to find the balance between holding nurses to account for their actions,
supporting them through a traumatic episode and at the same time establishing the cause
of an incident in a non-threatening manner. There was some evidence that managers were
attempting to obtain feedback about the processes in order to improve the management of
the situation. Being able to obtain meaningful feedback in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of an investigation was seen as difficult.
Nurses' Views of the Approaches Adopted
The processes of managing clinical incidents were regarded by those staff subjected to
the investigation as threatening and on occasions were described as hostile. The
perception of nurses remained one in which blame is sought to be attributed to an
individual rather than seeking an understanding of the causes of an incident. There was
ev idence to suggest that some of these perceptions are borne from a feeling of guilt rather
than an overt blame by the organisation. There are some very clear demonstrations of
investigative processes designed to examine the systems of work and processes rather
than concentration on the role an individual has played. These are however very few and
have not been adopted across the organisation. These were also only applied by a specific
manager and did not follow strictly the policy in place at the time. The implementation of
a new policy, which adopted the approach recommended by the National Patient Safety
Agency (NPSA). i.e. root cause analysis, was a significant move towards ensuring that
clinical incident investigation concentrated on processes and systems rather than
individuals.
This approach was very new at the time of the research and those involved in its early
implementation reported that there was a degree of nervousness around its
implementation. Whilst this was acknowledged as being the normal reaction to novel
policies and procedures there remained a perception that this was a managerially driven
process designed to find and apportion blame. This pointed to the fact that no matter what
approach was taken by the organisation it would be perceived by those who were
involved in the incident that the system was designed to find fault. As stated earlier this
may be more related to the feelings of guilt experienced by nurses rather than overt
attempts by the organisation to apportion blame. It may however also be related to the
fact that the organisation continued to have in some cases a disciplinary "investigative"
process alongside this new root cause analysis. It was reported that in some cases there
was confusion around the order in which these processes were conducted i.e. should the
root cause analysis be completed before or after the disciplinary investigation?
During the interviews it was reported consistently that nurses only accept other nurses
undertaking investigations into incidents involving nurses. A number of different
explanations were offered for adopting this view. These included that only nurses would
appreciate the professional issues involved within a given situation and that it was the
duty of the professional to manage and regulate itself and thus maintain self-regulation.
Working in Partnership
Staff organisations were involved in managing clinical incidents, adopting a partnership
approach, in line with national HR strategy. Managers and nurses expressed different
views on the effectiveness of the partnership approach and were able to quote both good
and bad experiences of managing incidents where nursing staff were represented by their
trade unions. One manager described how they had attempted to manage clinical
incidents without the need for the involvement of staff representatives, believing that this
was "better" for both the organisation and the individual member of staff. Whilst they
perceived their motives to be straightforward and "fair', this was not a view shared by-
staff organisations that perceived such actions as trying to "punish" their member without
the "protection' of their representative. Another manager's perception was that staff
organisations' actions resulted in being 'forced' into taking disciplinary action where it
was not merited. This demonstrated that perhaps lip service was being paid to the concept
and principles of partnership working, where the reality was one of mistrust and ulterior
motives. This was balanced by some very clear examples of managers and staff
organisations working together to undertake thorough investigations into clinical
incidents without necessarily concentrating on the role played by individuals but
concentrating more on systems and processes.
Documentary Evidence Available
a\ number of different forms of documentation were utilised in the management of
incidents and were reviewed as part of the study. The research studies explored within the
literature review identified consistently the need to improve the quality of documentation.
This study reaches the same conclusion. The documentation expected by the organisation
to be completed as part of the management of clinical incidents was available in only a
small percentage of the cases reviewed.
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There were considerable inconsistencies in the quality and quantity of the supplementary
documents utilised. For some important parts of the process there were apparently no
documents to demonstrate the process, content and outcome of investigative meetings.
There was a lack of consistency in the terms used even in similar incidents within the
same managerial units. It was evident that the investigations undertaken by not following
the policy produced reports, which were more descriptive in relation to the incident itself,
the process of investigating the incident, its outcome and any agreed actions. The
conclusion from this method would arguably be that where qualified nurses are free to
use less bureaucratic methods of reporting and recording methods in the management of
an investigation, the final reports are richer in terms of quality and quantity of
information. Perhaps more importantly in terms of understanding of the role of systems
as well as the role of individuals, this method was more effective in determining the
source and cause of an incident. In relation to how blame is apportioned this is also an
important feature as it may be that the process and the need to strictly adhere to the
beauracratic documentation are in themselves factors tending to promote the apportioning
blame to individuals inappropriately.
2. Are clinical incidents managed consistently?
There is a perception among the nursing staff that there are inconsistencies in how similar
incidents are managed. A number of variable factors were identified as having an impact
on the management and outcome of a clinical incident. The perceived inconsistencies
were noted both within and between managerial units. The variable factors included the
experience of the manager, the managerial unit, the trade union representation and nature
of the incident. There was also concern expressed that there appeared to be
inconsistencies in the outcome of investigative processes. Recorded outcomes within the
documentation confirm this view.
The evidence from documented incidents and semi-structured interviews suggests that as
well as inconsistencies in procedures there were significant inconsistencies in the
eventual outcome. Once again this was evident within and between managerial units of
the organisation. This was illustrated in particular through medication errors. It, was
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evident that investigations into medication errors had a number of potential outcomes or
combination of outcomes. These might include, no action, disciplinary action (there were
a variety of levels of disciplinary action possible, ranging from an oral warning, through
to dismissal), undertaking a reflective process, additional education and training and
supervised practice. Nurses identified similar medication errors with very different
outcomes e.g. additional education and supervision in one case and severe disciplinary
action and threats to employment in another. Controlled-drug errors tended to be
managed through the disciplinary processes as both clinical nurses and nurse managers
regarded these as more serious errors, irrespective of the outcome to the patient.
Common themes began to emerge in relation to nurses' perceptions of managers and the
likely outcome of incident investigations. It was observed and reported by nurses who
participated in the interviews that inexperienced managers were more likely to follow a
disciplinary route than experienced managers. A consistent finding during the interviews
was that nurses who functioned within a managerial culture using the disciplinary
approach were less likely to report incidents particularly where there has been no obvious
harm to patients; and nurses who functioned within a managerial culture using a
reflective approach were more likely to report incidents irrespective of the outcome.
There is a clear view that doctors are managed very differently as a result of an untoward
clinical incident. Many of the individuals who were interviewed acknowledged that this
was a perception rather than a reality in that, due to the confidential nature of such
investigations, they were not fully aware of the outcome of incidents involving doctors.
There was a widespread perception that the organisation policy for the management of
clinical incidents should apply to all staff but was rarely if ever applied to medical staff.
This adds to the overall view that the nursing hierarchy tends to seek to blame individual
nurses when something goes wrong.
Managers reported that they tried to differentiate how clinical incidents were managed
according to the nature of the incidents. This was illustrated through the way in which
less serious incidents were managed in a less formal manner and were managed utilising
a reflective approach. Mores serious incidents were managed through the investigation
process. There was no consistency however in what was described as a 'minor incident'
and what was regarded as a 'major' incident. This once again left the nursing staff
involved in the incident unclear as to why apparently similar incidents were being
managed differently with different outcomes.
There was an inconsistent approach as to how and whether patients were informed about
a clinical incident or a near miss. Some reported that it was so obvious to the patient that
an error had occurred that not to tell the patient would be counter-productive. Others
described circumstances where it would be difficult for the patient to understand what
had happened. Managers and nurses felt that there was a lack of guidance on the matter
and were even unclear as to who should make the decision as to whether the patient
should be told. The patient's consultant was seen as being the ultimate arbiter on this
decision. This matter being left to individual discretion was felt to lead to an inconsistent
approach.
3. HOW IS THE OUTCOME OF SUCH INVESTIGATIONS USED TO INFORM CLINICAL
NURSING PRACTICE?
There was very little evidence that any lessons learned from the clinical incidents were
shared either within or between managerial units. Where this was evident it was usually
undertaken at a personal and informal level. Some concern was expressed at the ability to
share such information whilst at the same time maintaining the confidential nature of the
incident, its management and the anonymity of the nurses involved. At the same time it
was acknowledged that the organisation's grapevine was very often a vehicle carrying
this information anyway. There are a number ofmethods, which could have been adopted
to ensure that anonymous examples were used to illustrate issues and ensure lessons were
learned. It was clear that there were some fora through which this information could be
filtered. Those involved in the incidents on the whole tended to receive little in the way
of formal feedback.
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It was notable that nurses rarely used the clinical governance framework to explore the
causes of incidents and errors or to use this mechanism to disseminate the lessons learned
from the process. There was a perception that this was in the main a medical mechanism
and that any multi-disciplinary discussions were restricted to patient pathways or specific
problems relating to the processes of delivering healthcare and on some occasions issues
raised through patient complaints.
The documentary evidence suggested that there was little in the way of follow-up to
education, training and supervised practice. Where this was available it was restricted to a
short report from the ward manager indicating that they were satisfied that the individual
involved was competent to undertake a particular process. However, during the
interviews it was reported that the feedback tended to be more formalised and it was
accepted that this type of information was more likely to be recorded within an
individual's personal files rather than in the incident documentation. This data source was
not accessed as part of the research study.
During an investigation, circumstances in mitigation were often used to explain, at least
in part, why an incident might have occurred. Managers reported that these were often
presented no matter how relevent. The most often quoted being a lack of available staff.
It was acknowledged that this may be relevant in a small number of cases however in
many there could have been additional staff around and the incident would probably still
have happened
Systems have been developed to enhance the learning opportunities for individual
members of staff. These include reflective exercises designed to allow the individual
nurse to take some time to reflect on what has happened, how it happened, how it could
be prevented in future and the identification of skills and knowledge gaps. There are
some examples of additional training for nursing staff in policies and procedures relating
to the incident in which they were involved. It was reported that these were effective but
there is little in the way of documented evidence that they had been completed or had
been instrumental in reducing the incidence of errors.
2.36
4. What role does blame play in the process?
It was consistently reported by qualified nurses that senior nurses involved in the
investigation of an incident sought to blame and punish a nurse for their role within an
incident, as opposed to reviewing systems and processes potentially contributing to an
error.
Nursing staff reported that they were aware that other nursing staff are reluctant to come
forward when they had committed an error. The reasons cited all related to the fear of
reprisals which included reduction in professional standing, loss of confidence in the
nurse's ability by managers, disciplinary action, fear of dismissal, permanent record of
incident and impact of future employment prospects. These reflect findings in other
studies reported in the literature review. Despite this view managers interviewed reported
that the use of the documentation relating to incident reporting was being utilised more
effectively previously. However, the majority of those interviewed recognised that errors
were not being reported due the fear of reprisals and the fear of being blamed.
Both managers and nurses reported that a blame free culture was neither realistic nor
desirable. There was recognition by both groups that there were circumstances whereby
individuals should be held to account for their actions or inactions and hence blamed. All
those involved found it difficult to articulate the difference between what some described
as human error" and actions which merited formal action. Both groups recognised this in
relation to nursing and expected that doctors should be managed within a similar system.
It was perceived there was no justification for doctors to be managed differently in
relation to untoward clinical incidents. There were mixed views as to whether the system
adopted by one group was more effective than another. Whilst recognising that there
were differences in the views expressed it was clear that the process adopted by doctors
was too informal, and that adopted by nurses was overly formalised. A balance between
the two was therefore seen as the most appropriate method. The organisation has worked
towards developing a just' culture. This could be expanded as a fair and just culture.
These terms are currently not used within the policy documentation.
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Nurses demonstrated attribution tendencies in both directions. Attribution away from self
to other obscure organisational issues tended to be displayed by more senior nurses (i.e.
charge nurses were more likely to look to organisational issues to which they could
attribute the cause). More junior staff were more likely to attribute the cause of errors to
themselves and accept that they had committed an error. It was reported throughout the
interviews that in this latter case, for the individuals who adopt this approach, the
organisation could not punish the individual more than they were punishing themselves
and disciplinary action was therefore pointless. Often in investigations organisational
issues were presented as mitigating circumstances. There were mixed views as to the
appropriateness of these factors in determining the root cause of the incident.
5. How can Fatal Accident Inquiries assist in the process?
Fatal Accident Inquiries (FAI) were found to be a useful source of information with
regard to providing a considered view as to the cause of death and where there may be
faults in the systems of working which may have contributed to the cause of death. In
particular the sheriffs determination may be helpful in counteracting negative publicity
often generated in these circumstances. The FAIs examined included a number involving
settings other than hospitals although the majority related to deaths which had occurred
within a hospital setting.
It was interesting to note that the sheriff s final determination did not conform to a
standard format. This applied as much to the physical layout of the report as much as to
the way in which an individual sheriff handled each section of the determination. It could
be argued that there is little to be gained from adopting a very strict and uniform
approach to such reports. However, if they are to be useful reports to organisations, an
individual involved and indeed to the families of the person whose death is being
investigated, then it is argued that these could be presented in a consistent and accessible
format. There are six sections, which should be included in the final determination. In
some reports where the sheriff has nothing to determine under a particular section there is
simply no mention of this section. In others the sheriff states that he/she makes no
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determination under that section. In others the sheriff conclude that he/she has not be
asked to determine under certain sections and will therefore make no comment.
The final determination is expected to follow the specific sections detailed earlier and
that does include a section for 'any other relevent facts'. This offers the sheriff an
opportunity to deal with any specific pieces of evidence that do not fall neatly within the
earlier sections. This includes detailed organisational and individual issues and this has
the potential to detract from the principle of fact-finding rather than fault finding as in
reality the sheriff in some instances is pointing to "faults' within organisations and
individuals. Whilst the organisation under investigation had no FAIs relating to them this
section can be particularly useful as a learning opportunity for other organisations as it
was often regarded as 'there but for the grace of God...' That said there was no evidence
from any of the documentation or interviews that issues and / or lessons from FAIs had
been circulated throughout the subject organisation. As stated earlier in particularly high
profile cases there has been mis-representation of issues within certain sections of the
media. In some determinations the sheriff took the opportunity to redress the balance.
This is particularly relevent in cases where reporting contributed to a loss of trust within
individuals and organisations. However, it is also acknowledged that such remarks made
by a sheriff against the commentary are then rarely reported widely if at all.
The final observation in relation to FAIs is that there is no formal mechanism for
addressing any system defects identified during the inquiry. The sheriff may make a
number of recommendations relating to various aspects of individual practice and
systems within organisations and there appears to be an assumption that these will be
addressed by organisations. It is clear that any organisation that failed to address these
points would be placing itself at further risk, however the legal process is then complete
and these is no requirement for an organisation to demonstrate that it has addressed the
issues. The need to "close the loop' in relation to any systematic review is a well-
established principle. In audit processes, it is expected that having identified an issue,
action is taken and the cycle is completed through some form of re-measuring. It is
remarkable that the legal process, dealing with clinical incidents, which have the most
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extreme impact on a patient, has no formal requirement to complete the cycle and ensure
that its findings are accepted and recommendations are implemented. Fatal Accident
Inquiries and the determinations produced as a result of such inquiries are in a position to
take a procedural lead in demonstrating how such investigations could be conducted at an
organisational level in order to establish facts and not fault and that the outcomes must be
used productively to prevent recurrence. The evidence within this research study suggests
this is an opportunity missed. It is suggested therefore that a process of feedback to the
Sheriff Court could be developed, through which organisations must demonstrate that the
systems have been rectified.
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Chapter X
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION AND PROPOSED MODEL
Chapters V-VIII presented the data generated from this study. Chapter IX outlined the
findings drawn from the data and how they related to the available literature. This final
chapter outlines a proposed model to improve the management of clinical incidents and
provides a rationale for the various elements of the model. In the final section of this
chapter the issues that emerged from the findings are explored and suggestions made for
further research in the field.
A ProposedModel
It is clear from the findings that the lack of a consistent approach to the management of
clinical incidents has a significant impact on individual nurses, managerial units and the
organisation as a whole. It is also evident that organisations cannot look to the legal
processes for a lead in relation to best practice around the management of incidents.
Therefore a model for the management of clinical incidents is presented. The model
draws on the work of the NPSA, in devising a nationally recognised methodology for
undertaking a root cause analysis. It also adapts the work undertaken by Merry and
McCall Smith in relation to blame and presents a method of attribution based on the same
principles but removes the negative connotations associated with "blame'. It facilitates an
understanding of the difference between an error and a violation. Finally it directs the
management of the process towards ensuring the organisation reacts appropriately
according to the cause of the incident and ensures the information gleaned and lessons
learned from the incident are fed through the organisation's clinical governance
processes. The model has 5 stages and is titled using the acronym RADAR - Recording,
Analysis. Defining, Attribution and Reaction (This should not be confused with
RIDDOR which is a health and safety reporting mechanism). Whilst this research sought
to examine clinical incidents involving qualified nurses, the issues raised suggest a
common system of managing incidents and that any specific professional nursing issues
arising as a result of an incident can be addressed either within the proposed framework
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or dealt with separately. A diagrammatic representation of the model is provided within
appendix 4
Reporting
Within the literature there was considerable debate in relation to whether incidents and
near misses should be reported using an anonymous process. Evidence from other
industries (for example aviation) would suggest that there are a number of advantages to
an anonymous reporting system and it is suggested that this is the most effective way of
obtaining the relevant information in relation to error management. Within healthcare
there remains a degree of scepticism, from patient and professional groups about the use
of anonymous reporting within health services. However, there are some very effective
and fully evaluated systems within healthcare that have employed successfully an
anonymous format. To this end the model suggests that both methods are included within
the process; an anonymous format for near misses and a non-anonymous format for
actual incidents. Both types of incidents are required to be investigated by the
organisation.
Actual Incidents: These are reported as part of a local recording system or where
appropriate through a national process (e.g. RIDDOR). There is a need to develop a
national system for all clinical errors. This would facilitate a greater understanding as to
the quantity and nature of clinical incidents and would also provide a framework for
benchmarking of error rates and the dissemination of lessons learned across the whole
system. In order to investigate fully the circumstances surrounding an incident it is
important that this system is not an anonymous reporting system.
Near Misses: These should form part of a local recording system and should be an
anonymous reporting system whilst ensuring that sufficient information is gathered in
order to identify the cause and potential impact of a near miss. This information can then
be disseminated throughout the organisation in order that practitioners are aware of a
potential hazard and can prevent a near miss becoming an actual incident sometime in the
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future. This investigation could be undertaken using a modified root cause analysis
method
The findings from the research suggest that the standard documentation provides little
information beyond the basic demographic details required for each incident. The most
informative reports are those that are more descriptive and follow a similar form to a
critical incident technique. The research study also demonstrated that the investigations
involving a physical walk through the process with the appropriate individuals, provided
the clearest explanation of the cause of the errors and was also able to demonstrate the
inter-relationship between the working environment and the individual who must
function within it. By producing investigation reports using this method the process of
analysing the data will be more effective in establishing weaknesses within systems, roles
played by individuals and identifying any actions required to rectify problems and by
whom.
Analysis
The next stage of the process is to undertake an analysis of the information gathered as
part of the reporting mechanism. The perceived inconsistencies reported within the study
suggest that a standard framework for undertaking an investigation is required to identify
the root cause of an incident. The evidence from this study suggests that the more
qualitative data gathered the more effective the action plan to change systems and
improve patient safety. The NPSA method provides an opportunity to review the
antecedents to an incident and identify the causes. The analysis will allow the
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There are 3 main advantages to adopting the NPSA model of root cause analysis; (1) It
assures a consistency of approach within an organisation. (2) It assures a consistency of
approach between different organisations and (3) It enables a full analysis of all factors
contributing to an error
From the analysis, causes relating to organisational issues can be addressed possibly
without further recourse to the roles played by individual members of staff and therefore
ensure the focus of defining the root cause of the problem rather than concentrating on
the role played by individual members of staff. This once again would reflect the findings
in other studies and begin to foster a systems approach rather than a person approach to
error management. It also allows the investigation to identify any specific issues relating
to patients rather than staff and organisation-related aspects. The information glean from
the analysis can then be used to identify an error as opposed to a violation and move into
the next phase of the model.
It was clear from the evidence within the study that another nurse should investigate
incidents involving nurses. It is suggested that an approach should be adopted that does
ensure that nurses are involved in all investigations involving nurses and that this can be
achieved in a number of different ways. The model does not offer any particular method
but suggests that the approach will be determined by the nature of the incident. For
example in a medication error it may be appropriate for the analysis to be undertaken by a
clinical pharmacists with professional support and advice from a nurse. In an incident
examining nursing practice exclusively there may be no need for any other discipline to
be involved.
Defining
This stage allows the investigation team to define the error or violation in relation to the
root cause. By defining these it is possible then to determine the most appropriate action
at both an individual and organisational level. To make this meaningful there needs to be
consistent definition of error and violation. The model presents the definitions outlined
by Mem and McCall Smith as being the most appropriate to be used.
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Error: An error is an unintentional failure in the formulation of a plan by
which it is intended to achieve a goal, or an unintentional departure of a
sequence of mental or physical activities from the sequence planned,
except when such a departure is due to a chance intervention. (Merry &
McCall Smith)
An error can then be categorised as a skill-based error, rule-based error or knowledge-










1. Slips - something is done which was not intended as a result of a failure of
attention. An act of commission. For example a nurse gives a drug to the wrong
patient as a result of being distracted during a medication round.
2. Lapse - something is not done which was intended as a result of a failure of
attention. An act of omission. A nurse does not administer a dispensed medicine
to a patient having been called away to take a telephone call.
3. Technical - a skill-based error, which is distinct from a slip or a lapse. There are
two main factors, which relate to technical skill-based errors in medicine (1)
patient variability (2) practitioner variability. Practitioner variability can relate to
difference between two different practitioners or related to one practitioner but in
different circumstances.
4. Rule-based errors: A failure in the process by which a set of circumstances is
recognised and an appropriate rule applied. Either due to pattern of events is
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incorrectly recognised and matched to an inappropriate rule. Or due to the
application of a wrong or inadequate rule to correctly matched mental schema.
5. Knowledge failures: Those situations where the fault lies with the information
recalled from the individual's internal store of knowledge. This may be due to
either a failure ofmemory or the individual did not have the knowledge.
6. Errors of Judgement: The decision may have produced the desired goal but
didn't. The outcome is a poor guide of quality of decision. The decision should be
called an error only if unsound for example is there a fault in logic or a deficiency
in the information
'Violations: A deliberate - but not necessarily reprehensible - deviation
from those practices appreciated by the individual as being required by
regulation or necessary or advisable to achieve the appropriate objective
while maintaining the safety of people and equipment and the ongoing
operation of a device or system.' (Merry and McCall Smith)
As discussed previously differences between an error and violation relate to the element
of choice. In an error the actor has no choice and in a violation the actor has chosen to
deviate from defined or accepted practice. Throughout the study and within the wider
review of the literature there was an acceptance that, where appropriate, individuals must
be held to account for their actions. Within the context of clinical incidents this
differentiation will allow this to happen. Nurses throughout the study attempted to
identify those incidents for which someone should be held to account and ultimately be
punished. There were attempts to identify how these would be differentiated and factors
would include the outcome (for the patient), whether controlled drugs were involved and
whether the individual member of staff was able to appreciate what had happened and the
actual and potential consequences of their actions or inactions. There was some difficulty
in being able to apply these without the outward perception that there was an
inconsistency in approach. The proposed model allows these to be clearly defined and to
maintain a consistent approach across different types of clinical incidents.
Whilst the research did not attempt to seek the views of patients within the literature it is
clear that there is an expectation by patients and their representatives that individual
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practitioners should be held to account for their actions. It was also clear that the culture
of wholesale blame was not a reasonable culture and that a balance should be achieved. It
is suggested that the proposed model in being able to differentiate between an error and
violation as well as being able to identify the root cause(s) would offer then an
opportunity to provide them with a fuller explanation of what happened, the cause of the
error and the planned actions to rectify any problems.
Attribution
The fourth stage of the process involves attribution of cause. It is suggested that the levels
of blame outlined by Merry and McCall Smith are adapted for this purpose although the
term blame is removed for two main reasons. Firstly, the term has very negative
connotations and the avoidance of its use will go some way to removing some of the
negativity that accompanies clinical incident management and as a result encourage
individual practitioners to report incidents. It is suggested that this may remove one of the
barriers to practitioners reporting incidents. The second reason is that the definitions
outlined by Merry and McCall Smith relate in the main to the technical definition of
blame as applied by the law, which do not fully translate into situations managed within
an organisational rather legal context. The suggested term is attribution rather than blame.
The proposed five levels of attribution are defined in table 12
Table 12: Levels and Definitions of Attribution Adapted from Merry and
McCall Smith's Levels of Blame
Level Definition
1 Attribution is to the causal effect where an individual may be the physical
cause of the effect but has acted reasonably has broken no rules and has
done nothing wrong in moral terms
Z. Attribution is to a failure to achieve the theoretical norm i.e. this is a
deviation from what would be described within a textbook.
J Attribution is to a failure to achieve the empiric norm i.e. this is a
deviation from what would be recognised as current practice within the
field
4 Attribution is to a course of action knowing the existence of risk and may
be described as reckless
5 Attribution is an unambiguous intention to cause harm.
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Reaction
The final stage of the process is the organisation's reaction to the attribution. At this stage
the information generated from the previous stages can be used to inform how the
organisation will react to a given situation. The reactions will be related to the root cause
and attribution and will be focussed on either the organisation's working systems or
where appropriate on the conduct or capability of individual practitioners. This
acknowledges that there are incidents that individuals have contributed to as opposed to a
flawed system of work. It also acknowledges that the role the individual played is related
to either their conduct or their capability. As such where an incident has occurred as a
result of someone's conduct there can be appropriate measures taken. If however there
are issues relating to capability these can be addressed in an appropriate albeit in a
different way from conduct. The levels and types of reactions as outlined within table 13.
Table 13: Levels and Definitions of Reactions
Level Definition
A A review of the organisation's systems and may have implications wider
than the organisation.
B A review of the current literature in order to understand the current
theoretical thinking.
C A review of current practice. Additional education / supervision for the
staff involved.
D A review of the individual's actions, which will determine whether the
issue is one of conduct or capability.
E A review of the individual's conduct and referral to appropriate
authorities.
The outcome of the above should then be included in an anonymous format within the
organisation's clinical governance framework. This will facilitate the dissemination of
lessons learned to all parts of the organisations as well as ensuring that any changes to
systems as a result of the outcome can be shared to prevent recurrence.
In this model it is recognised that errors are an inevitable part of the delivery of
healthcare. It determines the root cause(s) of the incident using a system divorced from
the disciplinary process. It describes and categorises the types of errors as outlined within
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the literature relating to the theory of errors and their management. It directly relates
these types of errors to an appropriate level of attribution, which in turn determines the
relevant course of action. This may on occasions result in blame being directly
attributable to individuals but more importantly it will direct the organisation to
weaknesses within its systems and processes and as such identify where action needs to
be concentrated if the incident is to be prevented from recurring.
It must be recognised that the proposed model is not indented to be prescriptive. It is not
intended to be a substitute for the professional and analytical processes employed by
nurse managers during investigations, it is indented to be a framework within which such
managerial actions can be undertaken. The wide variation in the type of incidents as
demonstrated within the study organisation, means that it would be very difficulty, and
arguably counter productive, to have a model which would be able to cover all potential
incidents. The model also recognises that each incident will have unique elements that
would not necessarily fall within the model and therefore must be managed by the
expertise of the individual manager.
The rationale for this model is now explored taking into account the conclusions drawn
from the data generated within the study and the themes that emerged from the literature
review.
Nursing Approach toManaging Incidents
The concerns of how nurses are managed in relation to clinical incidents within the
literature are reflected in the findings of this study. Although there is limited information
within the literature specifically in relation to nurses, the study concludes that the lived
experiences of nurses and managers within the study reflect many of the issues raised
within previous research. This would lead one to believe that there are qualities within
nurses and nursing, which influence this approach. In the literature review the research
examined some of the history of nursing and its relationship with other disciplines, in
particular medicine. It concluded that the development of nursing is closely linked with
the social changes experienced by women throughout the same period. However, the
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development of the nursing professions has resulted in nursing moving away from its
dependence on medicine therefore there can be little scope for attributing some of these
issues to the patriarchal role played by medicine over nursing. The review also outlined
some of the arguments relating to the view that nursing and women's issues were linked
to the exclusion of any impact on men's issues either in society or within nursing itself.
The conclusion is therefore that nursing practice and management continues to be
influenced by its militaristic and religious origins. This is not to argue that nursing
practice has a military or religious basis but that there are traits relating to hierarchy,
strict adherence to rules and regulations and the maintenance of a clear order, are
characteristics that remain despite the changes which nursing has seen.
Nurses involved with Clinical Incidents
The nurses within the cohort of interviewees had a wide range of experience and
backgrounds. There was a mix of newly qualified staff as well as more senior staff who
had been qualified for a considerable number of years. The experiences of nurses varied
considerably and there are a number of factors contributing to these experiences. Whilst
the main aim of the research was to explore the issues of blame one further concept began
to emerge from the data - guilt. Individuals expressed that they were being blamed for
what happened by the organisation and many did express this as the organisation rather
than individuals or specific roles. It is therefore suggested that the emotions expressed as
being blamed could be more related to a feeling of guilt, therefore deflecting the cause of
negative emotions away from themselves onto a faceless organisation. The guilt may be
derived from the fact that the nurse actually or potentially harmed a patient, or that they
had compromised their personal or professional standards. This would not hold true for
those individuals who did not recognise the implications of their actions.
This however does not detract from individuals with the relevant authority to punish
people as a result of an error. It is suggested through this research that the problem lies in
not being able to differentiate between what constitutes an error and what constitutes a
violation. The differentiating factor between error and violation, as defined by Reason, or
Merry and McCall Smith, is intent, or more accurately choice. Intent has a very specific
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meaning within the law and there is the potential to take a literal meaning of intent from a
legal perspective. Errors are by definition unintentional and violations are intended in that
the actor is aware that their actions are contrary to what is expected of them. In
understanding these definitions in light of the information gathered throughout this
research it is suggested that one way of improving the management of untoward clinical
incidents is to differentiate between what is an error and what is a violation. This allows
there to be a clear definition of how these should be handled. When this is combined with
the levels of blame which are suggested by Merry & McCall Smith then the development
of an algorithm provides some guidance to all those involved as a means of
understanding what has gone wrong, why it has gone wrong and what would be suitable
actions as a result.
The study demonstrated through the experiences of those involved (either as an
investigator or as someone who has been the subject of investigation), that nurses tend to
take a punitive approach to the management of untoward clinical incidents. This was
coupled with a lack of consistency in how errors were managed. This applied to similar
errors both within and between managerial units within the organisation, and is despite
working within the same policy framework.
In order to improve the management of untoward clinical incidents involving qualified
nurses there is a need to alter radically the approach being taken by organisations. The
subject organisation has taken some steps in order to improve the structures and
processes, however there is little evidence of changes in outcome, which in turn has not
improved the overall perceived culture within the organisation. This would appear to
continue to suspect that nurses will be pursued and blamed for untoward clinical
incidents. In order to achieve the changes required there is a need to utilise the current
literature in relation to the theory of error; the apportioning of blame; the need to
disseminate the lessons learned from incidents and to emulate those industries successful
in implementing effective reporting mechanisms.
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Additional Research.
It is suggested that further research could be undertaken as outlined in the original aims
of this project i.e. involving more that a single subject organisation. This would allow not
only a comparative study to be completed but also to widen the range of individual nurses
who may have been prepared to take part in the study. Whilst it is acknowledged that the
there is nothing to suggest that the individual nurses and the organisation involved within
this study were atypical, this could be affirmed through further research studies
examining the same subject matter.
One of the key issues that emerged during the study was the contrasting approach
adopted by different clinical disciplines in the management of incidents, in particular the
difference between doctors and nurses. This was reinforced by comments made by
doctors to the researcher during discussions usually following a general enquiry as to the
nature of the research. It is therefore suggested that a further study could be undertaken to
examine the nature of such differences and indeed to establish whether this perception
could be proven through empirical data.
Having developed a model for the management of clinical incidents some further
research would be beneficial to evaluate its effectiveness. In particular it would be
important to examine whether the implementation of the model manages some of the
issues that emerged from the data generated from the subject organisation and the
interviewees. The model aims to provide a framework within which clinical incidents are
managed fairly and consistently, where the true root causes can be identified and
appropriately attributed and where the organisation can react to obviate the causes and to
ensure learned lessons are disseminated throughout an organisation. Any analysis of the
model's effectives should be concentrated around these aims. A further research study




There is a great deal of rhetoric at a strategic policy level in relation to improving the
NHS's management of clinical incidents. The study suggests that such initiatives are
having a limited impact at an organisational level and almost no impact at an individual
level. For example, the call for a blame free culture (no matter how inappropriate that
may be perceived to be) is not something that is facilitated by organisations and not
something which individual practitioners involved in clinical incidents have experienced
in relation to nursing. Even if we accept that the terminology is inappropriate, the
sentiment of adopting a system whereby incidents are reported and managed within an
open and just culture, has equally failed to become part of organisational culture.
Arguably this will only become part of an organisation's culture when it is compelled to
adopt such an approach. One way of achieving this is through the standards set for the
service. In Scotland this is through the NHS Quality Improvement Scotland's processes.
At the time of the study this was through the draft clinical governance standards. Whilst it
is accepted that at the time of the study they were in a draft format, there are a number of
other initiatives that could have informed their development (including the predecessor
CSBS standards, CNORIS standards and the NPSA systems) but these appear to have had
little influence on their development. The adoption of RADAR as a model for managing
clinical incidents would make a significant contribution to changing an organisational
culture away from one of blame more towards one of based on justness and fairness.
Given that one of the significant deficiencies reported within the literature is a lack of a
robust method of reporting and recording such incidents; it is suggested that a system,
which includes all four elements of the NHS in the UK, would appear to be appropriate in
order to achieve such a goal. It seems that to lose the opportunity for the relevant health
departments to collaborate in managing this issue will result in a further number of years
whereby the information relating to the number and type of incidents within the UK NHS
remains incomplete. The solution seems relatively straightforward. The Scottish
Executive should collaborate with the Department of Health in England and the NPSA to
refine the work already undertaken in order to correct some of the anomalies identified
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through the pilot sites and to establish a (truly) national framework for the recording,
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PhD - Management of Untoward Clinical Incidents
Firstly, can I introduce myself. My name is James Miller. 1 have worked within the NHS
for 20 years and I am currently undertaking a PhD at the University of Edinburgh. The
subject area of my study is the management of untoward clinical incidents involving
qualified nurses. The aim of the project is to examine how these incidents are managed
and to establish whether those involved feel that the process undertaken and the outcome
was 'fair". In particular I am interested to examine the concept of blame in such
situations.
1 have obtained permission from the Trust to examine the management records relating to
incidents and the local ethics committee has decided that ethical approval is not required
for this study.
I am writing to you to ask whether you would be prepared to be involved in this research
project. Your involvement in the project is entirely voluntary. If you would prefer not to
be involved then I would be grateful if you could return the enclosed form, which will
also help with the study.
If you would be prepared to be involved, the next stage will be a short interview with
myself at a time and place, which is convenient for yourself.
There are no other researchers involved in the study and no-one from your trust will see
the data collected. The detail ofmy supervisors is contained within the information sheet
enclosed. All reports will be anonymous in the final dissertation and even the names of
the Trust will not be included. Therefore, complete anonymity is assured.
I do hope you feel that you will be able to take part in this study. If so then please
complete the enclosed form and return to myself. If you would like any further
information or would like to clarify any issues then please do not hesitate in contacting
me at any of the telephone / e mail addresses which are contained on the information
sheet enclosed.
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This information sheet is designed to provide some basic details of a
current PhD study.








An Investigation into the Management and Outcome of Untoward Clinical Incidents,
Which Involve Qualified Nurses Within and Between Two National Health Service
Trusts.
INTRODUCTION
The subject area proposed for investigation is the management of clinical incidents,
which involve nurses, and in particular how outcome of the investigative process ios
determined. The proposed research has both a professional nursing and a medico-legal
perspective. The wider area of study involves clinical risk management clinical
governance, which is currently exercising the minds of both managers and clinical staff
within the National Health Service (NHS).
There have been a number of studies, which have looked at the management of clinical
incidents involving medical staff but there has been little work undertaken in relation to
nursing. A number of very high profile cases, which have involved fatalities, have
resulted in considerable interest from the general public. Much of the interest is based on
who is to blame when something goes wrong within a hospital.
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Questions You May Have
Why me?
A number of staff are being approached who may be prepared to discuss issues relating to
the management of clinical incidents
What does it involve?
You will be asked to take part in an interview, which will be conducted by James Miller.
If you agree, the interview will be recorded (audio only). The tapes and notes from the
meeting will be destroyed after the study is complete.
How long w ill it take?
No longer than one hour.
Who will be involved?
James Miller will be the only person involved in the interview and the collation of the
data. No one else has access to this information
Where and when will it take place?
At a time and place which is convenient to yourself.
Is participation voluntary?
Yes. You can withdraw from the process at any time.
Will my manager know 1 am taking part?
No-one will know except the researcher and anyone else you choose to tell.
Will my name appear in the report?
No. All names including that of the Trusts involved will be changed to assure anonymity.
Supervision
The researcher is supervised by Professor of Nursing Studies (Professor K Melia) and the
Professor of Law (Professor R A MacCall-Smith).
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Appendix 2
Consent Form
Management of Untoward Clinical Incidents
Please return this form in the envelope provided.





Please identify by tick which method ofcontact you would prefer.
□ I would prefer not to take part in the study.
Please provide a brief explanation for preferring not to take part.
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Identify Error or Violation
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